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Abstract 
 
    Why, during an ethnic conflict, would an ethnic group turn its weapons against itself?  That is 
the question that motivates this dissertation.  Such behavior is puzzling because as an ethnic 
group devotes valuable time, energy, and resources on an intra-group conflict, it reduces the total 
amount of resources the group can draw on to wage the ethnic conflict.  Unfortunately, the ethnic 
conflict literature provides few answers to the puzzle of infighting during ethnic conflict because 
the ethnic conflict literature generally assumes that ethnic violence increases ethnic cohesion.  I 
examine that assumption in detail, and find it both theoretically and empirically flawed.   
    Instead, I argue that both at the factional level and at the individual level, ethnic violence 
creates incentives and opportunities for fragmentation, and the ethnic leadership then engages in 
infighting to counter this pressure.  I test the theory using both large-n statistical analyses, as well 
as process tracing and case studies.  Both empirical analyses provide evidence to support the 
theory, challenging the claim that ethnic violence increases ethnic cohesion.  Ultimately, I 
conclude that infighting during ethnic conflict is the irrational macro-level outcome of rational 
micro-level choices. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 
 
    Why, during an ethnic conflict, would an ethnic group turn its weapons against itself?  That is 
the question that motivates this dissertation.  Such behavior is puzzling because as an ethnic 
group devotes valuable time, energy, and resources on an intra-group conflict, it reduces the total 
amount of resources the group can draw on to wage the ethnic conflict.  Instead of focusing 
attention and resources on fighting the opponent, ethnic leaders turn their weapons on the very 
group in whose name they are supposedly fighting.   
    In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the causes and consequences of combatant 
fragmentation.
1
  However in the ethnic conflict literature, infighting during ethnic violence is not 
seen as problematic.  This is because much of the ethnic conflict literature continues to assume 
that the external pressures generated by ethnic violence will ‗harden‘ ethnic boundaries and 
make ethnic groups more cohesive.  This assumption, though, has been challenged by a steady 
stream of empirical evidence from places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where the effect of 
violence on ethnicity has not been so simple.  These conflicts have instead been characterized by 
a shifting landscape of sub-group actors, clan and tribal loyalties, and malleable allegiances.  In 
these conflicts, ethnic violence did not produce group cohesion.  Instead, these regions have seen 
the puzzling phenomenon of infighting during ethnic conflict.   
     In Iraq, for example, the three main ethnic groups (Shia, Sunni, and Kurds) have been 
engaged in a national power struggle.  At the same time, though, there has also been a significant 
amount of infighting within each of these groups.  For example, from 2004-06 two rival militia 
groups within the Shia camp, the Mahdi Army and Badr Organization, violently clashed in 
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 The February 2012 issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution is devoted to the problem of combatant 
fragmentation. 
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several cities throughout Iraq.  Among Sunnis, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Sunni nationalist 
insurgents fought over smuggling routes and leadership positions (Staniland 2012).  Among 
Kurds, bloody clashes occurred between the separatist groups, PUK and KDP, and the recently 
created Islamic fundamentalist group, Ansar al-Islam.  
    We see a similar pattern in Afghanistan, where the Tajik-led Northern Alliance opposed the 
Pashtun-led Taliban.  Since the fall of the Taliban, though, there has also been a national power 
struggle between the Taliban and the government of Hamid Karzai.  However both the Taliban 
and Karzai are part of the same Pashtun ethnic group.  Furthermore, the Taliban have also used 
violence against their own members.  In recent years, the Taliban used terrorism against senior 
leaders who engaged in negotiations with the Karzai government (Nelson and Farmer 2012).  In 
2010, Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, made infighting an official policy by issuing a 
directive ordering field commanders to capture and kill ‗collaborators,‘ which Omar broadly 
defined as any Afghan who helped NATO forces (Al Jazeera 2010). 
    During an ethnic conflict, why would an ethnic group turn its weapons against itself?  Why 
would an ethnic group waste valuable energy and resources on infighting during an ethnic 
conflict?  That is the puzzle that this dissertation seeks to solve. 
 
1.1  Background of the Study 
    Today, the most frequent form of organized political violence takes place within states, rather 
than between states.  According to the Correlates of War dataset, between 1816 and 2007 there 
have been 655 wars.  Of these, 95 have been inter-state wars, 163 have been extra-state wars 
(between a state and a non-state actor), 335 have been intra-state wars (within the boundaries of 
a state), and 62 were non-state wars (between two non-state actors).  The percentage of intra-
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state wars has also steadily increased over time.  Between 1997 and 2006, almost 75% of new 
war onsets have been intra-state wars (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).   
    Ethnicity has played a role in many of these conflicts.  According to one study, of the 127 civil 
wars fought since 1945, almost two-thirds involved some form of ethnic violence (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003).  Toft (2005:3) goes even further: 
Today, nearly two-thirds of all armed conflicts include an ethnic component.  Ethnic 
conflicts are almost twice as likely to break out as fights over governmental control and 
four times more likely than interstate wars…The number and intensity of ethnic conflicts 
across the globe directly and indirectly threaten the lives of millions.       
 
    Scholars who study ethnic violence have devoted much time and effort to studying the 
complex impact of ethnicity on violence.  These studies have looked at issues as diverse as the 
impact of ethnicity on civil war (Collier and Hoeffle 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), the impact 
of ethnicity on democratic stability (Snyder 2000; Chua 2003), and the impact of ethnicity on 
terrorism, to name just a few examples.  In recent years, a constructivist moment within the 
ethnic conflict literature has emerged, and has urged scholars to reverse the causal arrow in order 
to study the impact of diverse forces on ethnicity (Chandra 2012).     
    However with a few notable exceptions, when looking at the impact of violence on ethnicity 
the academic literature generally continues to assume that violence ‗hardens‘ ethnic boundaries.  
This assumption, though, makes it impossible to explain the puzzle of infighting during an ethnic 
conflict.  If ethnic violence hardens ethnic boundaries, how can we explain infighting during an 
ethnic conflict?   
    If we look to the civil conflict literature, we find growing evidence to support the prevalence 
of combatant fragmentation during civil war.  Since 1989 combatant fragmentation has occurred 
in approximately 44% of civil wars, with fragmentation occurring more than once in many 
conflicts, and with splits clustering toward the beginning and end of the conflict (Findley and 
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Rudloff Forthcoming).  Ethnic conflicts, though, are assumed to follow a different dynamic 
because ethnicity is one of the strongest bonds that can unite a group of people.  In ethnic 
conflicts, it is argued, violence causes ethnic groups to unite, not fragment.   
    In contrast, I find that similar to civil conflicts, ethnic violence does indeed cause ethnic 
groups to fragment.  In this dissertation, I show that (1) contrary to the common wisdom, ethnic 
violence exerts an external pressure on ethnic groups that can encourage infighting rather than 
cohesion, and (2) variation in outcome (whether ethnic conflict leads to infighting or cohesion) 
can in large part be explained by the intensity of ethnic violence:  The greater the ethnic 
violence, the greater the external pressure for infighting.  Infighting during ethnic conflict, I 
ultimately argue, is the irrational macro-level outcome of rational micro-level choices.  
  
1.2  Theoretical Explanation 
    Why, during an ethnic conflict, would an ethnic group turn its weapons against itself?  What 
causes infighting during an ethnic conflict?  This dissertation argues that both at the factional 
level and at the individual level, ethnic violence creates incentives and opportunities for 
fragmentation.  Fragmentation, though, does not always lead to violence since differences can be 
settled non-violently through negotiation and compromise.  However as the intensity of ethnic 
violence increases, ethnic violence actually creates a pressure that pushes the ethnic group 
toward violent infighting.   
    First, at the factional level, ethnic violence encourages fragmentation by providing incentives 
and opportunities to challenge the ethnic leadership.  Incentives to challenge the leadership can 
certainly exist prior to the outbreak of ethnic violence, however existing theories assume that the 
outbreak of ethnic violence then encourages the ethnic group to overlook these differences and 
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unite against a common threat.  Instead, I find that ethnic violence actually creates new areas of 
contention such as the type of strategy (terrorism vs. non-violence) the ethnic group should 
employ against its opponent.  By placing new issues on the table, ethnic violence provides 
factions with more reasons and opportunities to contest the current leadership.   
    As the level of ethnic violence increases, ethnic violence pushes the ethnic group toward 
violent infighting for at least two reasons.  First, intense ethnic violence lowers the cost and 
increases the benefits of infighting by eroding institutions that maintain law and order, such as 
police forces, and by eroding non-violent pathways toward regime change, such as elections.  
Second, intense ethnic violence increases the cost of bargaining and negotiation.  As the 
casualties from ethnic violence begin to mount, rivals begin to fear for their survival.  The threat 
to their survival increases the costs of a time-consuming bargaining process, and makes the 
efficiency of violence a more attractive option.       
    At the individual level, ethnic violence encourages fragmentation by providing group 
members with incentives and opportunities to collaborate with ethnic rivals.  The rival ethnic 
group might, for example, offer rewards or reduce penalties for collaborators.  During an ethnic 
conflict, the prison system offers an excellent opportunity to gather information and recruit new 
collaborators.   
    As the level of ethnic violence increases, ethnic violence pushes the group toward violent 
infighting because increased ethnic violence also increases the threat collaboration poses to the 
leadership.  Since the leadership cannot know the identity of collaborators, they instead respond 
to the increased threat by using demonstrative violence against suspected collaborators in order 
to generate fear in all group members, deter further collaboration, and ensure group cohesion.   
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This theory can be modeled by the following diagram: 
 
   
Figure 1.1 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3   Significance of the Study  
    In this dissertation, I hope to offer contributions both to the scholarly literature and to public 
policy.  The study hopes to contribute to the scholarly literature in three ways.  First, the 
dissertation addresses an important gap in the new fragmentation literature by examining the 
effect of different forms of violence on intra-group dynamics.  Second, the study challenges both 
the claim that violence increases fragmentation and the claim that violence increases cohesion.  
Instead, the dissertation finds that violence can lead to a variety of outcomes.  While ethnic 
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violence increases fragmentation, ethnic leaders can then use intra-group violence to counter this 
pressure by policing boundaries and increasing group cohesion.  Finally, the dissertation 
demonstrates the valuable insights that can be gained by disaggregating the ethnic group in order 
to explore the shifting loyalties and tensions that characterize intra-group dynamics. 
    This study hopes to contribute to public policy in two ways.  First, the study challenges early 
theories which claimed that violence hardened ethnic boundaries.  This assumption underlies 
policy recommendations such as partition as the solution to ethnic conflict (Kaufmann 1996; 
Kaufmann 1998; Muller 2008).  Partition theory is based on belief that differences between 
people are a source of conflict, and that by sorting people into groups based on ethnicity we can 
eliminate differences and therefore eliminate conflict.  However such arguments are flawed 
because people have multiple identities (such as religion, caste, race, class, gender, occupation, 
and so forth) and so sorting people into groups based on one identity will not eliminate 
differences due to other identities.  In fact, this dissertation finds that the reason why ethnic 
violence leads to infighting is precisely because ethnic violence can activate alternate identities 
within an ethnic group.  Within an ethnically homogeneous group, for example, ethnic violence 
can activate tribal or clan differences.  By examining infighting within an ethnically homogenous 
group, this dissertation hopes to show that partition by itself is not a solution to the problem of 
organized violence.   
    Second, when faced with wide-spread violence which cannot be explained using readily 
available theories, there is sometimes an unfortunate tendency to dismiss the perpetrators of 
violence as ‗irrational‘, or to attribute their behavior to a ‗culture of violence‘.  This leads to the 
policy conclusion that external efforts at conflict resolution are futile.  I hope to counter this 
tendency by trying to make sense of what seems, on the surface, as senseless behavior.  Why 
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would a group attack itself during an ethnic conflict?  This dissertation argues that such behavior 
is not irrational.  Instead, the perpetrators of violence are responding to opportunities and 
incentives for fragmentation created by the ethnic violence itself.  The ethnic leadership counters 
this pressure for fragmentation and restores group cohesion through the use of intra-group 
violence.  I therefore find that there is indeed a logic to infighting, and by studying this logic and 
its impact on intra-group dynamics, external efforts at conflict resolution may indeed be possible. 
 
1.4  Definition of Key Terms 
    Concepts such as ‗ethnicity‘ are sometimes difficult to study because they have such a wide 
variety of meanings.  In the following section, I take three concepts which appear frequently in 
the following analysis, and explain how they are defined for the purposes of this study:  (1) 
ethnicity, (2) ethnic boundaries, and (3) group fragmentation.  
 
1.4.1  Ethnicity 
    Irrespective of whether a person desires an ethnic identity or not, everyone is assigned to an 
ethnic group.  ―Trying to imagine a person without an ethnicity (or several of them) is like trying 
to imagine one without a heart, lungs, or other vital organ‖ (Arnold 2009:4).  But what exactly is 
ethnicity?  How many ethnic identities do people have?  Can ethnicity change, and if so, how?    
There are two main schools of thought on these matters:  constructivism and primordialism.   
 
Constructivism 
    According to constructivism, ethnicity is not a biologically given characteristic, but is instead 
a socially constructed category (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Laitin 1986).  Recent 
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constructivist works have focused on demonstrating that several ‗ancient‘ ethnic identities are 
actually fairly new constructions.  As recently as 1870, one author argues, most rural and small-
town dwellers in France did not see themselves as French.  For the majority of people living in 
France at that time, identities often did not stretch beyond the village or valley (Weber 1976).  
Similarly, the modern Englishman is constructed from Celtic Briton, Germanic Angle, Saxon, 
Jute, Dane, and Norman (Conner 2004).  In precolonial Rwanda, ‗Tutsi‘ and ‗Hutu‘ actually 
referred to a porous class division (Fearon and Laitin 2000), and in Sudan, the Arab Sudanese are 
actually ethnic Africans who adopted the Arab culture.   
   Constructivists also argue that individuals can have more than one ethnic identity, and that 
these identities can shift and change over time (Brewer 1999).  Constructivist literature has 
identified several processes that can cause ethnicity to change, including broad historical 
processes such as the rise of literacy and print vernacular (Anderson 1991), economic 
modernization (Gellner 1983; Newman 1991), or colonialism (Horowitz 1985; Laitin 1986).  
Ethnicity can also change when individuals move between social situations:    
...ethnic identity is a composite of the view one has of oneself as well as the views held 
by others about one‘s ethnic identity.  As the individual (or group) moves through daily 
life, ethnicity can change according to variations in the situations and audiences 
encountered (Nagel 1994:154).       
 
    Since ethnicity is malleable, it is also subject to manipulation.  Constructivist theories have 
examined the ability of ethnic entrepreneurs to manipulate ethnic relations in places as diverse as 
Yugoslavia (Gagnon 1995), Burundi and Rwanda (Uvin 1999), and India (Brass 2003).  In a 
collection of essays on ethnicity and nationalism, Brass (1991:8) explains why elites can 
manipulate ethnicity: 
…ethnicity and nationalism are not ‗givens,‘ but are social and political constructions. 
They are creations of elites, who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials 
from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being 
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or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for 
themselves. 
 
In modern social science, constructivist approaches have come to dominate the study of 
ethnicity. 
 
Primordialism 
    Primordialism, in contrast, assumes that ethnicity has biological or genetic foundations.  
Individuals have only one ethnic identity which is fixed and cannot be easily changed.  Although 
constructivism has become the dominant approach toward ethnicity among social scientists, it is 
nevertheless important to acknowledge the continuing importance of primordialism in both the 
social and biological sciences.   
    Primordialism is still relevant to the social sciences because social scientists often use 
primordialist assumptions to create ethnic datasets, such as the commonly used Index of 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF).  The ELF index is calculated using a formula that 
assumes each person in society belongs to only one ethnic group, and that ethnic categories are 
mutually exclusive (Chandra 2009).  Because of this, the conclusions of many quantitative 
studies are actually based on implicit primordialist assumptions (Chandra 2012; Chandra 2009).
2
 
    Primordialism has also seen an interesting resurgence in the biological sciences.  As Morning 
(2009:1168-1169) writes: 
Consider for example the forensic convention of identifying human remains or crime 
specimens by race; such efforts would be nonsensical were they not supported by the 
belief that racial identity is embedded in the human body.... The claim that races are 
genetically distinct groups is not only enjoying a scientific renaissance, but is also being 
conveyed through new products and services such as genetic genealogy tests that claim to 
identify individuals‘ racial ancestry, race-targeted pharmaceuticals and even vitamins. 
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Some scholars have developed or are currently developing quantitative datasets which incorporate constructivist 
assumptions.  These new datasets include the Index of Institutionalized Ethnicity (IEI) (Lieberman and Singh 2008), 
ECI (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008), and EVOTE (Chandra 2009). 
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    The field of medicine also often links ethnicity to health.
3
  During pregnancy, certain blood 
tests for genetic abnormalities, such as the test for cystic fibrosis, generate probabilities partly 
based on one‘s ethnic background.  Because of this, Morning (2011:3) challenges purely 
constructivist interpretation of race when she asks, ―What kind of phenomenon [is] race that it 
could be linked to blood, genes, and illness?‖  
 
A Middle Ground between Constructivism and Primordialism? 
    In 2001/2, the sociologist Ann Morning interviewed 40 biology and anthropology professors 
about their views on race.  She found that none could be classified either as pure constructivists 
or as pure primordialists: 
None took the extreme view that is sometimes attributed to constructionists—namely, 
that there is ―no difference‖ between any two human beings. Nor did anyone believe the 
old essentialist view that there are clear cut, sharply-defined discrete race groups, all of 
whose members share some trait (or traits) that no members of other races share 
(Morning 2006). 
 
    An alternative to constructivism and primordialism is to view ethnicity as both constructed 
and primordial.  It is clear that people are different, both in genetics and phenotype, and that 
these differences matter in terms of factors such as disease prevalence.  The question of how we 
should group these differences, and the normative meanings that are attributed to those 
differences, is cultural and contingent.  Human beings vary in their genetic makeup and physical 
appearance, but which of those differences should we use to categorize people into separate 
groups: skin color, hair color, height, or eye shape?  How much difference constitutes a racial 
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 The difference between race and ethnicity is an interesting topic.  One common way to differentiate between race 
and ethnicity is by arguing that race refers to categories based on physical differences, while ethnicity refers to 
categories based on cultural differences (such as language or religion) (Morning 2011).  In practice, though, ethnic 
differences often tend to have a biological, or heritable, component.  Some scholars have even defined ethnicity as a 
heritable quality (Chandra 2006).  Similarly, race often means more than biology and encompasses social and 
political differences (Morning 2006).  For these reasons, I do not differentiate between ethnicity and race in this 
dissertation. 
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difference?  While one form of categorization might be used in a particular time and place, the 
categories could very well shift in another time and place: 
In short, while human biological variation certainly seems to be real, the ways that we cut 
it up, name and describe it are the product of our scientific imagination (Morning 2006).
4
 
 
1.4.2  Hardened Ethnic Boundaries 
    A second concept that appears frequently in this dissertation is the concept of a ‗hardened 
ethnic boundary‘.  According to early scholars, violence produced hardened ethnic boundaries, 
but what exactly does that mean?  Later in Chapter 2, I examine the ethnic conflict literature and 
conclude that scholars use that term to mean three very different things.  In the literature, a 
‗hardened‘ ethnic boundary can mean either: (1) increased loyalty to one‘s own ethnic group, (2) 
greater hostility between ethnic groups, or (3) the external imposition of ethnicity.  However 
there is a fourth, more subtle way in which ethnic boundaries can be incrementally hardened in 
the absence of violence: through the ethnification of ordinary behavior. 
    In the literature, ‗ethnification‘ is defined as a process through which ordinary behaviors 
become redefined as ethnically meaningful (Kuran 1998).  Wearing a hat, for example, does not 
necessarily contain any ethnic symbolism.  During the Independence of India, however, Hindus 
began wearing the homespun ‗Gandhi cap‘ while Muslim opted for the fur-lined ‗Jinnah cap‘.  
                                                 
4
 Although this section draws on Morning‘s definitions of constructivism and primordialism, other definitions are 
possible.  In the field of comparative politics, Kanchan Chandra‘s constructivist writings have been enormously 
influential.  What Chandra defines as the constructivist position, though, is what Morning defines as the ‗middle 
ground‘ between constructivism and primordialism.  What Morning then defines as the constructivist position is 
dismissed by Chandra (2012:19) as not constructionist:  ―…it would be useful to identify what constructivism, at 
least with respect to ethnic identity, is not.  It is not, as it is often caricatured, a body of work which predicts 
unconstrained change in ethnic identities…The position that descent-based attributes are one of the principal 
constraints on ethnic identity change in the short term would be shared by most works that we term constructivist.‖  
Because Chandra claims so much for constructivism, the primordialist camp is left with very little content.  In this 
section, I use Morning‘s definitions because they allow for both constructivism and primordialism to have legitimate 
content.        
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Headgear, Kuran writes, went from being a personal choice to becoming a symbol of one‘s 
commitment to an ethnic group.   
    Ethnically meaningful behavior, though, does not constitute ethnic boundaries.  After all, if a 
Muslim in India wore a Gandhi cap, he would be seen as a disloyal Muslim, not a loyal Hindu.  
Ethnification, we might say, does not create an ethnic boundary but is rather the process that 
determines the strength of existing ethnic boundaries, and whether the boundary should be 
considered ‗hard‘ or ‗soft‘.  If we traveled to India, for example, and found that dozens of 
ordinary behaviors were infused with ethnic meaning, ordinary behaviors from the way one ate 
food, to the foot one used to step out the door in the morning, to the way one greeted neighbors, 
we would say that the boundary between Hindus and Muslims was quite hard.  If, on the other 
hand, all these actions were considered personal decisions devoid of any ethnic meaning, we 
might say that the boundary between Hindus and Muslims was relatively soft.       
    A second aspect of ethnification is the normative judgment attached to ‗ethnified‘ behavior.  
If, for example, Muslims accepted food with the left hand and Hindus with the right, do Muslims 
see ‗Hindu behavior‘ as inferior, superior, or neutral?  Similarly, what normative judgment do 
Hindus hold about ‗Muslim behavior‘?  Normative judgments can also be passed on ‗ethnified‘ 
behavior performed by co-ethnics.  For example, a Muslim who fails to wear a Jinnah cap might 
be praised, ignored, or sanctioned by other Muslims.  Once a behavior has become ethnified, the 
normative judgments attached to that behavior help shape how hard or soft an ethnic boundary 
becomes.   
    Finally, the social pressure to participate in ethnification can vary.  According to Barth (1969), 
the boundaries of ethnic groups are maintained through social interaction and the use of social 
sanctions.  In Punjab, Sikhs who refused to wear turbans and grow a beard were pressured to do 
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so through ridicule and the threat of violence (Kuran 1998).  The government can also participate 
in ethnification when it establishes policies, such as affirmative action or segregation, which 
distribute benefits and privileges by ethnicity.  Under these conditions, ordinary decisions, such 
as the decision about which school to attend or which water fountain to drink from, no longer 
represent personal taste, but are instead infused with ethnic symbolism and imposed upon 
people.   
    In short, the ethnification of ordinary behavior is a fourth, subtle way that ethnic boundaries 
can become gradually ossified in the absence of ethnic conflict. 
 
1.4.3  Ethnic Fragmentation 
    The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have presented scholars with the puzzle of 
group fragmentation during ethnic violence.  In response, scholars have increasingly sought to 
understand the causes and consequences of group fragmentation.  One interesting feature of this 
new literature is the wide variety of definitions for ‗fragmentation‘.  The reason behind this 
plurality of definitions is that ‗fragmentation‘ denotes something broken, but scholars differ over 
what exactly is broken in a fragmented group.   
    Some scholars, for example, are interested in the number of organizations within an ethnic 
group.  These scholars define fragmentation as the process by which a single organization breaks 
into multiple organizations (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012; Findley and Rudloff Forthcoming), 
or as the state of being broken into multiple organizations (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 
2012; Cunningham 2011) (Lawrence 2010).  The more organizations there are within the ethnic 
group, the more fragmented the ethnic group becomes.  Other scholars are interested in the 
distribution of power within an ethnic group.  A fragmented ethnic group is therefore one in 
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which power is distributed across multiple actors and organizations, while a unified ethnic group 
consolidates power in a single actor (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012).   
    Still other scholars are interested in the ability of group members to coordinate behavior.  For 
these scholars, a fragmented group lacks overarching institutions which can coordinate group 
actions (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012).  Fragmentation can also mean that the 
internal harmony of a group is interrupted because of internal violence (McLauchlin and 
Pearlman 2012).  Finally, fragmentation can mean that a group‘s sense of collective purpose, or 
‗togetherness‘ is broken.  A unified group, on the other hand, is characterized by a strong sense 
of collective purpose which is shared among all group members (Pearlman 2012).   
    At least one group of scholars has attempted to bring unity to this plurality of definitions by 
combining multiple definitions.  Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour (2012) define fragmentation 
in terms of the number of organizations, the degree of institutionalization, and the dispersion of 
power among those organizations.   
    Ultimately, though, the type of fragmentation one studies is in large part determined by the 
type of question one is trying to answer.  In this dissertation, I am interested in two forms of 
group fragmentation:  (1) at the factional level, the dissertation will explore how and why 
factions challenge the ethnic leadership, (2) then at the individual level, the dissertation will look 
at the incentive and opportunities to collaborate with an ethnic rival. 
 
1.5  Outline of the Dissertation 
    Chapter 1 presented the research question and defined key terms. In the next chapter, I review 
the literature on violence and ethnic fragmentation in order to place the dissertation within the 
framework of existing research.  Earlier scholarship that studied the effect of ethnic violence on 
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group dynamics did not see infighting as a problem.  That was because this literature argued that 
violence would ‗harden‘ ethnic boundaries and increase group cohesion.  Empirically, though, 
the claim that ethnic violence produces group cohesion was challenged by a steady stream of 
evidence in which ethnic groups simultaneously engaged in infighting and ethnic violence.  A 
new, more recent wave of scholarship has therefore turned its attention to this empirical puzzle 
by problematizing group fragmentation.  However while this literature examines the effect of 
violence on group fragmentation, it tends to treat ‗violence‘ as a homogenous concept.   
    In chapter 3, I address this gap by presenting a theory of infighting during ethnic conflict.  
According to this theory, ethnic violence creates opportunities and incentives for fragmentation.  
To counter this pressure for fragmentation, the ethnic leadership uses intra-group violence to 
restore group cohesion.   
    The dissertation then tests these hypotheses using a wide variety of quantitative and qualitative 
methods.  In Chapter 4, the hypotheses are tested using panel data on 274 ethnic groups in 115 
countries over the time period 1990-2006.  An multilevel model and a Markov probit regression 
find that (1)  there is a positive correlation between ethnic violence and infighting, (2) this 
relationship only holds when an ethnic group is geographically concentrated, and (3) this 
relationship only holds when infighting the previous year had been at low or high levels.   
    While Chapter 4 provides evidence that ethnic violence and infighting are positively related, 
the mechanism through which ethnic violence leads to infighting must still be tested.  In Chapter 
5, the dissertation tests the claim that ethnic violence leads to infighting by creating incentives 
and opportunities for factional violence and collaboration.  Using process tracing on a case study 
of Palestinian infighting, the dissertation finds evidence that violence does indeed lead to 
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infighting by increasing the incentives and opportunities for factional violence and collaboration.  
Chapter six concludes the dissertation with a summary and discussion.  
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
 
 
 
    Why would an ethnic group engage in infighting during an ethnic conflict?  In the ethnic 
conflict literature, much of the research that examines the effect of violence on group dynamics 
does not see infighting as problematic.  This is because for the most part, the ethnic conflict 
literature assumes that violence ‗hardens‘ ethnic boundaries and makes groups more cohesive.  
In this section, I examine those claims and I conclude that scholars who argue that ethnic 
violence hardens ethnic boundaries actually mean three different things when they use the term 
‗hardened boundary‘: (1) increased loyalty to one‘s own ethnic group, (2) greater hostility 
between ethnic groups, and (3) the external imposition of ethnicity.   
    I then examine each of these three claims in turn, and find several flaws in the causal 
mechanisms linking ethnic violence to hardened ethnic boundaries.  While ethnic violence can 
sometimes produce group cohesion, it can also produce the exact opposite outcome: ethnic 
violence can (1) decrease loyalty to an ethnic group, (2) decrease hostility between ethnic 
groups, and (3) can remove externally imposed ethnic identities.   
    The claim that violence hardens ethnic boundaries, which is quite prevalent in the ethnic 
conflict literature, can therefore provide little insight into the problem of infighting during ethnic 
conflict.  To search for more clues to this puzzle, this chapter turns next to the civil conflict 
literature, which has recently made some advances into the problem of rebel fragmentation 
during civil conflict.   
2.1   Reversing the Causal Arrow and Hardened Ethnic Boundaries 
    In the ethnic conflict literature, much effort has gone into studying the consequences of ethnic 
diversity.  These studies have, for example, examined at the effect of ethnic diversity on 
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interstate war (Van Evera 1994), on civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffle 2004; 
Posen 1993; Elbadawi and Nicholas 2002; Reynal-Querol 2002; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 
2010), on democratic stability (Chua 2003; Horowitz 1985; Mann 2005; Rabushka and Kenneth 
1972), and on terrorism (Basuchoudharya and Shughart 2010).   
    Other studies have flipped this causal arrow in order to study the effect of various factors on 
ethnicity.  These studies have, for example, examined how ethnicity is influenced by 
democratization (Snyder 2000), by elections (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005), economic growth 
(Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983), state formation and consolidation (Laitin 1986; Scott 1998), by 
elite manipulation (Brass 1997), and by emotions (Petersen 2002). 
    A few studies have looked at the effect of violence on ethnicity, and these studies tend to 
conclude that violence hardens ethnic boundaries.  According to students of inter-group conflict, 
such as Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser, inter-group conflict hardens group boundaries by 
causing groups to become more cohesive.  The experience of conflict with another group 
increases intra-group interactions, causes group members to draw stark contrasts between their 
group and other groups, and heightens group identification and group loyalty.  When facing a 
common enemy, factions within the group set aside differences and cooperate toward the 
common goal of group survival (Coser 1956).    
    The claim that violence hardens group boundaries is so prevalent that it is even used to 
generate policy solutions, such as partition as a solution to ethnic violence (Kaufmann 1998; 
Kaufmann 1996).  But what exactly does it mean to ‗harden‘ an ethnic boundary?  A closer look 
at the literature suggests that scholars who use that phrase are actually referring to three very 
different processes.  In the literature, the term ‗hardened‘ ethnic boundary is used by scholars to 
mean either: (1) increased loyalty to one‘s own ethnic group, (2) greater hostility between ethnic 
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groups, or (3) the external imposition of ethnicity.  In the next few sections I will examine and 
critique each of these three definitions.   
 
2.1.1  Harden 1: Inter-ethnic Hostility 
    For some scholars, the claim that violence ‗hardens‘ ethnic boundaries basically means that 
violence can change inter-ethnic relations.  These scholars use the phrase ‗hardened boundary‘ to 
indicate that the relationship between different ethnic groups has become increasingly negative 
and hostile.  The following passages provide brief illustrations of the claim that ethnic violence 
increases inter-ethnic hostility:    
...in ethnic wars both hypernationalist mobilization rhetoric and real atrocities harden 
ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals are unlikely to be made 
and even less likely to be heard (Kaufmann 1996:137). 
 
Stories of prior atrocities would circulate and encourage killings of Muslims in Bosnia or 
Tutsi in Rwanda.  These categories were artificially constructed and not precisely 
bounded...[b]ut once called into action as units of collective liability, the categories also 
gave members compelling reasons to join together in mutual solidarity and defense, and 
thus to make what had been previously a more abstract groupness more real (Calhoun 
2003:564). 
 
As stipulated in the model [in this paper], ethnic violence accentuated intergroup 
divisions while narrowing intragroup distances, leading to increased ethnic identification 
and escalating conflict (Sambanis and Shayo 2013). 
 
    Instrumentalist theories, which focus on elite manipulation of ethnicity, are especially likely to 
conclude that violence can lead to a deterioration in inter-ethnic relations.  According to these 
theories, elites can deliberately use riots and other forms of violence to increase hostility between 
ethnic groups (Gagnon 1995; Brass 2003; Uvin 1999).  In an interesting study, Wilkinson (2012) 
suggests that politicians who find themselves at an electoral disadvantage are more likely to 
incite riots when ethnic identities are unactivated or weakly activated.  This is because ethnic 
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riots can be used to temporarily increase inter-ethnic hostility and harden ethnic identities around 
a winning ethnic coalition.  
    In the literature, even the threat of violence has sometimes been linked to increased hostility 
between ethnic groups.  According to Posen (1993), when the state collapses ethnic groups find 
themselves in a security dilemma because the actions that one group takes to protect itself can 
appear threatening to another group.  This leads to increased hostility between the ethnic groups, 
eventually culminating in ethnic violence. 
 
Analysis 
    The causal argument that links violence to greater inter-ethnic hostility makes two important 
assumptions.  The first assumption is that violence produces hostility toward those who 
perpetrated the violence.  The second assumption is that violence is primarily perpetrated by 
members of the rival ethnic group.  Together, these two assumptions lead to the conclusion that 
ethnic violence increases hostility between ethnic groups. 
 
 Assumption 1:  Violence produces hostility toward the perpetrators of violence 
The assumption that violence produces hostility toward the perpetrators of violence seems 
uncontroversial, but there are important examples where this assumption does not hold.  First, 
different people can react differently to the same violence.  In an interesting series of interviews, 
Kreidie and Monroe (2002) explore the motives of perpetrators of violence during the Lebanese 
Civil War.  One of these was a man they called ‗Marwan‘.  In the following paragraph, Kreidie 
and Monroe describe how the same experience of violence produced different reactions among 
different members of Marwan‘s family:   
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Even when the war erupted and their lives were endangered, Marwan‘s parents chose not 
to get involved and discouraged their son from taking part.  Unlike his parents, however, 
Marwan could not take a passive role. ―How can I see this happening to my people?  
They [Christian Lebanese Forces] allied with the enemy and they were supplementing 
their plan of eradicating not only the Palestinians but also us Lebanese Muslims‖ (p. 20).  
 
    From this passage, we can see that violence produced strong feelings of fear and caution in 
Marwan‘s parents.  In Marwan, though, the same violence produced feelings of anger and 
hostility.  This suggests that at the individual level, violence can trigger different emotions in 
different people.  Violence may indeed produce hostility, but can also produce fear.  
    Second, at least one scholar has found that at the group level, violence can reduce hostility 
between ethnic groups.  Byman (2002) argues that the state can use a mix of violence and 
positive incentives to co-opt minority groups that violently oppose the dominant ethnic group.  
To empirically test his claim, he looks at three cases in which the government used violence and 
coercion to make an ethnic group less of a threat to the dominant ethnic group.  These cases 
include Bakhtiyaris in Iran, Berbers in Morocco, and Arabs in Israel.  However, Byman also 
finds that the use of violence can sometimes lead to increased inter-ethnic hostility, and this is 
demonstrated with a case study of Baathist violence against Kurds.  Byman concludes that two 
factors are especially important in determining how state violence will effect inter-ethnic 
relations.  The first is the amount of violence used by the state: the greater the violence, the more 
likely it is that inter-ethnic hostility will increase.  The second factor is the ability of the state to 
co-opt ethnic group leaders and group members. 
 
 Assumption 2: Violence is primarily perpetrated by ethnic rivals.   
The second assumption that links ethnic violence to increased hostility between ethnic groups is 
the assumption that violence is primarily perpetrated by ethnic rivals.  However during an ethnic 
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conflict, violence can also be perpetrated by co-ethnics.  Infighting among co-ethnics can even 
lead to defection, with group members turning to the ethnic rival for help and support.  In 
Algeria, one important reason why many Algerian Muslims supported the French during the War 
of Independences was because of FLN (National Liberation Front) violence.  Also in Iraq, the 
desire for revenge against co-ethnics led many former insurgents to switch sides and join U.S. 
counterinsurgency efforts (Kalyvas 2008).   
    In summary, it seems that under certain conditions ethnic violence can indeed increase inter-
ethnic hostility.  Under other conditions, though, violence can lead to a quite different outcome.  
Violence can produce fear and caution, it can decrease inter-ethnic hostility, and it can increase 
intra-ethnic animosity to the point of ethnic defection.   
 
2.1.2  Harden 2: Ethnic Cohesion 
The claim that violence hardens ethnic boundaries is also asserted by scholars who believe that 
violence can change intra-ethnic relations.  At the individual level, a ‗hardened‘ boundary means 
that members of an ethnic group feel more loyalty to their identity and grant that identity more 
importance.  This then leads to greater ethnic cohesion, which ‗hardens‘ the identity.  Examples 
of this argument can be found in the following passages:  
 
Conflict enhances the hardening effect of mass literacy on identity by enhancing the 
emotional impact of recorded national memories (Van Evera 2001:21). 
 
If men define a threat as real, although there may be nothing in reality to justify this 
belief, the threat is real in its consequences- and among these consequences is the 
increase of group cohesion (Coser 1956:107). 
 
Specifically, the model [in this paper] predicts that intense ethnic conflict makes people 
care more about their ethnic group relative to other groups, and seek to resemble it more 
(Sambanis and Shayo 2013). 
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    At the factional level, an ethnic group can become more cohesive when sub-groups, such as 
clans or tribes, set aside differences and work together.  The ethnic group then begins to look 
more like a unitary actor as various sub-groups either unite under an umbrella organization, or 
cooperate toward the same goal.  The more the ethnic group resembles a unitary actor, the more 
cohesive it becomes.  
 
Analysis 
    While violence may indeed increase group cohesion, it does not always lead to this outcome.  
There are at least two reasons why violence does not always increase ethnic cohesion.  First, 
people can have multiple ethnic identities, so it isn‘t immediately clear which ethnic identity 
people will cohere to.  Ethnicity is actually an umbrella concept that encompasses several 
different types of identities.  Identities that are typically included under the umbrella of ethnicity 
include race, tribe, religion, and caste, to name just a few.  Additionally, many of these 
categories can be further divided into ethnic subcategories.  For example, a person can belong to 
a particular sect of a particular ethnic group, such as Sunni Muslim or Brahmin Hindu.  Because 
ethnicity is such a large, multifaceted concept, most people actually have multiple ethnic 
identities.     
    Ethnicity is also often assumed to be a particularly salient cleavage (Horowitz 1985).  
However if people have multiple ethnicities, then some ethnic identities may be more salient 
than others.  During the Partition of India, for example, there was a great deal of violence 
between Hindu Brahmins and Muslims.  Dalits (Untouchables) were forced to choose between 
defending their Hindu identity against Muslims, or standing aside and claiming this was a fight 
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between Brahmins and Muslims.  Ultimately, Dalits chose to stand aside and not participate in 
the conflict (Butalia 1998).   
    Second, empirical evidence indicates that when faced with an out-group threat, groups 
sometimes fragment rather than unite.  In Iraq, the Sunni insurgency was originally spearheaded 
by ex-Baathist forces, but between 2003 and 2006, the insurgency splintered into at least 56 
different Sunni insurgent groups (Findley and Rudloff Forthcoming).  In 1985, the Indian 
government negotiated an autonomy agreement with Punjabi separatists.  When the agreement 
was not implemented, Punjabi militant groups fractured and began attacking each other 
(Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012).  In Sudan, the violence between African Muslims and 
Arab Muslims was also accompanied by violence between two competing factions of African 
Muslims, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudanese Liberation Army.   
    A more extreme form of ethnic fragmentation occurs when members of an ethnic group defect 
to the other side.  Examples of this include Algerian Muslims supporting the French during the 
War of Independence, Sunni tribes allying with the US in Iraq, Kashmiri Muslims supporting the 
Indian military, and Tamil militants siding with Sri Lankan and Indian forces against the LTTE 
(Kalyvas 2008; Staniland 2012).   
    It turns out that fragmentation during violence is surprisingly common.  In a recent study of 
group fragmentation, the authors coded the number of wars in which at least one combatant 
experienced fragmentation.  They found that since 1946, fragmentation occurred in roughly 44% 
of conflicts (Findley and Rudloff Forthcoming).  In summary, then, it seems that under certain 
conditions ethnic violence can indeed lead to greater ethnic cohesion.  Under other conditions, 
though, ethnic violence can lead to abandoning co-ethnics, infighting, or even defection.  
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2.1.3  Harden 3: Imposing Ethnic Identities 
    Finally, the term ‗hardened ethnic boundary‘ can describe the extent to which ethnic identities 
are externally imposed.  Individuals normally have a portfolio of ethnic identities from which to 
choose, and that portfolio can change as the social situation changes (Nagel 1994).  If identities 
are imposed so that individuals have little to no choice over the ethnicity that is activated, then 
we can say that in that society, ethnicity has hardened.   
    Prior to the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, for example, people of African origin 
had severely restricted ethnic options.  Also during periods of extreme violence, such as civil 
wars, individuals can be assigned to sides based on ethnic background.  In Abkhazia, a former 
Autonomous Republic of the Soviet Republic of Georgia, people were forced to identify 
themselves as either Abkhaz or Georgian during the civil conflict.  Even if people privately 
would have preferred another identity, publicly no other options were allowed (Dale 1997).  The 
following passages describe how ethnic options can become severely restricted during periods of 
violence: 
 
Once violence starts, ethnic identities become social facts, they are quickly ascribed to 
people whether or not they want to have them...The power of ethnicity comes from an 
acceptance by enough people that particular social divisions are natural and inevitable 
(Allen and Seaton 1999:3). 
 
Ethnic civil wars, argue partition theorists, are characterized by strong and fixed 
identities, by weak ideological and strong religious overtones, by the dissemination of 
tales of atrocities to strengthen mobilization, and by easy recognition of identities and the 
existence of only limited scope for individual choice (Sambanis 2000). 
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Analysis 
    If identities cannot change because they are externally imposed, this assumes the existence of 
external actors who are powerful enough to enforce particular ethnic structures.  However, such 
actors may not always be present, due perhaps to state collapse or to intervention by a third 
party.  Kalyvas (2008:1048) examines the effect of civil war on ethnicity and finds that:  
Civil war is a process of severe disruption: It destroys existing structures, networks, and 
loyalties; it creates new opportunities for political losers, alters the size of optimal 
coalitions, gives rise to new entrepreneurs, and generally reshuffles politics.  Therefore, it 
has the potential to alter the structure of cleavages and generate realignment in identity 
affiliation, thus destabilizing and even changing a country‘s ethnic demography. 
 
    In short, violence can be used to create and maintain order, but violence can also be used to 
disrupt the existing order (Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud 2008).  This means that external actors 
may indeed use violence to impose and maintain particular ethnic structures, but violence can 
also strip those actors of the ability to impose ethnic structures.     
    During colonial times, for example, colonial powers frequently used violence to establish and 
maintain particular ethnic hierarchies in their colonies.  Eventually, several colonies used 
violence to challenge the colonial regimes, and in the process created new ethnic hierarchies.  
Additionally, perpetrators of genocide and ethnic cleansing rely on violence to create particular 
ethnic structures.  External actors, though, can use violence to stop them from establishing those 
ethnic structures.        
    In short, violence can be used to impose and maintain a particular ethnic structure.   However, 
violence can also be used to disrupt that order and establish new ethnic structures.  
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2.2   The Civil Conflict Literature on Rebel Fragmentation 
    This chapter has found several flaws in the wide-spread assumption that ethnic violence leads 
to hardened ethnic boundaries.  Unfortunately, these arguments cannot help us explain the puzzle 
of infighting during ethnic conflict.  To search for additional clues to help explain the puzzle, we 
therefore turn to the civil conflict literature, which has recently made some advances into the 
problem of rebel fragmentation during civil conflict.  
 
2.2.1   Group Fragmentation as the Independent Variable 
    The civil conflict literature has made recent advances into the puzzle of combatant 
fragmentation during civil conflict.  However for the most part, combatant fragmentation is 
explored as an independent variable, rather than a dependent variable which needs to be 
explained in its own right.  This literature, for example, has found that group fragmentation can 
have a wide range of consequences.  First, fragmentation can shape how violence is conducted.  
Fragmentation can encourage violence against civilians, it can encourage violence against other 
factions within the ethnic group, and fragmentation can encourage violence against other ethnic 
groups through outbidding (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012).  Fragmentation can 
discourage nonviolent strategies because nonviolent resistance requires a high degree of 
coordination and cohesion (Pearlman 2012).  Finally, a fragmented insurgency becomes less 
effective at attaining its goals since fragmentation makes political and military coordination more 
difficult (Pearlman 2008/09). 
    Second, fragmentation can influence peace negotiations.  There is a vast spoiler literature 
which finds that factions that are dissatisfied with the terms of a negotiated agreement will 
attempt to undermine that agreement, unless third parties suppress or co-opt them (Stedman 
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1997).  Spoilers can undermine negotiations through a variety of routes.  Spoilers can use 
violence to make the state mistrust the ability of their negotiating partner to fulfill its obligations 
(Kydd and Walter 2002).  Spoilers can also use violence to provoke a retaliatory attack that will 
radicalize moderates within their own community, and undermine the possibility of a negotiated 
agreement (de Figueiredo Jr. and Weingast 2001).  The ultimate goal of spoilers, according to 
Pearlman (2008/09), is actually not to influence peace negotiations, but rather to contest the 
leadership of the ethnic group.  Spoiling is ultimately a strategy to shift the distribution of power 
among factions.     
    Finally, fragmentation can shape the termination of violence.  Fragmentation can help end 
violence by allowing the state to co-opt faction leaders, which undercuts a rebel group and brings 
the conflict to a more speedy conclusion (Driscoll 2012).  When combatants are fragmented, 
conflicts tend to terminate with a negotiated agreement (Findley and Rudloff Forthcoming).  
Lastly, as the number of factions within a group increases, the number of concessions made in 
that negotiated agreement by the opposing side also increases (Cunningham 2011).   
 
2.2.2   Group Fragmentation as a Dependent Variable 
    The civil conflict literature has also offered valuable insights into the causes of fragmentation 
during conflict.  While the theories in this literature are quite diverse, we can organize the 
theories by where they locate the causes of infighting.  The theories tend to locate the causes of 
infighting in one of three different places:  (1) combatant/opponent characteristics, (2) power 
transitions between factions, and (3) the context in which factions operate. 
    The first set of theories locates the causes of infighting in combatant characteristics.  Asal et al 
(2012), for example, find that certain organizational structures increase the probability of group 
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fragmentation: organizations with a factionalized leadership are most likely to experience splits 
whereas organizations with a unified leadership are more likely to remain together.  Warren and 
Troy (Forthcoming) stress the importance of group size:  in small ethnic groups ethnic 
entrepreneurs are prevented from inciting violence by ethnic leaders, while in large ethnic groups 
ethnic entrepreneurs are prevented from inciting violence by the repressive actions of the state.  
Moderately sized ethnic groups are therefore more likely to experience fragmentation.  Stedman 
(1997) argues that ideology influences fragmentation, and claims that spoilers emerge because 
actors within a rebel movement differ in the radicalness of their goals.   
    A related set of theories locate the causes of infighting in opponent characteristics.  Goodwin, 
for example, (2001) finds that insurgent movements will remain cohesive when the state they 
face is both weak and exclusionary.  However one major challenge for theories that locate the 
causes of infighting in either combatant or opponent characteristics is that these theories tend to 
be path dependent and cannot explain the variation in infighting over the course of an ethnic 
conflict.  Combatant and opponent characteristics tend to remain constant throughout the 
conflict, but infighting can vary widely during the course of the conflict.  During some periods 
infighting can be quite high, while during other periods infighting is almost nonexistent.  While 
these theories may therefore provide some information about the underlying causes of infighting, 
the immediate causes of infighting continue to remain a puzzle. 
    There is second set of theories which locate the causes of infighting in the power relationship 
between factions.  Staniland (2012), for example, finds that defection from an ethnic group is 
caused by fratricide among co-ethnic insurgent groups, which occurs when one group makes a 
bid for hegemony or when local feuds escalate out of control.  In order to survive the fratricide, 
threatened insurgent groups will often turn to the state, or to other non-co-ethnic rivals, for 
31 
 
support.  Greenhill and Major (2006/07) focus on power shifts, and argue that spoilers emerge 
when shifts in the relative power between factions provide an opportunity to undermine 
negotiations.   
    In both these cases, the authors locate the source of infighting in the bid for hegemony by 
weaker factions.  There are three challenges for these theories.  First, these theories must explain 
why a rising faction would violently challenge the dominant faction when time alone will grant 
the rising faction dominance.  Second, the theories must also explain why dominant factions 
choose violence instead of modifying the status quo to appease the challenger.  Finally, ‗power‘ 
is a rather nebulous concept, and so a challenge these theories face is the need to specify what 
exactly constitutes a power shift.  Otherwise, power shift theories can only be used as post-hoc 
explanations.   
    A third type of theory locates the causes of infighting within the context in which factions 
operate.  Kalyvas (2008), for example, argues that a key factor in defection is the ability of the 
state to encourage defection by dispensing resources and controlling territory.  However the state 
can also encourage defection through negative incentives as well, and sometimes defection is not 
the intended purpose of the state, but rather the unintended consequence of other actions. 
    McLauchlin and Pearlman (2012) examine the effect of state violence on factions.  The 
authors argue that violence by the state can cause a group to either fragment or unite, depending 
on how satisfied factions are with the status quo.  If factions within the group are satisfied with 
the status quo, violence will lead to cohesion.  If factions are dissatisfied with the status quo, 
violence will lead to fragmentation.   
    There are two challenges to this argument.  First, the ‗status quo‘ actually consists of decisions 
on a wide array of issues.  It seems unlikely that factions will agree on every issue, which means 
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that there will always be dissatisfied factions.  Second, the level of violence does not remain 
constant throughout the conflict, and it seems probable that low levels of violence (i.e. mild 
property damage) might have vastly different consequences than high levels of violence (i.e. 
mass killings).  There is therefore a gap in this literature for a theory which examines the wide-
range of consequences that ethnic violence can have on factions, and ways in which different 
levels of violence can influence those consequences. 
 
2.3  Summary 
    This chapter has argued that with a few notable exceptions, the ethnic conflict literature does 
not see infighting during ethnic conflict as problematic because the literature assumes that 
violence ‗hardens‘ ethnic boundaries and increases group cohesion.  The empirical evidence 
from places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, though, challenges this assumption.  To look for clues 
to the puzzle, the chapter therefore turns to the civil conflict literature, which has recently begun 
to examine the problem of combatant fragmentation during civil conflict.  In the next chapter, I 
build on insights from the civil conflict literature in order to create a theory of infighting during 
ethnic conflict.  
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Chapter 3:  Theory of Infighting during Ethnic 
Conflict 
 
―…numbers, weapons, and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may 
still be counterbalanced by superior cohesion and discipline.‖  
- (Huntington 1968:23) 
 
 
 
 
   Why would an ethnic group engage in infighting during an ethnic conflict?  Such behavior is 
puzzling because as an ethnic group devotes valuable time, energy, and resources on an intra-
group conflict, it reduces the total amount of resources the group can draw on to wage the ethnic 
conflict.  Instead of focusing attention and resources on fighting the opponent, ethnic leaders turn 
their weapons on the very group in whose name they are supposedly fighting.  How can we 
explain such puzzling behavior? 
    In this chapter, I argue that infighting during an ethnic conflict is the irrational macro-level 
outcome of rational micro-level choices.  At the micro-level, individuals and factions are 
responding to incentives and opportunities generated by the ethnic violence itself.  First, at the 
factional level, ethnic violence encourages fragmentation by providing incentives and 
opportunities to challenge the ethnic leadership.  Incentives to challenge the leadership can 
certainly exist prior to the outbreak of ethnic violence, however existing theories assume that the 
outbreak of ethnic violence then encourages the ethnic group to overlook these differences and 
unite against a common threat.  Instead, I find that ethnic violence can actually create new areas 
of contention such as the type of strategy (terrorism vs. non-violence) the ethnic group should 
employ against their opponent.  By placing new issues on the table, ethnic violence provides 
factions with more reasons and opportunities to contest the current leadership.     
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    As the level of ethnic violence increases, ethnic violence pushes the group toward violent 
infighting for at least two reasons.  First, severe ethnic violence lowers the cost and increases the 
benefits of infighting by eroding or stretching institutions that maintain law and order, such as 
police forces, and by reducing non-violent pathways toward regime change, such as elections.  
Second, severe ethnic violence increases the cost of bargaining and negotiation.  As casualties 
from increase, rivals fear for their very survival.  The threat to their survival increases the cost of 
bargaining, and makes violence a more attractive option.       
    At the individual level, ethnic violence encourages fragmentation by providing group 
members with incentives and opportunities to collaborate with ethnic rivals.  The rival ethnic 
group might, for example, offer rewards or reduce penalties for collaborators.  During an ethnic 
conflict, the prison system also offers an excellent opportunity to gather information and recruit 
new collaborators.   
    As the level of ethnic violence increases, ethnic violence pushes the group toward violent 
infighting because increased ethnic violence also increases the threat collaboration poses to the 
leadership.  Individual collaborators may be identifiable and subject to retaliation, but since the 
leadership cannot know the identity of all collaborators, they may instead respond to the 
increased threat by using demonstrative violence against suspected collaborators in order to 
generate fear in all group members, deter further collaboration, and ensure group cohesion.   
    The end result of these rational micro-level decisions is an irrational macro-level outcome: 
infighting during an ethnic conflict.  The theory outlined in this chapter can be modeled by the 
following diagram: 
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Figure 3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
    The rest of the chapter will elaborate on this theory.  The first section will start at the factional 
level and will explore how ethnic violence encourages factional violence.  The second section 
will then shift to the individual level, and will explore how ethnic violence encourages violence 
against suspected collaborators.  
 
3.1  The Factional Level:  Challenging the Ethnic Leadership 
    Nested within ethnic identities are numerous sub-identities such as clan, tribe, religion, region, 
and caste.  Not all sub-identities are politically organized, though, and the salience of these 
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identities can shift over time.  These sub-identities are nevertheless important because they 
provide important cleavages along which factions can form.   
    When ethnic violence occurs, it acts as an external shock that can shift this ethnic landscape.
5
  
One way ethnic violence can shift this landscape is by bringing new contentious issues to the 
table, such as the type of strategy the group should employ (violence vs. non-violence) or the 
type of goals the group should pursue (autonomy vs. independence).  By placing new issues on 
the table, ethnic violence increases fragmentation by providing factions with incentives and 
opportunities to challenge the leadership.  As ethnic violence becomes more intense, the violence 
pushes the group toward infighting by decreasing the cost of infighting and increasing the cost of 
negotiation.    
 
3.1.1  The Incentive to Challenge the Leadership 
    During ethnic violence, the incentive to challenge the leadership can come from at least four 
different sources.  First, factions can be dissatisfied with the leadership‘s strategic choices during 
the ethnic conflict.  For example, some factions might prefer negotiation while others advocate a 
more forceful or violent response (Kydd and Walter 2002).  In Palestine, Hamas prefers a policy 
of armed resistance and terrorism while Fatah advocates pressure through negotiation.  In 
Chechnya, insurgents were split between Islamic factions that supported tactics such as suicide 
bombings and hostage taking, and nationalist factions that opposed those tactics (Lyall 2010).   
    Second, factions might be dissatisfied with the goals of the leadership during the ethnic 
conflict.  While both the Turkish Hezbollah and PKK were Kurdish groups fighting against the 
                                                 
5
 Although the cause of the external shock is exogenous to the present theory, it is important to note that factions can 
purposely trigger inter-ethnic violence in order to shift the distribution of power within an ethnic group.  Factions 
have, for example, used terrorism against rival ethnic groups in order to provoke retaliatory violence (Pearlman 
2008/09; de Figueiredo Jr. and Weingast 2001) 
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Turkish government, the two groups also fought each other because the Turkish Hezbollah, 
unlike the leftist PKK, sought to establish a conservative Sunni theocracy in southeastern 
Turkey. 
    Third, ethnic violence can cause preferences to shift by increasing the cost of mobilization.  
Groups may respond differently to the increased cost of mobilization, with strongly committed 
groups pushing forward regardless of cost while less committed groups prefer compromise.  The 
increased cost of mobilization can force all factions to reconsider the utility of participating in 
the conflict, creating divisions even between those who had been satisfied with the status quo 
prior to the outbreak of ethnic violence.   
    Finally, previous sources of tension can carry over or be exacerbated by the violence.  Prior to 
the outbreak of the conflict, some factions might have been dissatisfied with the distribution of 
goods and resources within the ethnic group, or with the allocation of leadership positions.  After 
violence breaks out, this dissatisfaction can carry over or become exacerbated by the conflict.  
For example, the Chechen political and religious leader, Akhmad Kadyrov, fought against the 
Russians in the first Chechen War, but then switched sides and fought with the Russians in the 
Second Chechen war.  Kadyrov, who was a Sulfi mufti, opposed the rise of Wahhabism and the 
growing criminality he saw under the leadership of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov (Ware 
2005).     
    All these sources of dissatisfaction provide an incentive for fragmentation because they give 
factions a reason to challenge the ethnic leadership.      
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3.1.2   The Opportunity to Challenge the Leadership 
    Violence not only provides an incentive to challenge the ethnic leadership, but can also 
provide an opportunity to challenge the leadership.  Prior to the outbreak of violence, the 
distribution of power within the ethnic group may have made it risky for rival factions to issue a 
direct challenge.  Ethnic violence, though, can shift this distribution of power by undermining 
the leadership and by strengthening weaker factions.  Ethnic violence can shift the distribution of 
power and create an opportunity to challenge the leadership in at least three ways.   
    First, during the violence ethnic leaders may be arrested, kidnapped, or killed, which produces 
uncertainty and disarray as leadership authority shifts between individuals.  The loss of an 
organization‘s leadership can weaken an organization to the point that dissatisfied factions 
believe they have an opportunity to mount an effective challenge.  Two prominent examples of 
effective leadership decapitation are the arrests of Abimael Guzman, the leader of the Shining 
Path, and Abdullah Ocalan, the head of the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party‘s (PKK).  In both 
instances, the arrest of the leader led to the complete collapse of the organization (Jordan 2009).  
    In the aftermath of 9/11, leadership targeting has become a prominent strategy of the U.S. 
military, based on the belief that, ―The loss of leadership can cause many organizations to 
collapse‖ (Bush 2003).  However the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism continues with 
the following caveat:  
Some groups, however, are more resilient and can promote new leadership should the 
original fall or fail. Still others have adopted a more decentralized organization with 
largely autonomous cells, making our challenge even greater (Bush 2003). 
 
    Indeed, Spanish authorities had thought that the arrest of Francisco Mugica, the leader of the 
Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), would lead to the collapse of the organization.  ETA, 
though, did not collapse after the loss of its leader (Jordan 2009).  Also in Iraq, Abu Musab al-
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Zarqawi was killed in June 2006 based on the belief that his death would weaken al Qaeda in 
Iraq.  However al Qaeda simply replaced Zarqawi, and reconstituted itself (Masters 2012).
6
   
    Issuing an effective challenge against an ethnic leadership, though, does not first require the 
leadership to collapse.  A weakened organization can also become a potential target for 
challengers.  Although the death of Zarqawi did not lead to the collapse of al Qaeda in Iraq, it did 
cause the group to become splintered and decentralized, which then allowed other Sunni 
insurgent groups to step forward (Masters 2012; al-Salhy 2012).  Although al Qaeda in Iraq did 
not collapse,  
 
It doesn‘t have that distinct command-and-control structure it used to.  Once you take 
away that figurehead, no one has been able to come in and wrangle all the pieces together 
(Brian Fishman, as quoted in Beehner 2007). 
 
    Second, if an ethnic group appears to be losing the conflict, there is a greater potential for 
factional loyalties to shift.  Under such conditions, the leadership can suffer a loss of confidence.  
Factions that had previously supported the leadership may withdraw their support, or even turn 
against the leadership.  This presents rival factions the opportunity to challenge the newly 
weakened leadership for control of the ethnic group. 
    Third, ethnic violence allows dissatisfied factions to shift the distribution of power by turning 
to the ethnic rival for support and protection.  When Al Qaeda in Iraq began targeting rival 
groups, the presence of U.S. forces allowed besieged groups to protect themselves by turning to 
the U.S. for support.  In Kashmir, the Pro-Pakistani Ikhwanis were able to turn to the Indian 
military for support when they were targeted by other Pro-Pakistani Kashmiri militants 
(Staniland 2012).  
                                                 
6
 In an interesting study, Jordan (2009) looked at the consequences of leadership decapitation in terrorist 
organizations.  Her study found that the loss of the leader is most likely to lead to organizational collapse among 
organizations that are smaller, more recently formed, and ideologically based. 
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    Ethnic violence, then, can provide both an incentive and an opportunity to challenge the ethnic 
leadership.  The challenge to the ethnic leadership, though, does not necessarily need to involve 
violence.  Nor does the leadership need to respond to challengers with violence.  As the intensity 
of ethnic violence increases, though, infighting becomes more likely as ethnic violence decreases 
the cost of infighting and increases the cost of negotiation. 
 
3.1.3    The Conditions that Encourage Violence 
    Ethnic violence can create an environment that encourages and promotes infighting in at least 
three ways.  First, violence can create new cleavages in the ethnic group, around which 
competing factions can form.  These cleavages can form over differences in the strategy or goals 
of the conflict, or over the distribution of goods and leadership positions.  As the number of 
factions increases, the number of potential dyads along which incompatibilities and disputes can 
lead to violence also increases.  As the number of dyads along which conflict can occur 
increases, the probability of violence also increases (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012).   
    Second, ethnic violence can increase the probability that challengers will use violence by both 
(1) reducing non-violent pathways for protest and by (2) reducing the constraints against 
violence.  First, violence can erode institutions that had previously channeled leadership 
disagreements through non-violent pathways, such as regular elections.  When faced with ethnic 
violence, the ethnic leadership may cancel elections or declare a state of emergency.  Challengers 
are then faced with a dilemma because non-violent options to push forward their demands are 
reduced or no longer available.  If the leadership refuses to step aside or accommodate demands, 
and if non-violent options to change the leadership or gain legitimate representation are no 
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longer available, then violence, which is a much quicker and more efficient way to challenge the 
leadership, becomes a more attractive option.    
    Ethnic violence can also increase the probability that challengers will use violence by 
undermining institutions that had previously constrained factional violence.  During periods of 
ethnic violence, institutions that had maintained law and order, such as regular police forces, can 
be spread thin or have their resources redirected toward the ethnic conflict.  This creates 
conditions under which, for example, roving groups of factional supporters can freely challenge 
opponents.  When the forces that maintained law and order are undermined, the constraints on 
factions are loosened and violent clashes become more likely.   
    Third, as the casualties from ethnic violence begin to mount, rivals begin to fear for their 
survival.  The threat to their survival makes bargaining and negotiation, which are time-
consuming processes, a less attractive option.  The efficiency of violence becomes a more 
attractive option.       
    If the above causal analysis is true, we would expect the following two predictions and 
hypotheses to also be true: 
 
H1:  When inter-ethnic violence is at low levels, then infighting from factional violence will also 
be at low levels.  
 
H2:  When inter-ethnic violence is at high levels, then infighting from factional violence will 
also be at high levels. 
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3.2    The Individual Level:  The Pressure to Collaborate7 
    Ethnic violence not only creates pressure for fragmentation at the factional level, but also 
creates pressure for fragmentation at the individual level.
8
   When ethnic violence occurs, it acts 
as an external shock that creates new challenges, incentives, and opportunities for group 
members, leading those who would normally never consider collaboration to suddenly 
reconsider, and causing those who have already collaborated to rethink their actions.  As ethnic 
violence increases, collaboration may or may not increase.  However, as ethnic violence 
increases the threat collaboration poses to the ethnic leadership does increase, making it more 
likely that the leadership will use violence to deter collaboration and restore group cohesion.   
 
3.2.1  The Incentive to Collaborate 
    The pressure to collaborate can come from several sources.  First, the rival ethnic group can 
encourage collaboration.  Collaboration aids the rival group in many ways, but at least one study 
has found that when the rival group is able to successfully co-opt faction leaders, it tends to 
undercut the resistance and bring the conflict to a more speedy conclusion (Driscoll 2012).  The 
rival ethnic group can encourage collaboration through negative incentives, such as blackmail 
and threats, or with positive incentives, such as money, food, and freedom of movement.  In Iraq, 
for example, Americans used the promise of a paycheck and steady employment to recruit 
former Baathists to fight Sunni insurgents (Maass 2005). 
                                                 
7
 In this dissertation, collaboration is defined as fighting against co-ethnics by joining another ethnic group that is 
opposed to the aspirations of one‘s co-ethnic group (Kalyvas 2008). 
8
 Factions can also collaborate against the ethnic leadership.  However, since that type of collaboration often 
involves direct attacks against the ethnic leadership, factional collaboration is included under ‗factional challenges to 
the leadership‘. 
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    A second incentive to collaborate can come from within the ethnic group, as individuals seek 
revenge for pre-war grievances, or seek revenge for atrocities committed during the ethnic 
violence (Staniland 2012).  In East Timor, Mydans (1999) tells the story of a young Timorese 
man, Alfonso Goncalves, who was killed by Timorese militants collaborating with the 
Indonesian army.  Goncalves was targeted by collaborators not only because his father was a 
strong proponent of Timorese independence, but also because of a pre-conflict family feud.  
Goncalves‘ niece had eloped with a relative of the militants, and the murder of Goncalves was an 
act of revenge.  In Chechnya, the recently assassinated Chechen warlord, Raybek Tovzayev, 
chose to collaborate with the Russians because in 1995, a Chechen rebel leader had entered 
Toyzayev‘s village and killed his father in front of the family.  Three months after his father‘s 
murder, Toyzayev gathered a small band of fighters and assassinated the Chechen rebel leader 
(Tyler 2001).  Among Algerians who supported France during the war of independence, one of 
the most important reasons for defection was FLN violence (Kalyvas 2008).   
    Within the ethnic group, pressure to collaborate can also come from tribal or clan loyalties 
because if the local leaders choose to defect, group members may feel compelled to do the same.  
During the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya, for example, the British relied on local leaders to 
persuade and bully their supporters into joining the British Home Guard (Kalyvas 2008).   
    A fourth pressure can come from the need to provide daily necessities or to take care of a 
family.  According to one Chechen refugee, many Chechens were willing to work for the pro-
Russian Chechen leader, Akhmad Kadyrov, because it was one of the few ways to earn a steady 
paycheck: 
There are no jobs in Chechnya.  Either you bring stuff to the market to sell or you work in 
the reconstruction business.  You know, the Russian state is trying to build Grozny, and 
most of our men work in these construction sites.  But there are not many construction 
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jobs.  And even if you find one, it is not likely that you will get paid regularly (as quoted 
in Kalayvas 2008, 1054).      
 
    A fifth incentive to collaborate can arise from personal beliefs and ideology, which may 
conflict with those of the political leadership.  In such cases, collaboration does not suggest 
disloyalty to the ethnic group, but rather disloyalty to the political leadership, which the 
individual may believe is necessary in order to remain loyal to the ideals and goals of the larger 
ethnic group.   
    Lastly, pressure can also come from self-interest and the desire to be on the winning side.  
During the Mau Mau insurgency, for example, Kikuyu who had been Mau Mau insurgents 
switched sides when the local distribution of power also switched (Kalyvas 2008).  
 
3.2.2   The Opportunity to Collaborate 
    In addition to providing incentives to collaborate, inter-ethnic violence can also provide 
individuals with opportunities for collaboration.  During periods of ethnic violence, there is often 
a great deal of confusion and disarray.  During this period of disarray, behavior that might have 
previously aroused suspicion might instead be overlooked.  Also during ethnic violence, the 
ethnic rival may arrest or detain members of the ethnic group.  These periods of incarceration 
provide excellent opportunities to gather information from collaborators or to coerce new 
individuals to collaborate by, for example, reducing jail time in return for information. 
 
3.2.3   Pressure for Violent Infighting 
    The different pressures to collaborate may vary in their intensity as the conflict continues, with 
some sources exerting more pressure and others exerting less.  For example, as the conflict 
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becomes more violent the rival ethnic group might offer greater incentives to collaborate, which 
attracts some within the ethnic group.  On the other hand if the ethnic group is also winning the 
conflict, then the more pragmatic members of the group will be less willing to collaborate.  At 
the same time, violence from co-ethnics may cause some group members to collaborate out of 
desire for revenge.  These shifting pressures mean that the pressure to collaborate may or may 
not increase as inter-ethnic violence increases in intensity.  Changes in the pressure to 
collaborate are dependent on a variety of factors, only some of which are related to the intensity 
of violence.   
    However, even if the pressure to collaborate is not directly related to the intensity of violence, 
we cannot say the same for the damage caused by collaboration.  Collaborators can undermine an 
ethnic leadership in a variety of ways.  First, collaborators have important local knowledge that 
they can leak to the rival group.  According to Lyall (2010:16): 
Defectors, particularly those fleeing posts with command responsibilities, can reveal a 
variety of different types of sensitive information, including the size of the group, the 
identity and whereabouts of its leadership, its morale, and the location of its physical 
infrastructure such as bases and weapons caches. 
 
    The rival ethnic group can then use this information to target or kill militants.  In India, the 
Indian government recruited former militants from the United Liberation Front of Assam 
(ULFA) into the pro-government militia, Surrendered Liberation Front of Assam (SULFA).  
SULFA was then used by the government to assassinate activists and ULFA members (Gossman 
2000).  The Indian government used the same tactic in Kashmir, where the government‘s use of 
‗turncoat‘ militants as informants and assassins had a devastating effect on militant organizations 
(Gossman 2000).     
    The fear of informants can cause ethnic leaders to be constantly on the move, preventing them 
from organizing and planning the resistance.  In Chechnya, Chechens who supported the Russian 
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government were enlisted in ‗sweeps‘, which were house-to-house searches for insurgents.  
Sweeps conducted entirely by Chechens, rather than Russians, were far more effective and led to 
a significant decline in insurgent attacks (Lyall 2010).   
    Collaboration can also undermine the legitimacy of the ethnic leadership.  If collaboration 
leads to mass defection, the leadership‘s claim of being the sole legitimate representative of the 
ethnic group is called into question.  Using the category of ‗loyal Kurd‘, Turkey was able to 
mobilize tens of thousands of Kurdish peasants into local militias.  Support for the PKK‘s 
separatist agenda declined dramatically, and to stop the flood of defections, the PKK began a 
systematic campaign targeting defectors (Kalyvas 2008).  During the Colonial wars of the 19
th
 
century, recruiting collaborators from the indigent population was seen as both routine and 
necessary (Lyall 2010). 
    The ethnic leadership, in turn, can respond to this threat using a range of strategies.  The 
leadership can, for example, employ speeches, positive incentives, and punitive measures.  As 
ethnic violence increases, collaboration may or may not increase.  However, as ethnic violence 
increases the increased ability of collaborators to undermine the ethnic group makes it more 
likely that the ethnic leadership will use violence against collaborators.  The violence is used not 
only to eliminate existing collaborators, but also to deter others from collaborating.  Through 
violence the leadership can intimidate potential collaborators, forcing individuals to weigh the 
benefits of collaboration against the terrible cost of being caught.   
    As inter-ethnic violence becomes more intense, collaborator killings are likely to become 
more public and more gruesome.  In 2010 when violence in Afghanistan was at its worst since 
the Taliban was overthrown in 2001, Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, issued new orders to 
his field commanders instructing them to kill collaborators working with NATO forces (Al 
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Jazeera 2010).  As violence escalated in Iraq, Sunni insurgents targeted collaborators working 
with the new interim government.  The insurgents targeted both high level officials such as the 
governor of Mosul, and low level officials such as Zawadi Shaati, who was brutally tortured and 
then shot in the head before his body was left hanging from a lamp post (Harnden 2004).  Ethnic 
leaders can use brutality as a tool to generate fear and compel loyalty by deterring additional 
collaboration.   
    If the above causal analysis is true, we would expect the following two hypotheses to be true: 
H3: When inter-ethnic violence is at low levels, then infighting due to collaboration will also be 
at low levels.  
 
H4: When inter-ethnic violence is at high levels, then infighting due to collaboration will also be 
at high levels. 
 
3.3  Additional Implications of the Theory 
    According to the theory presented in this chapter, ethnic violence increases infighting by 
encouraging challenges to the leadership and by increasing the threat from collaboration.  
However the effect of ethnic violence on infighting can be influenced by the proximity of ethnic 
group members to each other for at least four reasons. 
    First, it is easier for group members to engage in violence against each other if they are in the 
same geographic location.  Physical separation makes it more difficult to attack co-ethnics.  
Second, in a group that is geographically concentrated, group members are more likely to 
compete over the same resources.  An ethnic group that is geographically dispersed, in contrast, 
will likely have other resources which they can try to obtain.  The pressures for change within a 
geographically dispersed group may therefore be lower, making it less likely that a shift in the 
power structure will lead to factionalism.   
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    Third, when group members are geographically concentrated, out-group members are less 
likely to have knowledge about the leadership structure and inner workings of the group.  Any 
out-group member that tried to infiltrate a tightly concentrated ethnic group would likely be 
quickly identified and isolated.  This makes insider information more valuable, and makes the 
threat from collaboration relatively higher.  When an ethnic group is tightly concentrated, the 
asymmetry of information between out-group and in-group members will increase the threat of 
collaboration, leading to greater violence against suspected collaborators. 
    Finally, when an ethnic group is geographically concentrated, more group members may have 
access to valuable information, such as the location of key leaders or the location of weapon 
stockpiles.  The number of potential collaborators is therefore much larger.  However, because 
the group is tightly concentrated, it also becomes easier to identity collaborators.  Because (1) 
collaborators are easier to identify and (2) there are more potential collaborators to deter, the 
violence against collaborators is expected to be more frequent, public and gruesome. 
    If the above analysis is true, we would expect the following hypothesis to be true: 
H5: Inter-ethnic violence will increase infighting more when ethnic group members are 
geographically concentrated.    
 
3.4  Summary 
    Why would an ethnic group engage in infighting when fighting an ethnic conflict?  This 
chapter argued that infighting during an ethnic conflict is the irrational macro-level outcome of 
rational micro-level choices.  At the micro-level, individuals and factions are responding to 
incentives and opportunities generated by the ethnic violence itself.   
    First, at the factional level, inter-ethnic violence provides an incentive and opportunity to 
challenge the ethnic leadership.  As the level of violence intensifies, ethnic violence also creates 
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an environment that facilitates and encourages violence within the ethnic group.  When 
combined, these two consequences of ethnic violence dramatically increase the probability of 
violent challenges to the ethnic leadership.  The ethnic leadership, in turn, uses violence to 
counter this pressure toward fragmentation and restore group cohesion.   
    Second, at the individual level, violence can provide group members with both the incentive 
and opportunity to collaborate with ethnic rivals.  As the level of inter-ethnic violence increases, 
collaboration may or may not increase, but the threat collaboration poses to the ethnic leadership 
does increase, making it more likely that the leadership will use violence against suspected 
collaborators in order to deter collaboration and restore group cohesion.  The end result of these 
rational micro-level decisions is an irrational macro-level outcome: infighting during an ethnic 
conflict 
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Chapter 4:  Statistical Analysis 
 
 
 
 
    Why would an ethnic group engage in infighting during an ethnic conflict?  According to the 
theory presented in the previous chapter, the ethnic violence itself creates opportunities and 
incentives for fragmentation.  To counter this pressure for fragmentation, the ethnic leadership 
uses intra-group violence to restore group cohesion.  This theory was then used to generate the 
following five hypotheses:   
 
H1:  When inter-ethnic violence is at low levels, then at the factional level infighting from 
leadership challenges will also be at low levels.  
 
H2:  When inter-ethnic violence is at high levels, then at the factional level infighting from 
leadership challenges will also be at high levels. 
 
H3: When inter-ethnic violence is at low levels, then at the individual level infighting from 
collaboration will also be at low levels.  
 
H4: When inter-ethnic violence is at high levels, then at the individual level infighting from 
collaboration will also be at high levels. 
 
H5: Inter-ethnic violence will increase infighting more when ethnic group members are 
geographically concentrated.    
 
 
    To test these hypotheses, the dissertation will need to use a two-step approach.  The first step 
will consist of a series of statistical analysis which test the claim that higher levels of ethnic 
violence lead to higher levels of infighting.  This is an important and controversial claim because 
much of the ethnic conflict literature assumes the exact opposite – the literature assumes that 
ethnic violence actually ‗hardens boundaries‘ by increasing group cohesion.  The assumption 
that ethnic violence increases ethnic cohesion has even led to some controversial policy 
51 
 
recommendations, such as partition as a solution to ethnic conflict (Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 
1998; Muller 2008).   
    If ethnic conflict does indeed produce higher levels of infighting, then the second step, which 
is presented in the next chapter, is to use process tracing on a series of case studies in order to 
test the proposed causal mechanism that links ethnic violence to infighting.  According to the 
hypotheses, ethnic violence causes an increase in infighting because at the factional level, ethnic 
violence increases the incentive and opportunity to challenge the leadership, and also creates 
conditions that encourage violence.  At the individual level, ethnic violence creates incentives 
and opportunities for collaboration, and increases the threat collaboration poses to the leadership.  
The leadership then attempts to counter these pressures for fragmentation by using intra-group 
violence to restore ethnic cohesion.     
    Using a series of statistical regressions, the rest of the chapter will test the first of these claims, 
which is the hypothesis that higher levels of ethnic violence lead to higher levels of infighting. 
 
4.1  Research Design 
    This chapter attempts to answer three different questions about the relationship between ethnic 
violence and infighting.  First, do higher levels of ethnic violence lead to higher levels of 
infighting?   Second, is the relationship between ethnic violence and infighting influenced by the 
geographic concentration of the ethnic group (hypothesis 5)? And finally, given levels of 
infighting at time t-1, does ethnic violence cause the ethnic group to transition to higher levels of 
infighting at time t?   
    All three of these questions require us to make a causal inference about what would have 
happened to the amount of infighting within an ethnic group at a particular moment in time if 
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that same ethnic group had experience a different level of ethnic violence at that same moment in 
time.  All attempts at causal inference, though, run into what is known as the ―fundamental 
problem of causal inference.‖  The ―fundamental problem of causal inference‖ is that we cannot 
observe both what would have happened if the ethnic group did experience ethnic violence at a 
particular moment, and what would have happened if that same ethnic group did not experience 
ethnic violence at that same moment.  Instead, we only observe one outcome, and must then 
make causal inferences based on incomplete information (Gelman and Hill 2007). 
    One way to get around this problem is by using statistical adjustments to estimate the 
unobserved outcome.  To make causal inferences about the effect of ethnic violence on 
infighting, this chapter will use two different statistical methods:  Multilevel modeling, which 
addresses the interdependence of observations for each ethnic group, and a Markov transition 
model, which allows us to model the transition from one level of infighting to another. 
 
4.1.1  Data 
    The data used in this section is from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project.  MAR has 
collected information on 274 ethnic groups in 115 countries over the time period 1990-2006.
9
  
Each year, the dataset records whether a specific ethnic group engaged in infighting and/or 
ethnic violence, and if so, the intensity of violence.  There are a total of 2,130 individual 
observations in the dataset.   
                                                 
9
 The dataset provides information only on the post-Cold War era.  The theory, however, does not predict that the 
Superpower rivalry influences the effect of ethnic violence on infighting.  If the statistical analysis fails to provide 
evidence of a relationship between ethnic violence and infighting in the post-Cold War era, then there is no reason to 
believe the theory can explain infighting during the Cold War or pre-Cold War era.  If the statistical analysis does 
provide evidence of a relationship between ethnic violence and infighting in the post-Cold War era, this would 
justify further research which tests this relationship during the Cold War and pre-Cold War era.   
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    The ethnic groups included in the MAR dataset are defined as non-state, ‗politically 
significant‘ communal groups.  MAR defines ‗politically significant‘ groups as those that meet 
the following two criteria: 
 The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-
a-vis other groups in a society; and,  
 The group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or 
promotion of its self-defined interests.  (MAR website) 
    This is important for two reasons.  First, Rosenbaum (2010)cvf  argues that a good 
observational study is one in which the subjects are included or excluded from an experiment 
based on covariates prior to, and unaffected by the treatment.  The ethnic groups included in 
MAR are chosen based on criteria unrelated to the ―treatment‖ of ethnic violence, and so the 
study meets this exclusion criterion.  Second, the ethnic groups included in the analysis are 
already politically mobilized, and it therefore seems likely that these groups will be more 
cohesive than non-mobilized ethnic groups.  The groups in the MAR dataset therefore represent 
a hard case for my theory, which argues that inter-ethnic violence will cause such groups to 
fragment and engage in infighting. 
 
4.1.2  Multilevel Model 
    The dissertation uses a multilevel model to address two of the three questions that motivate 
this chapter:  (1) Do higher levels of ethnic violence lead to higher levels of infighting? (2) Is the 
relationship between ethnic violence and infighting influenced by the geographic concentration 
of the ethnic group?   
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    In the dataset, each ethnic group is observed at multiple points in time, and the levels of 
infighting and ethnic violence within the group are then recorded.  However, the observations 
recorded for a single ethnic group at time t are likely correlated with the observations recorded 
for that same ethnic group at time t-1.  Since the observations clustered within each ethnic group 
are likely not independent of the other observations within that same cluster, the observations 
contain less unique information.  The larger the correlation between observations, the less unique 
information each observation contains.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), though, assumes 
independent observations.  If OLS is used on clustered data with correlated errors, then the 
standard errors may be underestimated, increasing the chances of a Type I error and rendering 
significance tests less reliable (Luke 2004). 
    One measure that provides information on the level of correlation within groups is the 
interclass correlation (ICC).  The ICC tells us how strongly units in the same group resemble 
each other by using the following formula: 
 
𝐼𝐶𝐶 =  
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 2 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 2 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 1 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
 
 
 
    In our dataset, ethnic groups are the Level 2 units, and nested within those groups are repeated 
measurements, which are the Level 1 units.  If the ICC is close to zero, this means that nesting 
observations within groups is unnecessary because there is little variation at the group level.  
Single level regression is therefore acceptable.  If the ICC is close to one, then observations 
within groups are similar and group level variation accounts for most of the variation in the 
dataset.  Multi-level modeling is therefore suggested.  The ICC for our data is: 
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𝐼𝐶𝐶 =  
. 2426
. 2426 + .7673
=  .2402 
which means that approximately a quarter of the variation between observations can be 
explained by variation between groups, which is large enough to suggest the need for multi-level 
modeling. 
    Multilevel models use maximum likelihood estimation to predict the values of a dependent 
variable when the outcome is a function of predictors at more than one level.  Such models are 
useful whenever data has a clustered structure, such as houses within neighborhoods or, in this 
case, multiple observations of an ethnic group over time. The system of equations that will be 
estimated for a random intercept model is (Luke 2004): 
 
                                                    𝐿1:  𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗   
                                                    𝐿2:  𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝜇0𝑗   
                                                           𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10  
 
 
The first level equation (L1) estimates the value of infighting, 𝑌𝑖𝑗 , for each observation i of each 
ethnic group j.  The second level equation (L2) tells how each of the L1 parameters is a function 
of L2 predictors.  The equations in L2 estimate 𝛽0𝑗 , the intercept for each ethnic group j, and 𝛽1𝑗 , 
the slope for each ethnic group j.  𝛾00 is the expected value of infighting when the predictor 
variables all have a value of 0, and 𝛾10 is the mean value of the L1 slope for 𝑋𝑖𝑗 .  Finally, 𝜇0𝑗  is 
the unmodeled variability in each ethnic group j.  In the above model, the intercepts are allowed 
to vary for each ethnic group while the slopes remain constant.
10
 
                                                 
10
 A random intercept model assumes that different ethnic groups have different average infighting levels.  This is a 
reasonable assumption since the data shows that some ethnic groups appear to experience much more infighting than 
others.  A random slope model, though, assumes that the effect of ethnic violence on infighting varies across groups.  
Ethnic violence, in other words, may cause some groups to engage in more infighting than others.  However the 
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    The model will also include an interaction between ethnic violence and geographic 
concentration, as well as several control variables.  The interaction term is used to test the claim 
that ethnic violence has a different impact on infighting in geographically concentrated and 
geographically dispersed ethnic groups.  The control variables are included in order to account 
for observed variables that are related to both ethnic violence and infighting (Gelman and Hill 
2007).  For example, ethnic groups with kin across international borders might be more likely to 
engage in infighting because neighboring kin groups represent alternate sources of leadership, 
and they may also be more likely to engage in ethnic violence because they have more external 
support.  If the presence of kin across international borders were to be omitted from the analysis, 
then the effect of ethnic violence in the model would be ―confounded‖ with the effect of 
neighboring kin.   
 
4.1.3   Markov Ordered Probit Regression 
    The third question will be then be addressed using a Markov transition model, a method that 
allows us to model the transition between infighting categories, as well as the factors associated 
with each transition.  The Markov chain, developed by the Russian mathematician Andrey 
Markov, is a mathematical system that undergoes a transition from one state to another state.  
Markov chains are useful in the social sciences because they can be used to model how social 
phenomena move between different states (Gill 2006).  In a Markov chain, the decision making 
process is based only on the current conditions.  For example, a gambler might decide to fold or 
bet depending on the cards she holds, or an army general may decide to advance or retreat based 
                                                                                                                                                             
theory outlined in the previous chapter provides no reason to believe that ethnic violence has a different impact on 
infighting in different ethnic groups.  Because of this, the estimated model will have a random intercept and a fixed 
slope.  
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on current conditions on the battlefield.  Markov chains are ‗memoryless‘ in the sense that 
previous states are forgotten and only the current state matters in the decision-making process 
(Gill 2006).  
    In this dissertation, a Markov chain will be used to model the probability that an ethnic group 
will transition from one level of ethnic infighting to another level of ethnic infighting.  The 
conditions of the initial state are represented by all the variables in the previous year, at time t-1.  
The analysis will then examine how the variables in that initial state (t-1) influence the 
probability of transitions to another state in the following year, at time t.  If the hypotheses are 
correct, then the level of ethnic violence will influence the probability of transitioning between 
each of the different levels of infighting.   
    A Markov chain regression is used in this analysis for two reasons.  First, a Markov model 
will allow us to distinguish between the different levels of infighting in order to determine if 
some states have different transition probabilities than other states.  For example, is the impact of 
ethnic violence when transitioning from no infighting (level 0) different from the impact of 
ethnic violence when transitioning from moderate infighting (level 3)?  If an ethnic group is 
experiencing high levels of infighting, what impact does ethnic violence have on infighting in 
that group?  Second, the Markov model has the additional advantage of allowing us to determine 
what, if any, variables are associated with a decrease in infighting.  If an ethnic group is 
experiencing high infighting, are any of the variables associated with transitioning down to a 
lower level of infighting?  Depending on the outcome of the analysis, the answer to this question 
can have important policy implications for the management of intra-group conflict. 
    Following Epstein et al. (2006), I estimate the following Markov transition model: 
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𝐹 Pr 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑎  = Θ𝑎𝑏 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑎   , 
where a and b are possible infighting levels, Θ𝑎𝑏  is the category threshold, a parameter that 
provides each cumulative regression with its own intercept, 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑎  is a linear predictor, and 𝐹(∙) 
is a function that translates the [0,1] interval to the real line.  The left side of the equation tells us 
that we are estimating the probability that an ethnic group is at one level of infighting, given the 
level of infighting that they were at last year.  In other words, what is the probability that an 
ethnic group will be at infighting level 5, given that they were at infighting level 0 last year?  The 
right side of the equation is the cumulative link model, which is a class of regression models for 
ordered categorical data.  The cumulative link model consists of the category threshold (Θ𝑎𝑏 ) 
and a linear function of the regressors, (𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑎)  also known as the linear predictor. 
    To map the linear predictor to the unit interval [0,1], we need a link function 𝐹(∙). While any 
cumulative distribution function (cdf) can be used as a link function, the two cumulative 
distribution functions that are used most often are the logistic distribution: 
Λ 𝑧 =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑧
 
and the standard normal distribution: 
𝜙 𝑧 =
1
√2π
 e−
1
2
Z2 dZ
Z
−∞
 
This analysis will use the cumulative standard normal distribution, which then leads to the linear 
probit model: 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝜙 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖1+. . . +𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘  
                       =
1
√2π
 e−
1
2
Z2 dZ
𝛼+𝛽1𝑋𝑖1+...+𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘
−∞
 
 
59 
 
The linear probit model is used when the outcome, Y, is dichotomous.  Since the outcome in this 
analysis has six ordered categories, I use the ordered probit model.  
    To model the transition between the six ordered categories of infighting, I follow Epstein et al. 
(2006) and Owsiak (2011) and use cumulative transition probabilities.  Let us assume there are C 
ordered categories of the dependent variable, labeled 0, 1, …, C-1.  In this analysis C=6 since 
there are six different levels of infighting.  We can then express the dependent variable (Y) in 
terms of a new variable called Y* such that:  
𝑌𝑎
∗ = 1 if  𝑌𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑎, 
where 𝑌𝑡−1= infighting at time t-1 and α = the ordered category.
11
  The complete translation from 
Y to Y* is given in Table 4.1: 
 
Table 4.1:  Coding of Y* Variables 
Y: 
Level of Infighting at t-1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
𝑌0
∗ 1 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑌1
∗ 1 1 0 0 0 0 
𝑌2
∗ 1 1 1 0 0 0 
𝑌3
∗ 1 1 1 1 0 0 
𝑌4
∗ 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
 
    Since transition probabilities are cumulative, each value of Y* splits Y into a dichotomy and 
indicates whether the prior level of infighting was at or below a particular level of violence.  For 
example, 𝑌0
∗ splits Y into the dichotomy {0, 12345}, and indicates whether prior levels of 
                                                 
11
 I used the lagged dependent variable (Y) to generate Y* because the analysis is interested in transitions from the 
previous time period (t-1).   
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infighting was at or below level 0.  𝑌1
∗ creates the dichotomy {01, 2345}, and indicates whether 
prior levels of infighting were at or below level 1.  𝑌4
∗ creates the dichotomy {01234,5}, and 
indicates whether prior levels of infighting were at or below level 4.  𝑌5
∗ then becomes the 
reference category because it includes all values {012345}, and indicates whether prior levels of 
infighting were at or below level 5.   
    Using cumulative transition probabilities is useful because it allows us to combine categories 
that have similar transition probabilities (Epstein et al. 2006).  Let us assume, for example, that 
𝑌2
∗ and 𝑌3
∗ have similar transition probabilities.  This means that outcomes are basically the same 
when prior levels of infighting were at or below level 2 {012, 345}, and when prior levels of 
infighting were at or below level 3 {0123, 45}.  In other words, actors treat level 2 and level 3 as 
if they were the same.  Since 𝑌3
∗ subsumes 𝑌2
∗, for the sake of parsimony we do not therefore 
need both 𝑌2
∗ and 𝑌3
∗ in the model.  Instead, we can drop 𝑌2
∗ from the analysis, which collapses 
level 2 into level 3 and creates a single, more meaningful category.   
    By definition, Pr 𝑌 ≤ 𝑎 = Pr 𝑌 ≤ 𝑎 − 1 + Pr 𝑌 = 𝑎 , which means we can use 
cumulative transition probabilities to recover the transition probabilities for each individual level 
of infighting.  Substituting Y* for values of Y in the previous period yields the following 
equation: 
𝐹 Pr 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑎  = Θ𝑎𝑏 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑎  
 
    This equation can be estimated separately for each level of infighting.  For example, we can 
estimate one equation when 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 ≤ 0, and then another for 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 ≤ 1, etc.  However it is more 
convenient to combine that data into a single equation which includes Y*, the independent 
variables, and the interactions of Y* with each independent variable (Epstein et al. 2006): 
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𝐹[Pr 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
∗ = 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
∗ )] = Θb +  αlb yit−1l
∗
1
l=0
+ xit  𝛽 +  𝛾𝑙𝛾𝑖𝑡−1𝑙
∗
1
𝑙=0
  , 
 
4.2  Variables 
The following sections briefly describe the variables that will be used in the statistical analyses. 
4.2.1  Dependent Variable: Infighting   
    The dissertation claims that ethnic violence leads to infighting.  To test this claim, infighting is 
operationalized by measuring the intensity of intra-ethnic violence one year after inter-ethnic 
violence has (or has not) occurred.
12
  By lagging ethnic violence, the study seeks to follow the 
recommendation of Rosenbaum (2010:5) that good observational studies should have:  
…a well-defined treatment, that began at a well-defined time, so there is a clear 
distinction between covariates measured prior to treatment, and outcomes measured after 
treatment.     
 
    A one year lag is chosen because the theory predicts a short temporal gap between ethnic 
violence and infighting.  When ethnic violence increases, the theory predicts that infighting will 
follow fairly quickly.  Also, a one year lag between ethnic violence and infighting is neither too 
long for credible discussions of causal relationships, nor so short that questions of reverse 
causality arise (Lyall 2010).     
                                                 
12
 Previous studies have operationalized fragmentation in many different ways.  To measure fragmentation, some 
scholars have focused on splits within existing groups (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012; Findley and Rudloff 
Forthcoming), or on the total number of groups (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; Cunningham 2011) 
(Lawrence 2010).  Still others have developed composite measures of cohesion and fragmentation.  For example, 
Bakke, et al (2012) offer a tripartite measure that defines cohesion by the number of organizations, the distribution 
of power among these organizations, and by the presence of institutions that can coordinate action.  Pearlman (2012) 
looks at leadership, organizational structure, and a sense of collective purpose.  McLauchlin & Pearlman (2012) 
define cohesion by both the presence of an umbrella organization and the presence of armed conflict between 
factions. 
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    The variable, Infighting, is an ordinal variable coded on a 0-5 scale, with 0 representing no 
conflict and 5 representing protracted communal warfare.  Table 4.2 shows the criteria used to 
divide Infighting into these six categories: 
 
Table 4.2:  Summary of Infighting Categories13 
Level of 
Violence 
 
0 No conflict 
1 Sporadic violent attacks 
Attacks without weapons (e.g., brawls), knives, or few small arms 
(e.g., one or two handguns). 
2 Series of bombings/assassinations 
3 Substantial rioting 
4 Sporadic armed clashes 
Attacks with multiple firearms, automatic weapons, or heavy 
weaponry (mortars, shelling, etc.) 
5 Protracted communal warfare 
More than 6 clashes a year between antagonists 
  
 
 
    The distribution of Infighting is displayed in Figure 4.1.  What is most obvious from the 
histogram is the fact that most of the time, ethnic groups are not engaged in intra-communal 
violence.  In fact, out of 2,130 observations, approximately 83% of observations fail to note any 
infighting.  When infighting does occur, it tends to be at either low levels (―…violent attacks 
without weapons, knives, or few small arms (e.g., one or two handguns)‖), or at rather high 
levels (―...armed clashes with multiple firearms, automatic weapons, or heavy weaponry 
(mortars, shelling, etc.)‖). 
 
                                                 
13
 Data from: Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. ―Minorities at Risk Codebook, version 2/2009.‖ College Park, MD: 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management. 
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4.2.2  Explanatory Variable: Ethnic Violence 
    The dissertation claims that ethnic violence leads to infighting.  To test this claim, ethnic 
violence is operationalized by measuring the intensity of inter-ethnic violence each year.  The 
explanatory variable, Ethnic Violence, is an ordinal variable coded on a 0-6 scale, with 0 
representing no conflict and 6 representing communal warfare.  Table 4.3 shows the criteria used 
to divide ethnic violence into these seven categories: 
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Table 4.3:      Summary of Ethnic Violence Categories14 
Level of 
Violence 
 
0 No conflict 
1 Individual acts of harassment, no fatalities 
2 Political agitation, campaigns urging authorities to impose 
restrictions on group 
3 Sporadic violent attacks by gangs or other small groups 
Attacks without weapons (e.g., brawls), knives, or few small arms (e.g., 
one or two handguns) involving fewer than 20 people. 
4 Anti-group demonstrations, rallies, marches 
5 Communal rioting, armed attacks 
Attacks with multiple firearms, automatic weapons, or heavy weaponry 
(mortars, shelling, etc.) OR attacks without weapons (e.g., brawls), 
knives, or few small arms (e.g., one or two handguns) involving more 
than 20 people 
6 Communal warfare 
More than 6 clashes a year between antagonists 
 
 
 
    The distribution of ethnic violence is displayed in Figure 4.2.  From the histogram, we can see 
that inter-ethnic conflict is infrequent, although not as infrequent as intra-ethnic violence.  Out of 
2,130 observations, approximately 62% of observations fail to note any inter-ethnic violence, 
whereas 83% of observations failed to note intra-ethnic violence.  When inter-ethnic violence 
does occur, much of the violence is at moderate levels, which consists of ―sporadic violent 
attacks by gangs or other small groups without weapons (e.g., brawls), knives, or few small arms 
(e.g., one or two handguns) involving fewer than 20 people.‖ 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Data from: Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. ―Minorities at Risk Codebook, version 2/2009.‖ College Park, MD: 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management. 
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4.2.3  Bivariate Relationship Between Infighting and Ethnic Violence 
    In this section, the dissertation takes a preliminary look at the relationship between ethnic 
violence and infighting by examining the bivariate relationship between these two variables.  The 
bivariate relationship is examined by (1) graphing yearly trends, (2) performing a Chi-square test 
for independence, and by (3) examining a scatterplot of the data. 
    First, Figure 4.3 displays the yearly trend in ethnic violence and infighting.  In the first graph, 
we can see that between 1990-1995 there was a steady increase in the number of ethnic groups 
that engaged in ethnic violence.  After 1995, however, the number of ethnic groups that engaged 
in ethnic violence began to decline and then dropped steeply around 2001.  If ethnic violence 
leads to group cohesion, as much of the literature expects, then we should expect less infighting 
during the early 1990s, when ethnic violence was at its highest.   
    Instead, the second graph shows that between 1990-1994, there was a steady increase in the 
number of ethnic groups that engaged in infighting.  After 1994, however, the number of ethnic 
66 
 
groups that engaged in infighting began to decline.  Together, these two graphs show that both 
ethnic violence and infighting increased in the early half of the 1990s, and then sharply declined 
in the latter half of the decade.  This trend lends some preliminary support to the hypothesis that 
ethnic violence is related to infighting. 
 
Figure 4.3:  Yearly Trend in Ethnic Violence and Infighting 
 
  
 
    Next, since both the dependent and independent variables are categorical, we can test the 
independence of the two variables using a Chi-square test.  Table 4.4 lists the observed values of 
the data, and Table 4.5 lists the values we would expect to see if infighting and ethnic violence 
were actually independent of each other.  
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Table 4.4:  Observed Values 
  
Lagged Ethnic Violence 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Infighting 
0 966 119 57 216 25 70 38 1491 
1 65 15 12 34 5 16 3 150 
2 27 0 2 14 2 6 2 53 
3 7 0 0 1 0 4 0 12 
4 48 2 0 15 1 22 8 96 
5 5 1 0 5 0 1 2 14 
  
1118 137 71 285 33 119 53 1816 
 
 
 
Table 4.5:  Expected Values 
  
Lagged Ethnic Violence 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Infighting 
0 918 112 58 234 27 98 44 1491 
1 92 11 6 24 3 10 4 150 
2 33 4 2 8 1 3 2 53 
3 7 1 0 2 0 1 0 12 
4 59 7 4 15 2 6 3 96 
5 9 1 1 2 0 1 0 14 
  
1118 137 71 285 33 119 53 1816 
 
 
    These tables produce a Chi-Square (𝜒2) value of 138 with 30 degrees of freedom.  The 
probability of the null hypothesis of independence being true when 𝜒2 = 138 is less than .005, 
leading us to reject the null hypothesis that infighting and ethnic violence are not related to each 
other. 
    Finally, figure 4.4 uses a jittered
15
 scatterplot to examine the relationship between ethnic 
violence and infighting.  Included in the scatterplot are a red regression line and a blue loess line.  
The regression line graphs the linear relationship between infighting and ethnic violence, while 
the loess line using nonparametric methods to graph the relationship between the two variables.  
                                                 
15
 The x and y values in the scatter plot are jittered so that the density of the data at each point can be more clearly 
seen. 
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Both the regression line and the loess line are generally positive and increasing, lending 
additional support to the claim that ethnic violence is associated with an increase in infighting.   
 
 
Figure 4.4 
 
 
 
    In summary, the yearly trend data, the Chi-Square test, and the scatterplot all provide 
preliminary evidence that ethnic violence and infighting are related.  If ethnic violence actually 
led to increased ethnic cohesion, as much of the literature assumes, we should have seen a 
negative association between ethnic violence and infighting, and not the positive trend indicated 
by the data.  The next few sections will further explore this counterintuitive finding.   
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4.2.4  Interactions 
    According to the theory, the relationship between ethnic violence and infighting is different 
when an ethnic group is geographically concentrated.  A concentrated ethnic group will 
experience greater infighting when ethnic violence occurs, whereas an ethnic group with 
geographically dispersed members will experience less infighting during periods of ethnic 
violence.  To test this hypothesis, the analysis will include an interaction term between a measure 
of the geographic concentration of the ethnic group and the level of ethnic violence.  The 
geographic concentration of the ethnic group is measured on a 0-3 scale with 0 indicating a 
widely dispersed group, and 3 indicating a highly concentrated group. 
    An interaction term allows us to test the hypothesis that the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables is different at different levels of another predictor variable.  
The null hypothesis is that the predictor variable does not change the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables.    
 
4.2.5  Controls 
    In addition to ethnic violence and group concentration, there are several other factors that 
might cause or influence infighting.  The analysis will account for these by including several 
controls in the statistical analysis.  Table 4.6 provides descriptive statistics for all covariates 
included in the analysis.  Since the Markov analysis looks at factors in the previous time period 
that are associated with transitions to higher levels of infighting in the current time period, all 
control variables will be lagged by one year. 
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Table 4.6:       Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Infighting .39 1.038 0 5 2130 
Ethnic Violence 1.17 1.76 0 6 2130 
Geographic 
Concentration 
2.11 1.09 0 3 2130 
Ethnic Kin 1.60 0.97 0 3 2124 
Regime Type 3.31 6.00 -10 10 2130 
Group Population (in 
thousands) 
4696.12 13104 1 138964 2118 
Racial Difference 0.74 0.95 0 3 2119 
Religious Difference 0.82 0.92 0 2 2008 
Language Difference 1.06 0.68 0 2 2124 
Level of Discrimination 3.72 2.66 0 8 1863 
 
 
    First, the analysis will control for the presence of ethnic kin across international borders.  If an 
ethnic group has close kin across an international border, the ability of the leadership to 
consolidate control decreases for two reasons.  First, neighboring kin can become an alternate 
source of leadership, and so when ethnic violence occurs, the members of the ethnic group can 
look to those alternate groups for leadership and direction.  Second, factions within the ethnic 
group can also benefit because access to diasporas and state sponsorship can provide the funds 
needed to sustain an organization during an inter-factional competition.  This decreases the 
ability of the leadership to consolidate control over the ethnic group.  The amount of 
transnational dispersion, kin, is coded on a 0-3 scale, with 0 indicating that the group has no 
kindred across an international border and 3 indicating that the group has ethnic kindred in more 
than one adjoining country.  
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    The analysis will include a measure for regime type.  Democratic states tend to encourage and 
support the growth of civic groups.  This openness allows for the proliferation of factions within 
the ethnic group, and as the number of factions increase, the pressure for fragmentation will also 
increase.  To measure regime type, the analysis will use the Polity2 variable from the PolityIV 
dataset.  Polity is measured on a 21 point scale which ranges from -10 to 10.  A score of -10 
indicates a highly autocratic regime while a score of 10 indicates a regime that is highly 
democratic.   
    The literature on collective action has generally concluded that the larger a group becomes, the 
more difficult it becomes for the group to maintain cohesion (Olson 1965).  Larger groups have a 
more difficult time remaining cohesive for several reasons.  First, larger groups are more likely 
to have a wider range of preferences and identities, which could encourage fragmentation 
(Alesina and Spolaore 2003).  Additionally, intra-group tensions can increase with group size 
because of the decreased reputational costs of ethnic defection (Fearon & Laitin; Rohner 2007).  
The analysis will control for this by including a measure for the logged population of the ethnic 
group, log population. 
    Ethnicity is a broad category that encompasses many different identities.  To unpack the 
concept a bit more, the analysis will control for three types of ethnic distinctiveness: race, 
religion, and culture.  Racial differences from the majority ethnic group, race, are coded on a 0-3 
scale, with 0 indicating ‗no physical difference in appearance‘ and 3 indicating a ‗different racial 
stock, little or no intermixture‘.   Religious differences from the majority ethnic group, belief, are 
coded on a 0-2 scale, with 0 indicating ‗same religion as plurality‘ and 2 indicating a ‗totally 
distinct religion‘.  Finally, language differences from the majority ethnic group are used to 
indicate the degree of cultural distinctiveness.  Language, language, is coded on a 0-2 scale, with 
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0 indicating ‗linguistic assimilation with plurality group‘ and 2 indicating that the ‗group speaks 
primarily one language, different from plurality group‘. 
    The level of political and economic discrimination is also included in the model.  If an ethnic 
group faces a great deal of discrimination from the state, this might influence both their 
willingness and opportunity to engage in infighting.  Discrimination is coded on a 0-8 scale, with 
0 indicating no discrimination and 8 indicating a high degree of both political and economic 
discrimination.   
 
4.3  The Problem of Endogeneity 
    An important challenge in this study is the problem of endogeneity.  Even if inter-ethnic 
violence and infighting are positively correlated, how do we know whether ethnic violence 
causes infighting, as the theory expects, or whether infighting actually causes ethnic violence?  
There are two ways that infighting might cause ethnic violence.  First, some scholars have 
argued that intra-group competition can lead to outbidding.  Factions try to prove their military 
capability and increase popular support by attacking another ethnic group or by escalating 
violence during a conflict.  This undermines the legitimacy of other factions by making the other 
factions look ‗soft‘ and less effective.  The more intense the intra-group competition, the more 
violent outbidding will likely become (Bloom 2004; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012).  
The consequences of outbidding can range from destabilized peace negotiations to increased 
ethnic violence.   
    A second possibility is that ethnic groups which are fragmented are more likely to become 
targets of ethnic violence.  Fragmented ethnic groups are more vulnerable and less able to defend 
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themselves against an attack, and are therefore a more attractive target for predatory ethnic 
groups.  In both these situations, an increase in infighting leads to an increase in ethnic violence. 
    This chapter addresses the problem of endogeneity by lagging all variables.  Lagging the 
treatment is conceptually useful because it allows the model to predict what will happen in time 
period t0 by using information on what happened in time period t-1.  In the case of outbidding, the 
model will look at the degree of ethnic violence one year prior to the time when infighting is 
measured.  If the outbidding hypothesis is correct, then we should not expect to see a relationship 
between lagged ethnic violence and infighting because the outbidding hypothesis assumes intra-
group conflicts are the cause of, and therefore precede ethnic violence.  The outbidding literature 
generally argues that factions incite ethnic violence in order to increase their popular support 
(Bloom 2004; Kydd and Walter 2002). The outbidding hypothesis therefore provides no reason 
to assume that past values of ethnic violence will be related to present levels of infighting.  
    Similarly, if the predation hypothesis is correct, we should not expect to see a relationship 
between lagged ethnic violence and infighting because the predation hypothesis assumes intra-
group violence causes, and therefore precedes ethnic violence.  Under the predation hypothesis 
also, we have no reason to expect that past values of ethnic violence will influence present levels 
of infighting.  Even if infighting encourages attacks by predatory ethnic groups, the theory is 
silent about the consequences of those attacks on the level of infighting.  
 
4.4   Regression Results 
    The statistical section addresses three distinct questions about the relationship between ethnic 
violence and infighting.  First, are ethnic violence and infighting positively correlated?  Second, 
does the geographic concentration of the ethnic group change the relationship between ethnic 
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violence and infighting?  And finally, given levels of infighting at time t-1, does ethnic violence 
effect the transition to higher levels of infighting at time t? 
    The first two questions will be addressed using a multilevel model, and the third question will 
be addressed using a Markov transition model.    
 
4.4.1 Multi-level Model 
    In this section, the dissertation addresses questions about (1) the relationship between ethnic 
violence and infighting, and (2) the effect of geographic concentration on that relationship.  To 
answer these questions, this section will use a multilevel model which regresses infighting on 
ethnic violence, while taking into account the possibility of interdependence among 
observations.  All dependent variables are lagged one year, and the results of the model are 
presented in Table 4.7.  
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Table 4.7:  Multilevel Model 
Dependent Variable: Level of Infighting 
 
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept .214*** 
(.039) 
.094 
(.082) 
-.101 
(.113) 
-.574*** 
(.222) 
Ethnic violence .098*** 
(.014) 
.080** 
(.031) 
.018 
(.035) 
.015 
(.036) 
Geographic 
concentration 
 .057* 
(.013) 
.011 
(.038) 
.007 
(.039) 
Ethnic violence * 
Geo. concentration 
 .009 
(.082) 
.036** 
(.015) 
.037** 
(.015) 
Kin across borders   .106*** 
(.040) 
.117*** 
(.041) 
Polity score   .002 
(.006) 
.004 
(.006) 
Discrimination 
Level 
  .036*** 
(.012) 
.040*** 
(.013) 
Log 
Population 
   .062** 
(.025) 
Different 
Race 
   -.022 
(.041) 
Different 
Belief 
   -.001 
(.042) 
Different 
Language 
   .009 
(.055) 
N 1816 1816 1547 1458 
***p<0.01,   **p<0.05,   *p<0.10 
 
 
    In the first model, which is a simple regression of infighting on ethnic violence, the coefficient 
indicates that a one level increase in ethnic violence is associated with a .098 level increase in 
infighting.  If we look at the minimum and maximum possible values of ethnic violence, this 
coefficient tells us that when ethnic violence=0, infighting=.21, and when ethnic violence=6, 
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infighting=.8.
16
  These results, which are graphed in figure 4.5, support the hypothesis that an 
increase in ethnic violence is associated with an increase in ethnic infighting, and challenge the 
claim that ethnic violence increases ethnic cohesion.
17
   
 
Figure 4.5 
 
 
 
    The next three models interact the effect of ethnic violence with the geographic concentration 
of the ethnic group.  The interaction term is positive across all specification, which indicates that 
ethnic violence has a greater impact (i.e. steeper slope) when ethnic groups are geographically 
concentrated.  When ethnic groups are widely dispersed (geographic concentration=0), the slope 
of ethnic violence in model 4 is .015.  When ethnic groups are highly concentrated (geographic 
concentration=3), the slope of ethnic violence in model 4 is .126.
18
   
    If we look at the substantive results from model 2, this means that when ethnic groups are 
widely dispersed (geographic concentration=0) and there is no ethnic violence (ethnic 
                                                 
16
 The following formula was used to calculate the slope at different levels of ethnic violence:  
Infighting = .214 + Ethnic Violence (.098) 
17
 Since infighting and ethnic violence are rare events, a few observations can have a large influence on the 
regression line.  To check the influence of the observations, the Cook‘s Distance of each observation was examined.  
Cook‘s D values over 1.00 indicate an observation has a worrisome amount of leverage, however none of the 
observations in any of the models had a Cook‘s D over .74.   
18
 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑡𝑕𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽3(𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑕𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
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violence=0), then infighting = .094.  When ethnic violence=6 in widely dispersed ethnic groups, 
infighting=.574.  On the other hand, when ethnic groups are concentrated (geographic 
concentration=3) and there is no ethnic violence (ethnic violence=0), then infighting = .265.  
When ethnic violence=6 in geographically concentrated groups, infighting=.907.
19
  These 
results, which are graphed in figure 4.6, lends support to hypothesis five which argues that the 
effect of ethnic violence on infighting is influenced by the geographic concentration of the ethnic 
group.  
 
Figure 4.6 
 
 
 
    To further explore the interaction between group concentration and ethnic violence, the 
sample was divided into smaller groups according to the level of group concentration.  All 
observations in which group concentration=0 were sorted into one group, all observations in 
which group concentration=1 were sorted into a second group, observations where group 
concentration=2 were sorted into a third group, and in the final group, group concentration=3.  
                                                 
19
 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔𝑕𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = .094 + .08 𝑒𝑡𝑕𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙 + .057 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑛 + .009(𝑒𝑡𝑕𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙 ×  𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑛) 
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Models 2-4 were then re-run using each of these sub-samples.  The results of the analysis are 
presented in Table  4.8. 
 
Table 4.8:  Effect of Ethnic Violence at Different 
Levels of Geographic Concentration 
Dependent Variable: Level of Infighting 
 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Widely Dispersed) 
0 
 
-.004 -.008 -.010 
1 .161*** .012 -.003 
2 .189*** .167*** .177*** 
3 
(Highly Concentrated) 
.092*** .124*** .116*** 
***p<0.01,   **p<0.05,   *p<0.10 
 
    The columns in the table represent the different models, while the rows indicate the different 
levels of group concentration.  Within the table, each number represents the coefficient of ethnic 
violence at each level of group concentration.  While each model was run using the full set of 
variables associated with that particular model, the table lists only the coefficients on ethnic 
violence in order to conserve space.   
    The results of Table 4.8 are quite interesting.  According to the table, ethnic violence has 
almost no impact on infighting when an ethnic group is widely dispersed.  It is only when an 
ethnic group has some degree of geographic concentration that ethnic violence begins to have a 
significant impact on infighting.  Furthermore, the impact of ethnic violence is greatest when 
group concentration is at level 2, hinting at a curvilinear relationship.  This finding could mean 
that widely dispersed ethnic groups are unlikely to engage in infighting when ethnic violence 
occurs because there are fewer ties between group members.  Conversely, when a group is highly 
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concentrated, they more likely to engage in infighting because of increased interactions between 
group members.  As the degree of geographic concentration increases past a certain point, 
though, the geographic concentration of group members somehow begins to mitigate the effect 
of ethnic violence, making infighting somewhat less likely.  Future research might examine the 
interactions between geographic concentration and ethnic violence in order to determine the 
causes of this curvilinear relationship. 
    Turning to the control variables, the coefficient on neighboring kin is interesting because of its 
large substantive impact.  In model 4, a one unit increase in the level of kin leads to a .117 unit 
increase in the level of infighting.  This means that if an ethnic group has kin in more than one 
adjoining country (kin=3), the average value of infighting increases by .351. 
    Finally, two of the variables on ethnic group characteristics are especially worth noting.  First, 
group population is positive, indicating that larger groups tend to experience more infighting.  
Second, the level of discrimination is also positive, indicating that high levels of discrimination 
lead to higher levels of infighting.  While the first finding makes sense intuitively, the second 
finding is a bit surprising.  An ethnic group that is experiencing high levels of discrimination 
would be strengthened by a unified front, and perhaps better able to oppose the discriminatory 
actions.  Further research could explore why this outcome, which seems to be the rational 
outcome, does not seem to occur. 
 
4.4.2  Markov Transition Regression 
    In this section, the dissertation asks whether ethnic violence influences the transition to higher 
levels of infighting at time t, given the level of infighting at time t-1?  To answer this question, 
this section will conduct a Markov probit regression on ethnic violence and infighting.   
80 
 
 
Examining the Y* Variable 
    In this section, I examine whether all five Y* variables should be included in the model, or 
whether, for the sake of parsimony, we can reasonably collapse Y* categories.  This decision is 
made by examining the correlation coefficients between Y* variables.   A strong correlation 
between two Y* variables indicates that two variables convey essentially the same information.  
If both variables are then included in the model, it becomes difficult to distinguish the impact of 
each variable since both tend to increase together.    
    Table 4.9 lists the correlation coefficients between each of the Y* variables.  From the table, 
we can see that there is an almost perfect correlation between 𝑌2
∗ and 𝑌3
∗ (.947).  A look at the 
data tell us that this is because 𝑌3
∗ differs from 𝑌2
∗ by only 11 observations.  While 𝑌2
∗ includes all 
observations where infighting (Y) ≤ 2, 𝑌3
∗ includes all observations where infighting (Y) ≤ 3.  
There are only 11 observations in which (lagged) infighting is equal to three, which explains why 
𝑌2
∗ and 𝑌3
∗ are so highly correlated.  The large degree of correlation between these two variables 
indicates that only one category should be used in the analysis.  Since 𝑌2
∗ is nested within 𝑌3
∗, the 
analysis will collapse 𝑌2
∗ into 𝑌3
∗.         
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Table 4.9:  Correlation Coefficients among Y* 
Variables 
 𝑌0
∗ 𝑌1
∗ 𝑌2
∗ 𝑌3
∗ 𝑌4
∗ 
𝑌0
∗ 1     
𝑌1
∗ 0.693 1    
𝑌2
∗ 0.559 0.807 1   
𝑌3
∗ 0.530 0.764 0.947 1  
𝑌4
∗ 0.198 0.286 0.354 0.374 1 
 
 
    The table also indicates that there is a high correlation between 𝑌1
∗ and 𝑌3
∗.  The large degree 
of correlation between these two variables indicates that only one category should be used in the 
analysis.  Since 𝑌1
∗ is nested within 𝑌3
∗, the analysis will also collapse 𝑌1
∗ into 𝑌3
∗.         
    Lastly, 𝑌4
∗ (in which infighting (Y) ≤ 4) and the reference category 𝑌5
∗ (in which infighting (Y) 
≤ 5) differ by only 15 observations because there are only 15 observations in which infighting at 
t-1 is equal to 5.  Since these two categories are almost certainly highly correlated, and 
because 𝑌4
∗ is nested within the reference category, the analysis will collapse 𝑌4
∗ into the 
reference category. 
    The remaining Y* variables are therefore 𝑌0
∗ which splits Y into the dichotomy {0, 12345}, 
and indicates whether prior levels of infighting were at or below level 0, 𝑌3
∗ which creates the 
dichotomy {0123, 45}, and indicates whether prior levels of infighting were at or below level 3, 
and the reference category 𝑌5
∗ which includes all values {012345} and indicates whether prior 
levels of infighting were at or below level 5.  The advantage of this categorization is that it will 
later aid in the substantive interpretation of the results since the categories partition prior levels 
of infighting into three levels that I label: 
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1. no infighting (𝑌0
∗) 
2. moderate infighting (𝑌3
∗)  
3. high infighting (𝑌5
∗)   
 
 
Markov Ordered Probit Regression  
    This section presents the results of the Markov ordered probit model.  The results of the 
saturated model are listed in Table 4.10.   
Table 4.10:  Markov Regression Analysis 
Outcome Variable: Level of Infighting 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
𝑌0
∗ -1.408*** 
(.120) 
-1.484*** 
(.387) 
-2.459*** 
(.705) 
𝑌3
∗ -.984*** 
(.185) 
-1.860*** 
(.674) 
-2.400 
(1.477) 
Ethnic violence .100** 
(.048) 
.160** 
(.069) 
.200*** 
(.076) 
Ethnic violence*Y0 .067 
(.045) 
.107** 
(.050) 
.123** 
(.054) 
Ethnic violence*Y3 -.083 
(.061) 
.145* 
(.080) 
-.211** 
(.088) 
Geographic 
concentration 
 -.334* 
(.198) 
-.520** 
(.241) 
Geographic 
Concentration*Y0 
 .001 
(.114) 
.090 
(.129) 
Geographic 
Concentration*Y3 
 .470** 
(.223) 
.590** 
(.267) 
Kin across borders  .233 
(.163) 
.279 
(.172) 
Kin across 
borders*Y0 
 .014 
(.104) 
.005 
(.111) 
Kin across 
borders*Y3 
 -.121 
(.185) 
-.165 
(.196) 
Polity score  -.024 
(.024) 
-.029 
(.028) 
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Table 4.10 (cont.) 
Polity score*Y0  .019 
(.019) 
.032 
(.021) 
Polity score*Y3  .014 
(.029) 
.012 
(.033) 
Discrimination 
Level 
 .030 
(.052) 
-.040 
(.071) 
Discrimination 
Level*Y0 
 -.022 
(.041) 
-.004 
(.047) 
Discrimination 
Level*Y3 
 .007 
(.063) 
.070 
(.082) 
Log Population   .030 
(.149) 
Log Population*Y0   .107 
(.073) 
Log Population*Y3   -.017 
(.162) 
Different Race   .178 
(.159) 
Different Race*Y0   -.050 
(.120) 
Different Race*Y3 
 
  -.168 
(.189) 
Different Belief   .223 
(.186) 
Different Belief*Y0   -.231* 
(.120) 
Different Belief*Y3   -.054 
(.213) 
Different Language   -.400* 
(.215) 
Different 
Language*Y0 
  .076 
(.160) 
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Table 4.10 (cont.) 
Different 
Language*Y3 
  .384 
(.253) 
N 1816 1547 1458 
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
    To make this rather cumbersome model easier to understand, I examine both the statistical 
significance and the substantive impact of the findings.  First, to determine statistical 
significance, I first examine whether the interactions of a variable with Y* are significantly 
different from the reference category.  If the interaction of the variable with 𝑌0
∗ is significant, this 
means that the variable has a different effect on the current level of infighting (i.e., a different 
slope) when there was no infighting in the ethnic group last year.  If the interaction with 𝑌3
∗ is 
significant, this means that the variable has a different effect on the current level of infighting 
when there was high infighting last year.  If both the interaction with 𝑌0
∗ and the interaction with 
𝑌3
∗ are significant, this means that the variable has a different effect for all three levels of prior 
infighting.  If neither interactions are significant, this indicates that the variable has the same 
effect for all three levels of prior infighting (i.e., the slopes are all the same).  A summary of this 
is provided in Table 4.11. 
 
Table 4.11:  Meaning of Significant Interactions 
 𝒀𝟎
∗  𝒀𝟑
∗   
Significant? yes no Different effect if no prior infighting 
Significant? no yes Different effect if high prior infighting 
Significant? yes yes Different effect for all three levels of prior infighting 
Significant? no no Same effect for all three levels of prior infighting 
 
 
    We can illustrate this process by using ethnic violence as our example.  If we set the cut-off 
for significance levels at .05, then in table 4.8 the interactions with Y* are not significant in the 
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first model, but both interactions are significant in model 2 and model 3.  Based on this, I 
conclude there is some evidence that ethnic violence has a different effect on infighting for all 
three levels of prior infighting.  
    Next, I examine whether the impact of any of these effects is different from zero.  To 
determine that, I sum the coefficients on the direct and interaction terms and then conduct a 
Wald test to determine the p-value of the summed coefficient.  To obtain the coefficient on the 
effect of ethnic violence when there was no infighting last year, I add the coefficient on the direct 
effect of ethnic violence with the coefficient on the interaction of ethnic violence with 𝑌0
∗ 
(. 100 +  .067 =  .167).  This coefficient tells us that if there is no infighting in the previous 
year, then a one unit increase in ethnic violence increases infighting by .167.     
    To determine whether this effect (.167) is different from zero, I perform a Wald test on the 
hypothesis that the sum of these two coefficients (the main effect plus the interaction effect) is 
actually equal to zero.  The results of the Wald test provide a p-value of .011 (𝜒2 = 6.45, 𝑝 =
0.011), which tells us the interaction effect is statistically significant at the .05 level. 
    These same steps are repeated to calculate the coefficients for the effect of ethnic violence 
when there is moderate prior infighting (𝑌3
∗):  
 
. 100 − .083 =  .016, 
(𝜒2 = .20, 𝑝 = 0.655), 
 
    If prior infighting is high, the effect of ethnic violence is captured by the main effect of ethnic 
violence.  A summary of these results is presented in Table 4.12.  
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Table 4.12:  Summary of Markov Results 
for Ethnic Violence 
 𝒀∗ Model 1 
Ethnic violence 0 .167** 
3 .016 
5 .100** 
Note: Coefficients are the sums of the relevant direct and 
interaction effects.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
    In the table, each row indicates the level of infighting in the prior year, and the column 
indicates the model.  A positive sign on a coefficient means that the variable leads to higher 
levels of infighting, while a negative sign tells us that the variable leads to lower levels of 
infighting.  The asterisks indicate the significance level of the coefficient.   
    The results of the analysis for model 1 are quite interesting and reveal the strength of a 
Markov regression.  According to Table 4.10, ethnic violence is associated with transitions to 
higher levels of infighting when there has been no prior infighting and when prior infighting was 
high.  When prior infighting was at moderate levels, though, the impact of ethnic violence is 
greatly reduced.   
    Next, I examine whether this pattern can be found in the other two models.  The steps 
described above are followed for each variable in Table 4.8.  The results are presented below in 
Table 4.13. 
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Table 4.13:  Summary of Markov Results 
 𝒀∗ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ethnic violence 
0 .167** .267*** .324*** 
3 .016 .015 -.010 
5 .100** .160** .200*** 
Geographic 
Concentration 
0 
 .136 .070 
3 
5  -.334* -.520** 
Kin across borders 
0 
 .233 .279 3 
5 
Polity 
0 
 -.024 -.029 3 
5 
Discrimination Level 
0 
 .030 -.040 3 
5 
Log population 
0 
  .030 3 
5 
Different Race 
0 
  .178 3 
5 
Different Belief 
0   -.008 
3   
.223 
5   
Different Language 
0 
  -.400* 3 
5 
Note: Coefficients are the sums of the relevant direct and interaction effects.  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
    Next, I shift from the statistical significance of the results to their substantive impact.  The 
substantive impact of these findings is depicted in the following set of graphs.  Figure 4.7 
illustrates the effect of ethnic violence on the probability that an ethnic group will not engage in 
infighting.   When an ethnic group has not been involved in ethnic violence (ethnic violence = 0), 
there is an 84% chance that the ethnic group will also not engage in infighting, give or take 2%.  
In contrast, if the ethnic group has been engaged in intense communal warfare (ethnic violence 
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=6), the probability that the group will not engage in any infighting drops to 71%, give or take 
15%. 
  
 
Figure 4.7 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 4.8 depicts the probability that an ethnic group will not experience infighting, given 
previous level of infighting and previous level of ethnic violence.  The red line represents the 
effect of ethnic violence when there has been no previous infighting in the ethnic group (y0=1).  
The blue line represents the effect of ethnic violence when there has been previous infighting in 
the ethnic group (y0=0).  From the graph we can see that if an ethnic group has not engaged in 
infighting, then an increase in ethnic violence increases the probability that the group will engage 
in infighting by about 22%, with the probability of no infighting being 94% when ethnic 
violence=0, and 73% when ethnic violence =6.  If the group has previously engaged in 
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infighting, though, the probability of no infighting declines to 16% when ethnic violence 
increases to 5, but then suddenly increases to 55% when ethnic violence=6.
20
 
 
Figure 4.8 
 
 
 
    Figure 4.9 also depicts the probability that an ethnic group will not experience infighting, 
given previous level of infighting and previous level of ethnic violence.  In this graph, though, 
the red line represents the effect of ethnic violence when previous infighting had been at low-
moderate levels (y3=1).  The blue line represents the effect of ethnic violence when previous 
infighting had been high (y3=0).  From the graph we can see that if an ethnic group had been 
engaged in high levels of infighting, then an increase in ethnic violence increases the probability 
that the group will engage in infighting by about 20%, with the probability of no infighting being 
20% when ethnic violence=0, and 0.2% when ethnic violence =6.  If the group had previously 
engaged in low-moderate infighting, though, the probability of no infighting declines about 11% 
, with the probability of no infighting being 88% when ethnic violence=0, and 76% when ethnic 
violence =6. 
                                                 
20
 This sudden increase is puzzling, and requires further exploration. 
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Figure 4.9 
 
 
 
4.5   Summary and Conclusion 
    Using a series of statistical regressions, this chapter sought to test the claim that ethnic 
violence leads to infighting.  This is an important and controversial claim because much of the 
ethnic conflict literature assumes the exact opposite – the literature assumes that ethnic violence 
actually ‗hardens boundaries‘ by increasing group cohesion.   
    If ethnic violence does indeed increase group cohesion, then the statistical analysis should find 
evidence of a negative relationship between ethnic violence and infighting.  If the theory 
proposed in this dissertation is correct, though, then the statistical analysis should find evidence 
of a positive relationship between ethnic violence and infighting.  Both the multilevel model and 
the Markov regression did indeed find evidence of a positive relationship between ethnic 
violence and infighting, which supports the claim that ethnic violence actually leads to 
infighting.   
    However it is also true that ethnic violence does not always lead to infighting.  The data 
contains several observations in which ethnic groups were engaged in an ethnic conflict, but did 
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not experience infighting.  What differentiates those cases from the rest?  The analyses in this 
chapter suggest some interesting answers to this puzzle.  First, ethnic violence seems to only lead 
to infighting in geographically concentrated ethnic groups.  If an ethnic group is geographically 
dispersed, in contrast, ethnic violence will not lead to infighting.  Second, ethnic violence only 
seems to lead to infighting when prior levels of infighting within the group were low or high.  If 
prior levels of infighting were at moderate levels, then ethnic violence seems to have little impact 
on infighting.  Further research might help us determine the exact causal mechanisms that 
produced these outcomes. 
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Chapter 5:  Case Study: Ethnic Infighting 
 
 
 
    In the previous chapter, the hypotheses were tested using a cross-national dataset of 274 ethnic 
minority groups from 115 different countries.  Using a variety of statistical methods, the analysis 
found evidence to support the claim that ethnic violence leads to more infighting.  This evidence 
is important because much of the literature assumes that ethnic violence leads to greater group 
cohesion.  In contrast, the previous chapter found that ethnic violence generally leads to less 
group cohesion. 
    Building off the results of the previous chapter, the current chapter will explore the causal 
mechanism that links ethnic violence to infighting.  Why exactly does ethnic violence generate 
infighting?  While the previous chapter addressed questions of propensity, this chapter will 
address the question of mechanism.  According to the hypotheses: 
 
H1:  When inter-ethnic violence is at low levels, then at the factional level infighting from 
leadership challenges will also be at low levels.  
 
H2:  When inter-ethnic violence is at high levels, then at the factional level infighting from 
leadership challenges will also be at high levels. 
 
H3: When inter-ethnic violence is at low levels, then at the individual level infighting from 
collaboration will also be at low levels.  
 
H4: When inter-ethnic violence is at high levels, then at the individual level infighting from 
collaboration will also be at high levels. 
 
    To test the claim that ethnic violence leads to infighting through factionalism and 
collaboration, this chapter will study Palestinian infighting from September 2000 to October 
2012.  The Palestinians are an excellent test case for several reasons.  First, Palestinians and 
Israelis have engaged in almost continual ethnic violence since 1948, when the state of Israel was 
first founded.  In this one case, there is therefore over 60 years of data on the effect of ethnic 
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violence on intra-group dynamics.  Second, during this time period there has been a great deal of 
variation in the treatment variable: the intensity of inter-ethnic violence.  Over the past 60 years, 
periods of low intensity ethnic violence have been interspersed with periods of high intensity 
ethnic violence.   
    Third, the previous chapter has told us that ethnic groups which are geographically 
concentrated are more likely to experience infighting during ethnic violence.  The Palestinians 
are not dispersed throughout the region, but are instead geographically concentrated in two areas: 
The Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  The Palestinians therefore meet the conditions outlined in 
the theory, and we should therefore expect to see increased infighting when ethnic violence 
increases.  If this pattern is not evident in this case study, that would provide evidence against the 
validity of the theory.  
    The geographic concentration of Palestinians into two noncontiguous regions also provides the 
unique opportunity to formulate a natural experiment.  When ethnic violence occurs, the violence 
is usually concentrated in either Gaza or the West Bank.  The region that experiences ethnic 
violence can therefore be used as the treated group in a natural experiment, and can be compared 
to the control region which does not experience ethnic violence.  If the hypotheses are true, then 
the treated region should experience infighting while the control region does not. 
    Fifth, the theory developed in this dissertation also contributes to the extensive literature on 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  While some have located the causes of Palestinian infighting 
either entirely within Palestinian society (Schanzer 2008), or entirely due to Israeli actions (Qatar 
Foundation 2010), I argue that both these extreme positions are untenable.  Instead, as outlined in 
chapter three, ethnic violence acts as an external shock on existing group dynamics, both creating 
and exacerbating incentives and opportunities for infighting.  In short, this chapter contributes to 
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the Israeli-Palestinian literature by locating the causes of Palestinian infighting not within 
Palestinian society or Israeli actions alone, but rather at the intersection of both.    
    Finally, human rights groups, such as the Israeli human rights group B‘Tselem, have collected 
excellent data on Palestinian fatalities.  This data allows us to not only differentiate between 
Palestinians killed by Israelis and Palestinians killed by other Palestinians, but to also 
differentiate between Palestinians killed during factional fighting and Palestinians killed due to 
suspected collaboration.  This distinction was not possible in the cross-national analysis because 
such fine-grained data is quite difficult to collect.  While many datasets list the number of 
individuals hurt or killed in infighting, it is quite rare to find a dataset that also provides the 
motive for each killing. 
    Using a blend of statistical analysis, natural experiments, and process tracing, the rest of the 
chapter will test the four hypotheses listed above.  The chapter begins with a series of case 
studies that examine periods of high and low infighting.  The first case study finds that the during 
the first time period, the primary cause of infighting was factional violence, and that the intensity 
of factional fighting was exacerbated by the actions of Israel and the U.S.  The second case study 
then finds that almost all infighting fatalities during the second time period were due to 
suspected collaboration.  In the second case study, the data indicates that spikes in collaborator 
attacks were preceded by increased ethnic violence.  The last two case studies then briefly 
examine two periods of low infighting, and conclude that periods of low infighting were 
accompanied by periods of low ethnic violence. 
5.1   Research Design 
    In this analysis the dependent variable, ethnic infighting, is measured by the number of 
Palestinians killed by other Palestinians for political reasons.  Limiting the focus of the study to 
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political violence is necessary in order to exclude violence due to criminal activities such as theft 
or homicide, which likely require a separate theoretical explanation.  The independent variable, 
ethnic violence, is measured by the number of Palestinians killed by Israelis.   
    The data used in the analysis is compiled by the Israeli human rights group, B‘Tselem.  
B‘Tselem maintains a large database of statistics on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including a 
detailed list of Palestinians killed in the Occupied Territories.
21
  The analysis will employ 
monthly fatality rates from September 2000 to October 2012 because for that time period, 
B‘Tselem has gathered information on both Palestinians killed by Israelis and Palestinians killed 
by other Palestinians.  
    The analysis will examine the underlying causal relationship between ethnic violence and 
infighting by testing the hypothesis that ethnic violence leads to increased factionalism and 
collaborator killings.  The hypothesis will be tested by using the process tracing method on four 
case studies of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  Process tracing is a qualitative method that 
examines causation by looking at how the independent variable produces a series of conditions 
that lead to the dependent variable.  Using a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, 
process tracing attempts to determine whether the proposed causal mechanism is actually evident 
in the sequences of events leading up to the outcome (George and Bennett 2005; Checkel 2008).   
    There are two reasons why process tracing is especially useful in this chapter.  First, process 
tracing can complement statistical analysis by providing important insights into the mechanisms 
that underlie a statistical relationship.  According to David Laitin, the value of process tracing is 
that is has made a, ―fundamental contribution…in finding regularities through juxtaposition of 
historical cases…If statistical work addresses questions of propensities, narratives address the 
                                                 
21
 Data can be downloaded from the B‘Tselem website:  <http://old.btselem.org/statistics/english/>.  B‘Tselem 
continually updates its datasets as new information becomes available.  The data used in this analysis was 
downloaded on 10/12.  
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question of process‖ (Laitin 2002:2-5).  Second, process tracing is especially useful when the 
process under study is characterized by equifinality, in which multiple causal pathways can lead 
to the same outcome.  Indeed, the hypotheses tested in this chapter argue that ethnic violence can 
lead to infighting via two very different causal pathways.  According to George and Bennett 
(2005:215): 
 
Process-tracing offers the possibility of identifying different causal paths that lead to a 
similar outcome in different cases…Process-tracing encourages the investigator to be 
sensitive to the possibility of equifinality. 
 
    The four case studies in this analysis are chosen by selecting on the dependent variable.  In 
their influential book, King et al. (1994) warn that selecting cases on the dependent variable can 
lead to problems of selection bias.  However qualitative methodologists have argued that when 
using certain qualitative methods, such as process tracing, selecting on the dependent variable is 
not only permissible, but is the preferred method of case selection.  This is because process 
tracing is not interested in the correlation between the dependent and independent variable across 
multiple cases.  Instead, the value of process tracing comes from its focus on the specific 
sequence of events that led from the independent to the dependent variable in a single case 
(George and Bennett 2005:13).  
    Therefore in the following analysis, two case studies will examine periods of high infighting 
and two case studies will examine periods of low infighting.  To choose the time periods, I rely 
on fatality reports from B‘Tselem.  In the dataset, there are two time periods when infighting was 
especially deadly:  March 2002- April 2002 in which 38 Palestinians were killed, and May 2007-
June 2007 in which 213 Palestinians were killed.  To select the time periods when infighting was 
especially low, I select the two longest stretches of time when the number of Palestinian deaths 
from infighting was zero.  Those two time periods are July 2011-May 2012 in which no deaths 
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were recorded for 11 months, and September 2009-March 2011 in which no deaths were 
recorded for 19 months.  If the hypotheses are correct, we should expect to see the two periods of 
high infighting preceded by high levels of ethnic violence, while the two periods of low 
infighting will be preceded by low levels of ethnic violence.   
    In both case studies of high infighting, I find that infighting was indeed preceded by a spike in 
ethnic violence.  That spike in ethnic violence, however, was concentrated in Gaza in the first 
case study, and then in the West Bank in the second case study.  This disparity provides a unique 
opportunity to conduct a natural experiment.  A natural experiment is an observational study in 
which there are two or more roughly identical groups.  Some groups are exposed to the 
treatment, while others are not.  Most importantly, the treatment is assigned to groups either by 
nature or by factors that are exogenous to the theory.  The process by which the treatment is 
assigned to groups therefore approximates random assignment.  Natural experiments are most 
useful when the treatment can be clearly defined and is administered in a short time frame, 
because the effects of the treatment can then be more clearly observed (Meyer 1995).   
    In the Palestinian case, a natural experiment is possible because Palestinians are 
geographically concentrated into two noncontiguous regions, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  
During the period of highest ethnic violence, Gaza experienced almost four times more fatalities 
than the West Bank.  During the second highest period of ethnic violence, the West Bank 
experienced almost three times more fatalities than Gaza.  The treatment in both cases, ethnic 
violence, is both clearly defined and administered in a short time frame.  The region that 
experienced ethnic violence can therefore be used as the treated group in a natural experiment, 
and can be compared to the control region which experienced much lower levels of ethnic 
violence.   If the hypotheses are correct, we should expect to see high levels of infighting in the 
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treated region, and low levels of infighting in the control region.  The next two sections present 
the results of these analyses. 
 
5.2   Variables 
5.2.1   Dependent Variable 
    The degree of infighting is measured by the number of Palestinians killed by other Palestinians 
each month, as recorded by B‘Tselem.  Other studies have used different measures to proxy 
Palestinian group cohesion.  Brym and Araj (2008), for example, measure Palestinian social 
solidarity by using the ratio of suicide bombing attempts (what they call altruistic suicide) to 
non-altruistic suicides.  Using this measure, the authors conclude that increased conflict with 
Israel heightens Palestinian social solidarity.  In contrast, this study uses fatalities from 
Palestinian-Palestinian violence to measure Palestinian group cohesion and to test the claim that 
increased conflict with Israel actually decreases Palestinian cohesion.  The distribution of the 
dependent variable is displayed in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 
 
    There are 141observations and the variable has a mean of 4.7 and standard deviation of 15.4.  
The maximum value of infighting is 161, which is a clear outlier.  The vast majority of these 
outlier fatalities occurred between June 12, 2007 and June 14, 2007, during what has become 
known as ‗The Battle of Gaza.‘  This conflict began in 2006 when Hamas won the Palestinian 
legislative elections and Fatah refused to cede power.  In June 2007 Hamas violently removed 
Fatah from Gaza.    
 
5.2.2   Independent Variable 
    The degree of ethnic violence is measured by the number of Palestinians killed by Israelis 
each month, as recorded by B‘Tselem.  The distribution of the dependent variable is displayed in 
Figure 5.2.   
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Figure 5.2 
 
    There are 141 observations and the variable has a mean of 46.8 and standard deviation of 95.0.  
The maximum value is 977, which is a clear outlier.  The vast majority of outlier fatalities 
occurred between January 1, 2009 and January 18, 2009, during operation ‗Cast Lead.‘  
Operation Cast Lead began in Dec. 27, 2008 when the Israeli military launched an assault into 
Gaza in order to stop rocket attacks by Hamas.  By the end of the incursion, a total of 1,397 
Palestinians had been killed. 
 
5.3   High Infighting: May 2007-June 2007 
5.3.1 Background: The Evolution of Factionalism 
 
    The majority of infighting deaths during this time period were caused by clashes between two 
rival Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas.  In this section, I provide a brief history of the 
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rivalry between these two factions, which began with a disagreement over military strategy, and 
evolved into persistent factionalism and eventually electoral competition.   
    Fatah and Hamas support different ideologies, with Hamas endorsing Islamic nationalism and 
Fatah secular nationalism, but it is their strategic differences that have caused the two groups to 
clash
22
.  In the early days, Fatah supported armed resistance against Israel while the Muslim 
Brotherhood, from which Hamas emerged, supported the nonviolent Islamization of Palestinian 
society.  After the First Intifada, Hamas supported armed resistance against Israel while Fatah 
leaned toward diplomacy and negotiation.  The election of Mahmoud Abbas marked another 
turning point.  Abbas completely rejected armed struggle, believing that only negotiation and 
international pressure could lead to a Palestinian state.  Hamas, in contrast, has maintained that, 
―Palestine has been put on the map with the beginning of the Palestinian resistance.  It will 
disappear from the map the moment we stop our resistance‖ (Baumgarten 2005:39).23        
    The roots of the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas can be traced all the way back to early 
1950s, when various organizations clashed over how to respond to the founding of Israel.  One of 
the earliest resistance organizations was the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN), which 
believed that Palestine could only be liberated by a unified Arab army.  However a necessary 
precondition was the creation of Arab unity, which by the mid-1950s seemed increasingly 
unlikely.  According to Baumgarten (2005:32), after several attempts at creating pan-Arab unity: 
  
                                                 
22
 In a 2010 Doha Debate, Fatah and Hamas leaders debated each other over their differences.  Interestingly, the 
participants never even mentioned a religious/secular divide.  Instead, their primary point of contention was the 
strategy that should be pursued against Israel.  Fatah representatives focused on negotiation and international 
pressure, using South Africa as an example, while Hamas officials said Palestinians must focus on making the 
occupation as costly as possible, using Gaza and South Lebanon as examples (Qatar Foundation 2010). 
23
 This quote is from Khalid Mishal, the head of Hamas‘ politbureau in 2003.  Hamas believes that in the absence of 
a powerful external actor that will compel Israel to comply with agreements, the one bargaining chip the Palestinians 
have is ability to deny Israel the security it desires.  To give up the right to armed resistance therefore means giving 
up their only bargaining chip (Gunning 2004).  
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Israel was thriving, the situation of Palestinian refugees was deteriorating, the Arab 
national struggle against Israel was being waged with words rather than deeds, and the 
only ―Palestinian‖ organization, MAN, was seen as doing Nasser‘s bidding. 
  
    In response to the failures of MAN, and of pan-Arabism more broadly, Yasser Arafat founded 
The Movement for the Liberation of Palestine (Fatah) in the late 1950s.  Fatah was founded on a 
distinct Palestinian nationalism, and emphasized the role of armed resistance against Israel.  
Fatah quickly became popular among Palestinians refugees, who were disillusioned both by the 
ineffectiveness of pan-Arabism, and by the poor treatment of Palestinian refugees by their Arab 
neighbors (Baumgarten 2005).  
    The tactics Fatah used against Israel, though, were controversial.  Fatah decided to launch 
guerrilla attacks from a host country, initially Jordan and then Lebanon, in order to provoke 
Israel into a conflict that would then draw in the host country‘s military (Baumgarten 2005).  
MAN feared that these cross-border attacks would prematurely provoke Israel before the pan-
Arabic army was ready.  Another group that refused to endorse the tactics of Fatah was the 
Muslim Brotherhood, from which Hamas would later emerge.    
    The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 and opened branches in Gaza in the 
late 1940s (Milton-Edwards 2008).  Unlike the pan-Arabism of MAN and the Palestinian 
nationalism of Fatah, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted an Islamic ideology, arguing that the 
liberation of Palestine first required an ‗internal jihad‘ and the Islamic transformation of society 
(Abu-Amr 1993).  Rather than fighting Israel, the Brotherhood concentrated on ‗the upbringing 
of an Islamic generation‘ through the creation of an extensive network of religious schools, 
sports and social clubs, hospitals, libraries, and charities (Abu-Amr 1993).  At the time, Fatah 
was highly critical of the Muslim Brotherhood for not only failing to participate in the armed 
struggle, but also for taking volunteers away from armed resistance by claiming it was not yet 
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time for Jihad.  Despite these denouncements by Fatah, the Brotherhood refused to endorse 
Fatah‘s armed resistance.  Instead, the Brotherhood continued to maintain that resistance against 
the Israeli occupation was futile and premature (Gunning 2004).    
    During the 1967 war, Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt, and within six days, had 
defeated the armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.  Pan-Arabism had claimed that only a unified 
Arab army could defeat Israel, but Israel‘s easy victory over these Arab armies resulted in the 
death of pan-Arabism and convinced many that ‗armed struggle‘, or unconventional war, was the 
only viable strategy against Israel (Baumgarten 2005).  Fatah became the dominant force within 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
24
, and its numerous factions immediately began 
launching attacks against Israel‘s new occupation of the West Bank.  By the mid-1970s, the 
PLOs armed wing, the fedayeen, enjoyed the unquestioned loyalty and support of Palestinians 
(Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010).     
    In the late 1970s, though, two separate events would strengthen the role of Islamists in the 
Occupied Territories.  The first was the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which in Palestine focused 
attention on religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.  The second was the decision by 
the Israeli government to allow the establishment of Islamist groups in Palestine in the hope that 
they could counterbalance the PLO, which at the time was the much greater threat to Israel 
(Milton-Edwards 2008).  The Brotherhood took advantage of both these events to step up their 
social and political activities (Abu-Amr 1993).
25
   
    The First Intifada, which began in December 1987, was an important turning point in the 
relationship between Islamists and secular nationalists.  The uprising initially took both the PLO 
                                                 
24
 The PLO was created by the Arab League in 1964. 
25
 Not all factions within the Muslim Brotherhood were content with its policy of avoiding armed resistance with 
Israel.  In 1979, the Islamic Jihad broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood and quickly became one the most 
prominent Islamist groups to engage in armed resistance against Israel (Schanzer 2008). 
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and the Muslim Brotherhood by surprise, but both groups quickly tried to take control over the 
movement.  The PLO created the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), while the 
Muslim Brotherhood created Harakat al-muqawama al-Islamiyya, known by the acronym 
Hamas. 
    When the Intifada began, most of the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to 
continue their course of nonviolent religious outreach since they believed the Islamization of 
Palestinian society was not yet complete (Schanzer 2008).  The younger members of the 
Brotherhood, though, were eager to participate in the Intifada.  To prevent a split within the 
organization, the Muslim Brotherhood created Hamas as a separate wing
26
.  In its founding 
charter, published a few months later, Hamas claimed land occupied by Israel (both Israel proper 
and the Occupied Territories) for a future Palestinian homeland and stressed the importance of 
armed resistance.   
    Although Hamas did not explicitly present itself as an alternative to the PLO, it nevertheless 
repeatedly referred to Islam as an alternative to failed nationalist and secular ideologies (Abu-
Amr 1993)
27
.  Hamas challenged UNLU for control over the First Intifada by issuing rival 
communiqués, and by calling and for rival strikes, marches, and demonstrations (Milton-
Edwards and Farrell 2010).  In its conflict against Israel, Hamas followed a dual policy of 
‗internal‘ and ‗external‘ jihad.  On the one hand, Hamas devoted considerable resources to 
continuing the Islamization of society by expanding the extensive social service network of 
                                                 
26
 By creating Hamas as a separate wing, the Muslim Brotherhood could disown Hamas if the Intifada failed, and 
claim Hamas as its own if the Intifada succeeded (Abu-Amr 1993).  
27
 Hamas was invited to join the PLO, but demanded 40-50 percent of seats in the Palestine National Council (PNC) 
as a precondition for joining.  This number was based on the percentage of votes Hamas generally won in local 
elections to student councils, trade unions, and professional associations.  Since the PLO clearly could not meet this 
demand, Hamas may have been trying to refuse membership in the PLO while avoiding public criticism for rejecting 
cooperation with nationalist movements (Abu-Amr 1993).   
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schools, orphanages, and hospitals established by the Muslim Brotherhood, while on the other 
hand, Hamas engaged in armed attacks against Israel (Baumgarten 2005).   
    As the Intifada continued into the early 1990‘s, the PLO entered into peace talks with Israel.  
The negotiations culminated in the 1993 Oslo Accords, in which the PLO recognized Israel and 
renounced terrorism, and in which Israel agreed to the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
and to withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank.  Hamas reacted with fury, and issued countless 
leaflets denouncing the PLO as traitors.  Hamas also tried to derail the agreements by engaging 
in suicide attacks against Israel.  At this juncture, the Palestinian people, eager to enjoy the 
dividends of peace, put their support behind Arafat and the PLO (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 
2010). 
    The more pragmatic elements within Hamas responded to its declining popularity by 
moderating its policies.  In 1995, Hamas declared a unilateral ceasefire and its spokesman, 
Mahmud Zahar, explained that Hamas continually,  
 
…calculates the benefit and cost of continued armed operations.  If we can fulfill our 
goals without violence, we will do so.  Violence is a means, not a goal. Hamas‘ decision 
to adopt self-restraint does not contradict our aims (Baumgarten 2005:41). 
 
    The Second Intifada and the death of Arafat in November 2004 marked a new phase in the 
Hamas-Fatah rivalry.  Hamas had consistently refused to participate in earlier PA elections both 
because it rejected Oslo and, more importantly, because the popularity of Fatah made it unlikely 
that Hamas could defeat Fatah at the ballot box (Milton-Edwards 2008).  During the Second 
Intifada, though, Hamas‘ armed attacks against Israel found renewed support among a population 
disillusioned by the peace process, by the blatant corruption of PLO officials, and by the steadily 
growing number of Israeli settlements.  
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    Hamas successfully participated in several local elections and then ran in the January 2006 
Legislative election as the party of ―Change and Reform‖ (Usher 2005; Usher 2006).  In 
preparation for participating in mainstream politics, Hamas deliberately toned down its rhetoric.  
In 2004, the leader of Hamas in the West Bank, Hasan Yusuf, suggested that Hamas might be 
willing to concede its goal of a greater Palestine when he referred to, ―a long-term truce with 
Israel on the basis of the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip‖ (Baumgarten 2005:41). 
    The Legislative election, which was deemed free and fair by international observers, provided 
Hamas with a surprising victory.
28
  Hamas offered to form a coalition government, but Fatah 
refused to cede power.  In the weeks after the election, Fatah engaged in a ‗bloodless coup‘ in 
which Abbas issued multiple presidential decrees designed to shift power away from the 
parliament and toward the president.  For example, Abbas shifted authority over the PA‘s 
security forces, information and finance ministries, and payroll and personnel directly to the 
president.  The outgoing parliament also created a new constitutional court with the authority to 
resolve any dispute between the president and the parliament, and the authority to cancel and 
declare unconstitutional any laws created by the parliament (Usher 2006).  These actions caused 
a power struggle in Gaza, which ended in July 2007 when Hamas violently removed Fatah from 
power after weeks of bloody fighting (Norton and Roy 2007).   
 
 
                                                 
28
 Several explanations for the Hamas victory have been offered, including corruption and poor governance by 
Fatah, gratitude for Hamas‘ extensive network of charity organizations, frustration with the stalled peace process, 
and splits within Fatah that led ‗independent‘ Fatah candidates to run against ‗official‘ Fatah candidates (Usher 
2006).  
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5.3.2  A Look at the Data 
 
    Although the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas can be traced back more than 50 years, 
tensions between the two factions reached new heights when Hamas won 74 out of 132 seats in 
the Palestinian Legislative Council in the January 2006 elections.  Fatah, which had dominated 
the PA since its establishment, won only 45 seats (Bullock 2007).  Figure 5.3 graphs the total 
number of Palestinian deaths, starting with Hamas‘ electoral victory in 2006 and ending with the 
removal of Fatah from Gaza.    
 
Figure 5.3
 
 
 
    We can see from the graph that infighting spiked twice during this time period.  The first spike 
occurred in Jan-Feb 2007, during which time 86 Palestinians were killed in infighting.  The 
second, larger spike occurred in May and June 2007.  During those two months, 213 Palestinians 
were killed in infighting, and of those, 167 deaths were the result of clashes between Fatah and 
Hamas.  The majority of these deaths occurred between June 7 and June 15, in what has since 
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become known as the ‗Battle of Gaza‘.  During those nine days of intense factional violence, 156 
Palestinians were killed.  These two spikes in infighting represent a large increase from the 
average number of infighting fatalities over the entire time period studied (9/00-10/12), which is 
roughly 5 per month.   
    The graph also indicates that both spikes in infighting were preceded by spikes in ethnic 
violence.  First, there was a spike in ethnic violence in November 2006.  In that spike, 134 
Palestinians were killed, with the majority of those deaths occurring between November 2
nd
 and 
November 8
th
 during an IDF incursion to stop rockets from Gaza.  During that seven day period, 
98 Palestinians were killed in operation ‗Autumn Cloud‘.  Then in May 2007, 62 Palestinians 
were killed in ethnic violence, the majority of whom were killed between May-16 and May-21.  
This figure represents a noticeable increase from the average number of ethnic violence fatalities 
over the entire time period studied (9/00-10/12), which is roughly 47 per month.   
    This initial look at the data provides some support for the hypotheses since both spikes in 
infighting were indeed preceded by spikes in ethnic violence.  The evidence, though, is only 
moderately strong because (1) the May 2007 spike in ethnic violence is relatively small 
compared to the massive increase in infighting that followed, and (2) there is a spike in ethnic 
violence in July 2006 which is not followed by an increase in infighting.  Since the data only 
provides moderate support for the hypotheses, I further test the hypotheses by conducting a 
natural experiment in Gaza and the West Bank.  
 
5.3.3   A Natural Experiment: Gaza vs. West Bank 
 
    During May and June of 2007, Gaza experienced more than four times as many casualties 
from ethnic violence than the West Bank.  This disparity allows me to conduct a natural 
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experiment in which the West Bank is used as a control group.  If the hypotheses are correct, we 
should expect the number of fatalities from infighting in the West Bank to be lower than the 
number of fatalities from infighting in Gaza.  
    Figure 5.4 compares fatalities in Gaza and the West Bank.  As a reference point, the average 
number of fatalities from ethnic violence over the entire time period studied is roughly 47/month, 
and the average number of fatalities from infighting over the entire time period is roughly 
5/month.  
 
Figure 5.4 
 
 
 
 
    In Figure 54, we can see that in Gaza, ethnic violence was higher than average in May, but 
lower than average in June.  Infighting deaths in Gaza were well above average in both those 
months.  In Gaza, ethnic violence was well under the average for both May and June, and 
infighting was also well under the average for both those months.  A summary of the results of 
the experiment are presented in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1:   Summary of Findings 
 Gaza West Bank 
 May 2007 June 2007 May 2007 June 2007 
Ethnic Violence high low low low 
Infighting high high low low 
 
 
    Overall, the results of the natural experiment are generally supportive of the hypotheses.  In 
the West Bank, the results of the experiment clearly support the hypotheses: when ethnic 
violence is low, infighting is also low.  In Gaza, though, the results of the experiment are mixed.  
Only the results from May support the hypotheses, while the results from June, in which ethnic 
violence was low but infighting was high, seem to contradict the hypotheses. 
    How can we explain this anomaly?  One obvious explanation is that the increased infighting in 
June was the continued repercussion of the spike in ethnic violence from May.  The majority of 
deaths from ethnic violence in May occurred in the latter half of the month, between May16 and 
May 21.  The majority of deaths from infighting occurred in the first half of the month, between 
June 7 and June 15.  Only two and half weeks separate these two events, so a causal link between 
ethnic violence and infighting cannot be ruled out.   
    But how exactly did ethnic violence increase infighting during this period of time?  According 
to the theory presented in chapter 3, ethnic violence acts as an external shock that, at the 
factional level, can provide an incentive and opportunity to challenge the ethnic leadership.  As 
the level of violence intensifies, ethnic violence also creates an environment that facilitates and 
encourages violence within the ethnic group.  When combined, these two consequences of ethnic 
violence dramatically increase the probability that challengers will use violence against the 
ethnic leadership.  The ethnic leadership, in turn, responds violently to challengers in order to 
counter this pressure toward fragmentation and restore group cohesion.   
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     In the next two sections, I use the process tracing method to determine whether there is 
evidence that this is indeed the causal mechanism through which ethnic violence led to the Battle 
of Gaza.   
 
 
5.3.4    An Opportunity to Challenge the Leadership 
  
Israel and America Say No to Hamas. What Do You Say? 
-Hamas Election Banner, January 2006  
 
    Although Hamas won the 2006 Legislative Elections, Fatah refused to cede power and instead 
chose to challenge the Hamas-led government.  According to the theory presented in this 
dissertation, ethnic violence can provide factions with an opportunity to challenge the leadership 
by shifting the distribution of power away from the ethnic leadership and toward rival factions.  
There are three ways in which ethnic violence can shift the distribution of power.   First, ethnic 
violence can target the leadership, causing leaders to be arrested, kidnapped, or killed.  This 
produces disarray and can weaken the leadership to the point that rival factions believe they can 
issue an effective challenge.  Second, if the leadership appears to be losing the conflict, it can 
suffer a loss of confidence and lose the support of smaller factions.  Third, rival factions can shift 
the distribution of power toward themselves by turning to the ethnic opponent for support.  In the 
following analysis of the Battle of Gaza, I find evidence to support the first and third causal 
mechanisms. 
     In January 2006, Hamas swept the Parliamentary elections and won 76 out of 132 
parliamentary seats.  The elections were monitored by several international observation groups, 
which deemed the elections competitive, free, and fair.  Twenty-seven members of the European 
Parliament observed the elections, and the Parliament‘s President, Josep Borrell, said he, ―would 
like to salute the determination of the Palestinian people…who in spite of very difficult 
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conditions went in very large numbers to the polling stations to express their democratic choice‖ 
(European Union 2006).   
    Hamas offered to negotiate a unity government with Fatah, however Fatah was reluctant to 
cede power
29
.  In Gaza, Fatah activists, under the leadership of Mohammed Dahlan, stormed the 
parliament building.  In the West Bank, President Abbas tasked a team of legal experts with 
finding ways to shift powers away from the Parliament and toward the Presidency.
30
  Hamas 
formed a government without Fatah in March 2006, and over the next several months, Hamas 
and Fatah forces clashed repeatedly in the streets.  In February 2007, Fatah eventually agreed to 
form a unity government during the Saudi sponsored Mecca Accord, however in Gaza, Dahlan‘s 
forces continued to clash with Hamas (Steele 2007; Usher 2006).   
    The elections produced a dramatic power shift among Palestinian factions, but why did Fatah 
agree to elections when it was clearly not willing to cede power if defeated?  For almost 50 
years, Fatah had dominated the PA and everyone expected that the elections would provide Fatah 
with another victory.  Hamas itself was surprised by the results.  Publicly, the group claimed it 
had expected victory all along.  Privately, leaders conceded that they had expected to spend some 
time in the opposition so they could adjust to the process of governance (Milton-Edwards and 
Farrell 2010).  According to Usama Hamden, Hamas senior representative in Lebanon, ―The 
result was a shock for us…we decided to go for elections, but we were not expecting that any 
great significance would come from it‖ (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010:261).   
                                                 
29
 Abbas said he would agree to a unity government under the condition that Hamas accepted (1) all UN resolutions 
and Arab League summit resolutions pertaining to the Israeli-Arab conflict, and (2) also accepted all agreements 
signed between the Israel and the PLO (Usher 2006).     
30
 In the weeks following the election of Hamas, Abbas declared that the PA security forces, and information and 
finance ministries would report directly to the President.  Abbas also created a general-secretary position to control 
PA human resources.  The general-secretary was to be appointed by, and report directly to, the President, ensuring 
Abbas would have full control over the hiring of PA staff.  Abbas was given the authority by the outgoing Fatah 
dominated Parliament to appoint a new constitutional court which had the right to ‗cancel any law approved by 
Parliament on the grounds that it is unconstitutional‘ (Usher 2006).    
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    The election of Hamas had also surprised American and Israeli officials.  ―I‘ve asked why 
nobody saw it coming,‖ U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters, ―I don‘t know 
anyone who wasn‘t caught off guard by Hamas‘s strong showing‖ (Rose 2008).  Both the U.S. 
and Israel had firmly stated that they would not work with a Palestinian Authority that included 
Hamas, which both considered a terrorist group.  According to Rice, a party could not "have one 
foot in politics and the other in terror.  Our position on Hamas has therefore not changed‖ 
(Wilson 2006).  Foreign leaders were also wary of funding Hamas‘ attacks on Israel.  In response 
to the election, the U.S. cut funds to the Palestinian Authority, while Israel withheld the customs 
revenue it collected each month on behalf of the PA.  However without these revenue streams, 
the PA was unable to pay salaries and meet other government costs.  Israel also began to target 
Hamas, barring the movement of Hamas officials and detaining 64 Hamas officials, some of 
whom were Legislative Council members (Rose 2008; Usher 2006).  
    For Fatah, U.S. and Israel opposition to a Hamas-led government provided an excellent 
opportunity to gain outside support for an internal power struggle.  Fatah officials used the 
opportunity to acquire weapons and training that could be used against Hamas.  In May 2007, the 
Bush administration promised an $84 million aid package to Palestinian President Mahmoud 
Abbas, most of which was used to train an elite corps of Fatah fighter (Murphy and Mitnick 
2007).  Israel, in turn, permitted American training exercises to take place in the West Bank 
(Murphy and Mitnick 2007).   
    Israel also lifted restrictions on the flow of weapons and people across the Egyptian-Gaza 
border.  In late December 2006, a convey of four trucks was permitted to cross the border with a 
weapons shipment of 2,000 AK-47 rifles, 20,000 magazines and two million rounds of 
ammunition (Harel and Issacharoff 2006).  The trucks carrying the weapons were accompanied 
114 
 
by IDF military police, and the weapons were handed off to PA security personnel (Harel and 
Issacharoff 2006).  In May 2007, one month before the Battle of Gaza, Israel allowed 500 Fatah 
fighters to cross into Gaza from Egypt, where they had been receiving U.S. training (Murphy and 
Mitnick 2007).  This was an unusual move for Israel, which typically restricts the number of 
fighting age men who are allowed to cross over the Egyptian-Gaza border. 
    Israeli and American officials, though, maintained that the purpose of the weapons and 
training was not to undermine Hamas.  Amos Gilad, head of political military policy at the 
Defense Ministry, told Israel Radio, "The assistance is aimed at reinforcing the forces of peace in 
the face of the forces of darkness that are threatening the future of the Middle East‖ (Harel and 
Issacharoff 2006).  According to Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, U.S. Security Coordinator to Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority:  
 
We are involved in building up the Presidential Guard, instructing it, assisting it to build 
itself up and giving them ideas. We are not training the forces to confront 
Hamas…Hamas is receiving money and arms from Iran and possibly Syria, and we must 
make sure that the moderate forces will not be erased (Kalman 2006).   
 
    However despite official Israeli and American objections, few in the region believed that 
Israel and the U.S. intended anything other than the complete overthrow of Hamas.  According to 
Omar Shaban, a former advisor to Abbas: 
Palestinians believe the American support to Abbas is to take out Hamas rather than help 
secure the border crossings…There is a big fear within Hamas that these weapons will be 
used against them, which makes them take the initiative to get more weapons and to 
protect themselves … you are promoting the competition between the Fatah generals and 
Hamas (Murphy and Mitnick 2007). 
 
 
In a commentary for the Jerusalem Post, Palestinian Affairs correspondent Khaled Abu Toameh 
echoed those sentiments: 
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The U.S. believes that by giving Abbas more rifles and cash, it would be able to bring 
about regime change. But in the West Bank and Gaza, there is no shortage of weapons. 
Tons of explosives, rifles and missiles are smuggled across the Egyptian border nearly 
every day. What the Palestinians need is not more rifles -- which they never use to stop 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad or other militias anyway -- but good governance and credible 
leaders…American meddling in Palestinian affairs is backfiring, because many 
Palestinians are beginning to look at Abbas and Fatah as pawns in the hands of the U.S. 
and Israel.  
    Official American documents later uncovered in an investigative report reveal that despite 
protestations to the contrary, the U.S. goal in Palestine was indeed the overthrow of the Hamas 
led government (Rose 2008).  Starting in late 2006, the Bush Administration began pushing 
Abbas to dissolve the government and hold new elections.  If Hamas would not agree, then 
Abbas was to declare a state of emergency and form an emergency government.  Knowing that 
Hamas would respond violently to these actions, Jake Walles, the consul general in Jerusalem, 
was told to tell Abbas, ―If you act along these lines, we will support you both materially and 
politically‖ (Rose 2008). 
    The intent of the U.S. plan, which was approved by President Bush and implemented by 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott Abrams
31
, 
was to force a confrontation between Fatah and Hamas.  Under the plan, Fatah forces under 
Dahlan would be supplied with the weapons and training needed to win the confrontation and 
remove Hamas from power (Rose 2008).  However the American plan backfired and instead of 
driving Hamas from power, the Hamas instead tried to preempt the coup by seizing complete 
control of Gaza (Steele 2007). 
    On April 30, 2007, a portion of an early draft of the plan, which was called, ―An Action Plan 
for the Palestinian Presidency,‖ was leaked to the Jordanian newspaper, Al-Majd.  For Hamas, 
                                                 
31
 Some government officials ironically referred to the plan as ―Iran-Contra 2.0‖ because Elliott Abrams, who was 
placed in charge of the Fatah coup, was also part of the Iran-Contra affair under President Reagan.  Abrams was 
convicted, and later pardoned, of withholding information from Congress during that scandal.  
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the plan represented a blueprint for an American backed coup by Fatah (Rose 2008).  According 
to Fawzi Barhoum, Hamas‘s chief spokesman, the leak in Al-Majd convinced Hamas officials 
that ―there was a plan, approved by America, to destroy the political choice‖ (Rose 2008). 
    Then on June 7, the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, reported that senior Fatah officials had asked 
Israel to authorize another large arms shipment from Egypt.  According to the article, this 
shipment was to include ―dozens of armored cars, hundreds of armor-piercing RPG rockets, 
thousands of hand grenades and millions of rounds of ammunition for small caliber weapons‖ 
(Issacharoff and Harel 2007).  The article also stated that in Gaza, Dahlan was organizing 
another paramilitary force of 1,000 fighters to ―counter its synonymous rival in Hamas‖ 
(Issacharoff and Harel 2007).  The Battle of Gaza began that very day, and after a week of 
bloody fighting, Hamas had completely taken over control of Gaza. 
    Although at the time many thought Fatah had a strong military advantage over Hamas, in 
reality Hamas had several important advantages.  Fatah‘s security institutions had never really 
recovered from Operation Defensive Shield, a massive Israeli incursion during the Second 
Intifada (Milton-Edwards 2008).  Also, when the U.S. and Israel stopped the flow of funds to the 
PA, Fatah was hurt far more than Hamas.  Hamas continued smuggling weapons through the 
Egyptian border, and received about $120 million in aid from Iran (Rose 2008).  Using smuggled 
goods, Hamas was also able to arm its own police force in Gaza, the Executive Force, which 
functioned alongside Hamas‘ armed wing, the Izz-a-din al-Qassam Brigades.  These two armed 
groups were pivotal in Hamas‘ takeover of Gaza (Milton-Edwards 2008).   
    Within the Bush administration, one of the fiercest critics of the Palestinian policy was the 
neoconservative, David Wurmser.  A month after the coup by Hamas, Wurmser resigned as Vice 
President Dick Cheney‘s chief Middle East adviser.  According to Wurmser, Hamas had no 
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intention of forcibly taking control of Gaza until Fatah forced its hand.  Wurmser claims the 
Bush administration was: 
 
…engaging in a dirty war in an effort to provide a corrupt dictatorship [led by Abbas] 
with victory…It looks to me that what happened wasn‘t so much a coup by Hamas but an 
attempted coup by Fatah that was pre-empted before it could happen‖ (Rose 2008). 
 
    The above analysis therefore concludes that ethnic violence provided Fatah with the 
opportunity to challenge Hamas because (1) Israel concentrated ethnic violence on Hamas, and 
(2) Fatah was able to receive weapons and training from the U.S. and Israel.  Thus, the violence 
of May and June 2007 can be directly linked to U.S. and Israeli efforts to help Fatah overthrow 
Hamas.
32
  This analysis, though, does yet tell us why Fatah and Hamas engaged in a violent, 
rather than non-violent, power struggle.  This puzzle will be addressed in the next section.    
 
5.3.5   Creating the Conditions that encourage Violence 
 
    According to the theory in this dissertation, there are three ways in which ethnic violence can 
create conditions that make violence more likely.  First, ethnic violence can create new cleavages 
in the ethnic group, around which competing factions can form.  As the number of dyads along 
which conflict can occur increases, the probability of violence also increases.  Second, ethnic 
violence can increase the probability that challengers will use violence by both (1) reducing non-
violent pathways for protest such as regular elections and by (2) undermining institutions that 
had previously constrained factional violence.  Finally, inter-ethnic violence makes it more likely 
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 This case study also highlights the complexity of political violence because the case study reveals that there were 
several different conflicts being waged simultaneously in Gaza.  First, there was a power struggle between Fatah and 
Hamas, and alongside this was an ideological war between the U.S. and Islamic extremism.  The primary conflict, 
however, was the ethnic conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.  The U.S. likely would not have been so deeply 
involved in Palestinian politics if not for the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.  Additionally, both Fatah and 
Hamas were created in opposition to Israel, and so their power struggle cannot be fully understood outside the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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that ethnic group leaders will respond violently to co-ethnic challengers.  In the following 
analysis, I find evidence to support the second causal mechanism. 
    According a report by the Palestine Center for Human Rights (2007), the security situation in 
Gaza had already been rather tenuous because of the corruption of the Palestinian National 
Authority, and its inability (and sometimes unwillingness) to uphold the rule of law.  After the 
election of Hamas, the deterioration of the security situation in Gaza reached unprecedented 
levels because of both violence from the Israeli government and sanctions from other 
international actors.  This state of lawlessness then created an environment in which rival 
factions could attack each other with impunity.  According to a report by the Palestine Center for 
Human Rights:  
 
Israeli Occupation Forces escalated attacks against Palestinian civilians, the Palestinian 
government and the elected Palestinian Legislative Council. They killed many 
Palestinians, destroyed civilian facilities, abstained from transferring Palestinian tax 
revenues to the Palestinian side and further tightened the siege imposed on the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory. At the international level, the United States, the European Union, 
Canada and Japan decided to suspend financial aid to the Palestinian National Authority, 
which led to economic hardship and further suffering of Palestinian civilians. At the 
internal level, the state of lawlessness and assaults on the rule of law escalated, especially 
in the Gaza Strip (PCHR 2007:11). 
 
These warnings were echoed by other international observers.  In the U.S., Quartet envoy James 
Wolfensohn warned legislators that: 
 
Non-payment of salaries to some 73,000 security staff risks rising criminality, 
kidnapping, and protection rackets…the already highly charged environment needs no 
additional fuel for a spark to ignite (Wolfensohn 2006). 
 
    In the UN, a May 2007 report by Under Secretary General Alvaro de Soto, UN Special 
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-
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General to the PLO, warned that the sanctions against Hamas had produced dramatic economic 
and institutional deterioration: 
The propitious decline of the standard of living of Palestinians, particularly but by no 
means exclusively in Gaza, has been disastrous, both in humanitarian terms and with 
perilous weakening of Palestinian institutions.  The underpinnings for a future Palestinian 
state have been seriously undermined, and the capacity of the Palestinian security 
apparatus to establish and maintain law and order has diminished tremendously (de Soto 
2007). 
 
The ultimate victims of the deteriorating security situation were the Palestinian people: 
 
The population was often left cowering inside its homes as armed gangs took advantage 
of the deteriorating security situation and shot at each other from cars and balconies, 
carried out abductions and killings.  Month after month, throughout the autumn and 
winter of 2006 and the spring and early summer of 2007, armed clashes, assassinations, 
assaults, attacks, and brutal bloody violence broke out between Hamas and its rivals. 
(Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010:272) 
 
    In summary, the immediate cause of the factional violence was a power struggle between 
Fatah and Hamas for control of Gaza.  The two sides brutally attacked each other without 
concern for the many civilians that were caught in the crossfire.  However by deteriorating an 
already tenuous security situation, ethnic violence undermined the institutions that had 
previously constrained factional violence, allowing Fatah and Hamas the freedom to take their 
battle to the street.     
    
5.3.6   Summary of Results 
 
    The highest number of fatalities from infighting occurred between May 2007 and June 2007, 
during a violent power struggle between Fatah and Hamas.  Tensions between Hamas and Fatah 
rose dramatically after Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council in 
the January 2006 elections.  Fatah refused to cede power, leading to power struggle in Gaza.  The 
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power struggle ended in July 2007, when Hamas forcibly removed Fatah from power after weeks 
of bloody infighting.  
    In this case study I find that at the factional level, ethnic violence provided both an 
opportunity to challenge the leadership, and created the conditions that made intra-group 
violence more likely.  Ethnic violence provided Fatah with the opportunity to challenge Hamas 
because (1) Israel focused the ethnic violence on Hamas, and (2) Fatah was able to receive 
weapons and training from the U.S. and Israel.  Also, by further deteriorating an already tenuous 
security situation, ethnic violence increased the probability that the leadership challenge would 
become violent.  
    In this case study, I therefore conclude that the evidence supports hypotheses one and two.  
This case study finds that at the factional level, ethnic violence did not increase Palestinian 
cohesion as much of the ethnic conflict literature would expect.  Instead, ethnic violence 
provided an opportunity for Fatah to challenge the Hamas leadership, and also created conditions 
that made it more likely that the challenge would turn violent.   
 
5.4   High Infighting:  March 2002-April 2002 
 
    The second highest number of fatalities from infighting occurred between March 2002 and 
April 2002, about midway through the Second Intifada.  The hypotheses claim that factionalism 
and the increased threat of collaboration are the pathways that link ethnic violence to infighting.   
If the hypotheses are correct then (1) we should see this increased period of infighting preceded 
by a spike in ethnic violence, and (2) in the following case study, process tracing should find 
evidence for the proposed causal mechanism.  
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5.4.1   A Look at the Data 
 
    The violence of March and April 2002 occurred mid-way through the Second Intifada, a 
Palestinian uprising that began soon after Ariel Sharon entered the Temple Mount in September 
2000.  The Second Intifada ended roughly around February 2005, when Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas declared an end to violence and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon agreed to 
release 900 Palestinian prisoners.  Figure 5.5 graphs the total number of Palestinian deaths 
during the Second Intifada.     
 
 
Figure 5.5 
 
 
 
 
    The figure indicates that both ethnic violence and infighting reach their peak around 
March/April 2002.  The peak in infighting, though, is rather unclear because the scale of ethnic 
violence and infighting is quite different:  over the course of the Second Intifada, the average 
number of fatalities from ethnic violence is 60/month, while the average number of fatalities 
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from infighting is 3/month.  In Figure 5.6, I therefore graph only infighting fatalities so that 
changes in infighting over time can be more clearly seen. 
 
Figure 5.6 
 
 
 
    When we compare Figures 5.5 and Figure 5.6, we can more clearly see the significant increase 
in both ethnic violence and infighting during March/April 2002.  Over the course of these two 
months, a total of 483 Palestinians were killed in ethnic violence, a number which is over four 
times the average number of fatalities from ethnic violence during the Second Intifada.  Thirty-
eight Palestinians were killed in infighting during these two months, which is over six times the 
average number of infighting fatalities.  According to B‘Tselem, each of the 38 deaths from 
infighting in March and April 2002 were due to suspected collaboration with Israel.   
 
5.4.2   Theoretical Explanation for these Findings 
 
    According to the theory presented in chapter 3, ethnic violence not only leads to fragmentation 
at the factional level, but also creates pressure for fragmentation at the individual level.  When 
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ethnic violence occurs, it acts as an external shock that presents individuals with both an 
incentive and an opportunity to collaborate against their ethnic leadership.   
    The incentive to collaborate can come from several sources, including (1) the opposing ethnic 
group which uses positive incentives and negative incentives, (2) internal violence which may 
lead individuals seek revenge or protection, (3) tribal or clan loyalties, (4) the need to provide 
daily necessities and take care of a family, (5) personal beliefs and ideology, which may conflict 
with those of the political leadership, and (6) self-interest and the desire to be on the winning 
side.  Ethnic violence also provides an opportunity to collaborate because the confusion and 
disarray of ethnic violence allows behavior that might have previously aroused suspicion to 
instead be overlooked.  Also during the violence, the ethnic opponent may arrest or detain 
members of the ethnic group, which presents an excellent opportunity to gather information.   
    Ethnic violence also increases the threat that collaboration poses to the ethnic leadership, and 
in order to reduce that threat and restore group cohesion, the ethnic leadership is likely to use 
violence against suspected collaborators.  As the threat posed by collaboration increases, 
collaborator attacks are likely to become more public and violent.  The following case study tests 
this causal mechanism.  
 
5.4.3    What is Collaboration? 
 
    Collaboration is generally defined as working jointly with others.  In the context of an 
occupation, though, collaboration means working with the occupying force against one‘s own 
ethnic group.  Jawwad (2001) has developed a classification of Palestinian collaborators.  In his 
classification scheme, there is first the land dealer, who makes a profit off the occupation by 
purchasing land from Palestinians and then transferring that land to Israelis.  Second is the 
intermediary, who serves as an intermediary between the Israeli administrative apparatus and the 
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Palestinian population.  Some intermediaries have been known to require bribes from 
Palestinians before obtaining the necessary permits from Israel (Rigby 1996).   
    Next is the armed collaborator, who accompanies Israeli Special Forces on raids.  Fourth is the 
informant, who provides general political information, such as ‗who hangs out with whom‘, or 
who attended the recent rally.  Next is the economic collaborator, whose function is to push 
Israeli products in the Palestinian market.  Last is the infiltrator, which is usually the type of 
collaborator that first comes to mind for most people.  The infiltrator provides information from 
within Palestinian organizations.     
    At various times, the definition of ‗collaboration‘ has also been expanded to include criminals, 
such as drug-dealers, pimps, and prostitutes, on the ground that they undermine the morality of 
Palestinian society and therefore undermine the national struggle (Rigby 1996). 
 
5.4.4    The Incentive and Opportunity for Collaboration 
 
    Israel relies heavily on a network of collaborators to gather military intelligence about the 
Occupied Territories.  Collaborators can be recruited through a variety of methods.  For example, 
collaborators can be offered monetary incentives, which are especially attractive in a society 
where fifty percent of families live below the poverty line (Luft 2003).  Collaborators can also be 
recruited using other incentives, such as the permits needed to earn a livelihood, or the permits 
needed to take a sick relative overseas for medical treatment (Rigby 2001).  The price of these 
incentives might initially be low, say meeting with Israeli officials once a month, but that initial 
compromise can easily become a way to blackmail collaborators into further compromises.   
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    Another source of blackmail is the highly conservative morality of Palestinian society.  
Prominent Palestinian activists have inadvertently allowed themselves to become entrapped in 
schemes which combine prostitution and blackmail (Tamari 1990). 
    The Israeli prison system, which holds thousands of Palestinian security detainees and 
prisoners, is an especially important recruitment ground because many Palestinians who have 
been arrested and imprisoned have been pressured to become informants (Rigby 2001).  Within 
the prison system, recruitment can occur through a number of paths.  Petty criminals can be 
promised money or a reduced sentence in return for eliciting information from other prisoners 
(Tamari 1990).  Others can be threatened with a life sentence, whether possible or not, and then 
released back into Palestinian society after they agree to become informants (Jawwad 2001).  
The Second Intifada provided an excellent opportunity to recruit informants because during the 
four years of the Second Intifada, roughly 7,300 Palestinians were rotated through the Israeli 
prison system (Elmer 2012).   
    Finally, some Palestinians become informants not because they have been coerced, but rather 
because they oppose the policies of the Palestinian government.  In a recent documentary 
entitled, ‗The Collaborator and his Family‘, Ibrahim, a Palestinian informant from the West 
Bank, reveals that he became a collaborator because he opposed violent attacks against Israel 
(Sherwood 2011). 
 
5.4.5    The Threat Posed by Collaboration 
 
    Collaborators are a threat to the Palestinian leadership for several reasons.  During the First 
Intifada (1987-1993), the wide-scale use of Israeli recruitment methods met with great success.  
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By mid-1989, bands of armed collaborators were roaming villages and assisting Israeli security 
forces in arresting and interrogating suspected Palestinian activists.   
    Collaborators have also participated in the targeted assassination of Palestinian leaders.  In 
1996, Yahya Ayyash, known as ‗the Engineer‘ because of his skill in creating bombs, was 
assassinated by a bomb hidden inside a cell phone.  The cell phone was given to Ayyash by a 
Palestinian collaborator who was working with Israeli intelligence services (Milton-Edwards and 
Farrell 2010:118).     
    The fear of collaboration often forces Palestinian leaders to be constantly on the move (Luft 
2003).  Salah Shihada, the founder of one of Hamas‘ military wings, was assassinated when 
Israel dropped a bomb on the home where he was staying, killing Shidada along with fifteen 
civilians, nine of whom were children.  Israel was able to determine the location of Shihada 
based on information supplied by a Palestinian informant.  This dramatic event increased the fear 
of collaboration among Palestinians.  According to one Palestinian journalist:   
 
People are now looking for wanted men. They are stopping them in the middle of the 
street and will now begin asking for their identification before they enter a specific 
residential neighborhood. … No one feels safe. … How do you know who will be 
Shihada number two, and where the missile will come from? … Someone must have told 
the Shin Bet (GSS) that Shihada was visiting his house; that someone must live among 
us, and now everyone is looking for collaborators (Luft 2003). 
 
 
 
5.4.6    The Punishment for Collaboration 
 
    In Palestinian society, the punishment for collaboration can range from public admissions of 
guilt, to torture and summary execution.  The inconsistent punishment for collaboration is 
actually symptomatic of a larger issue.   Under the Cairo Agreement (1994) and the Taba 
Agreement (1995), Palestinian negotiators agreed not to threaten or harm ‗Palestinians who have 
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maintained contact with the Israeli authorities‘ (Rigby 2001).  However popular sentiment often 
views collaboration as treason, and demands an appropriate punishment.  According to Sheikh 
Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas: 
 
Collaboration can be defined as a contagious disease, like cancer or gangrene.  We excise 
the affected member in order to prevent the disease from spreading to the body‘s healthy 
members.  The collaborator declares a state of war between himself and his society, and 
passes on to the society‘s enemies information about his people and the reality in which 
they live….it is absolutely and utterly forbidden to remain silent about this or ignore it 
(Milton-Edwards 2008:119).   
 
    The gap between public policy and popular sentiment has led to either vigilante groups taking 
the matter into their own hands, or to judicial procedures which lack sufficient protection for the 
accused (Rigby 2001).  According to Lia (2006:395-396): 
 
Vigilant policing may occur as a communal response to the ‗perceived shortfall in the 
maintenance of order in society.‘  It spreads wherever state authorities are undermined by 
intercommunal or ethnic conflict and where significant segments of the population are 
prevented from resorting to the police in order to resolve conflicts and deal with crime.      
 
    The type of ‗justice‘ meted out by vigilante groups is often linked to the perceived threat 
posed by collaboration.  In the more extreme cases, collaborators have been assassinated by 
organizations, tortured by Palestinian security forces, killed by vigilante groups, or lynched by 
crowds (B'Tselem 2011).  Some attacks have been especially brutal, with collaborators being 
tortured and killed and their bodies publically displayed in order to serve as a warning to other 
collaborators.  Even when brought before the judicial system, collaborators are unlikely to be 
given a fair trial and have sometimes been condemned to death without the right to either defend 
themselves or appeal the conviction (Rigby 2001).  In 2002, Amnesty International issued a 
report citing their concern over the unlawful killings of suspected collaborators.  The report 
condemned the Palestinian Authority for not enforcing the rule of law by arresting the 
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perpetrators of these extrajudicial killings, and for committing human rights abuses by torturing 
collaborators arrested by the police forces (Amnesty International 2002).  Even the families of 
collaborators have been penalized.  The families have sometimes been required to denounce the 
collaborator, and are often ostracized by the rest of the community (Sherwood 2011).   
    In response to the growing number of collaborators during the First Intifada, both Hamas and 
the PLO began a counter-intimidation strategy that led to the deaths of hundreds of suspected 
collaborators.  The definition of collaboration was much broader during that time, and included 
everything from working with Israeli security forces, to not participating in work strikes, or 
marketing banned Israeli products (B'Tselem 2011).   
    In the final three years of the Intifada, the creation of vigilante ‗strike forces‘ to target 
collaborators combined with a broadened definition of what constituted collaboration, led to the 
killing of 150-200 suspected collaborators each year (Rigby 2001).  Dr. Eyad Sarraj, a 
psychiatrist in Gaza, describes the fear caused by those strike forces: 
 
I remember during the First Intifada when Hamas used to kill people and throw their 
bodies on the rubbish dump.  They would say ―this is a drug trafficker or collaborator‖ or 
something.  Of course they were killing these people under torture.  To my knowledge 
Hamas killed more people than the Israelis during the First Intifada, at least in Gaza.
33
  
To the extent that I was sitting once with Haider Abdel Shafi in his house and there was a 
knock on the door and it was a masked Palestinian militia.  I was hoping it was an Israeli 
soldier because you can deal with an Israeli soldier.  And that was the wish of so many 
Palestinians at that time.  We were too scared to open the door at night just in case it 
would be Palestinian militia, who would not have the time for discussion or argument, 
they would just shoot you and kill you (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010:119).      
 
    During the Second Intifada, the definition of collaboration was less broad, and was primarily 
defined as working with Israeli security forces.  Many of the collaborators killed during the 
Second Intifada were killed in summary executions by small groups of armed gunmen.   
                                                 
33
 This quotation is interesting because it reflects the Dr. Sarraj‘s perceptions of threat.  The actual fatality numbers 
from the First Intifada, though, show that Israelis killed 1551 Palestinians (B'Tselem n.d.), while Palestinians killed 
822 Palestinians (Human Rights Watch 2001). 
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    When collaboration is not seen as a grave threat, though, the punishment meted out 
collaborators can be quite mild.  Suspected collaborators are sometimes given the chance to 
repent by taking an oath of contrition on the Qur‘an, or by confessing and asking for forgiveness 
through the loudspeaker at the mosque (Schanzer 2002).  During the First Intifada (1987-1993), 
vigilante ‗strike forces‘ forced hundreds of collaborators to recant and to publically surrender 
their weapons in mosques and churches (Tamari 1990).   
    Both Palestinians and Israelis have used violence against suspected ‗collaborators‘ as a cover 
for other motives.  Among Palestinians, for example, collaborator killings have sometimes been 
used to further local grievances and feuds.  During the Palestinian Revolt of the 1930s, feuding 
clans and political factions used charges of collaboration to discredit rivals and justify violence 
(Rigby 2001).   
    Collaborator killings have also been used as part of disinformation campaigns by Israel.  
During the First Intifada, for example, Israeli security forces spread counterfeit bulletins which 
listed the names of collaborators who had already been exposed alongside the names of 
prominent Palestinians who were not collaborators (Tamari 1990). 
 
5.4.7   A Closer Look at the Data 
 
    Figure 5.7 provides a closer look at the two months when both ethnic violence and 
collaborator killings were at their highest.  The figure shows that there were actually two 
separate increases in ethnic violence.  If the hypotheses are true, then each increase in ethnic 
violence will be closely followed by an increase in collaborator killings.  The data confirms these 
expectations.  
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Figure 5.7 
 
 
 
    The first increase in ethnic violence occurred in early March with an IDF incursion into the 
West Bank.  The purpose of the incursion was to pursue Palestinians who were carrying out 
attacks on Israel, and the incursion involved ―the use of ground troops, attack helicopters, tanks 
and F-16 fighter jets in civilian areas, including refugee camps, causing significant loss of life 
among civilians‖ (U.N. General Assembly 2002).   This incursion was followed a few days later 
by an increase in attacks against collaborators, with 11 Palestinians killed for suspected 
collaboration during mid-March.  In the latter half of the month, ethnic violence decreased and 
there were no reported attacks on collaborators.   
    The second increase in ethnic violence began on March 29, when the Israeli government 
launched a second IDF incursion into the West Bank.  Operation ‗Defensive Shield‘ lasted from 
March 29 to May 3, and in the first nine days of the conflict 187 Palestinians were killed by 
Israel.  No Palestinians were killed in infighting during the first three days of the operation, but 
then on April 1, eleven Palestinians were attacked and killed for collaborating with Israel, and 
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then three days later, another 11 Palestinians were killed for suspected collaboration.  In the 
second half of the month, both ethnic violence and collaborator killings declined. 
    The data therefore supports the claim that ethnic violence leads to increased attacks against 
collaborators.  Both Israeli incursions into the West Bank led to a high number of Palestinian 
deaths, and a few days after the incursions began, there was a wave of attacks against 
collaborators. 
 
5.4.8    Endogeneity 
 
    In each of the graphs, a spike in collaborator killings is then followed by a period of time in 
which ethnic violence is either reduced or again at mean levels.  This is important because it 
addresses the problem of reverse causality.  If infighting actually led to ethnic violence through 
outbidding or predation, rather than the other way around, we would expect that increased 
infighting would then be followed by higher levels of ethnic violence.  However, according to 
the data higher levels of ethnic violence always preceded infighting spikes.  After the infighting 
spike, what then followed was a period of reduced ethnic violence.  The data therefore does not 
support the argument for reverse causality.  
 
5.4.9    A Natural Experiment: Gaza vs. West Bank 
 
    During March and April of 2002, the West Bank experienced almost three times as many 
casualties from ethnic violence as Gaza.  This disparity allows us to conduct a natural experiment 
in which Gaza is used as a control group.  If the hypotheses are correct, we should expect the 
number of fatalities from infighting in Gaza to be lower than the number of fatalities from 
infighting in the West Bank.  
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    Figure 5.8 compares fatalities in Gaza and the West Bank.  As a reference point, the average 
number of fatalities from ethnic violence over the entire time period studied is roughly 47/month, 
and the average number of fatalities from infighting over the entire time period is roughly 
5/month.  
 
Figure 5.8 
 
 
 
    In the figure, we can see that in the West Bank, ethnic violence was well over the average in 
both March and April.  Infighting deaths were also above the average during these same months.  
In Gaza, ethnic violence was over the average in March, but under the average in April.  
Infighting, though, was below average in both those months.  A summary of the results of the 
experiment are presented in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2:   Summary of Findings 
 West Bank Gaza 
 March 2002 April 2002 March 2002 April 2002 
Ethnic Violence high high high low 
Infighting high high low low 
 
 
    Overall, the results of the natural experiment generally support the hypotheses.  In the West 
Bank, the results of the experiment clearly support the hypotheses: when ethnic violence is high, 
infighting is also high.  In Gaza, though, the results are more mixed.  In Gaza, only the results 
from April support the hypotheses, while the results from March, in which ethnic violence was 
high but infighting was low, appear to contradict the hypotheses. 
    However a closer look at the data might explain this anomaly.  In general, deaths from 
infighting during the Second Intifada were almost three times higher in the West Bank than in 
Gaza.  During the Second Intifada, 113 Palestinians were killed in infighting in the West Bank, 
whereas 40 were killed in infighting in Gaza.  This means that on average, 2.1 Palestinians were 
killed per month in the West Bank, whereas in Gaza the fatality rate from infighting was 0.7 per 
month.  In March, the month that seems to challenge the hypotheses, ethnic violence was high, 
and 2 people were killed in infighting, which is almost three times the average for Gaza during 
this time period.  If our reference point is the average number of fatalities during the Second 
Intifada in Gaza alone, rather than in both Gaza and the West Bank, then the results of the 
experiment in Gaza are actually consistent with the hypotheses.   
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5.4.10    Summary of Results 
 
    The second highest number of fatalities from infighting occurred between March 2002 and 
April 2002, in the midst of the Second Intifada.  The Second Intifada was a period of increased 
ethnic violence and the case study reveals that this ethnic violence changed the role of 
collaborators in the conflict.  The increased need for military intelligence led Israel to intensify 
recruitment efforts, while the increased danger posed by collaboration led Palestinians to 
violently target suspected collaborators.  According to B‘Tselem, every infighting death that 
occurred during these two months was due to suspected collaboration with Israel.   
    The data indicates that there were actually two separate spikes in ethnic violence during this 
time period, and each spike in ethnic violence was then closely followed by a spike in 
collaborator killings.  Moreover, the ethnic violence was concentrated in the West Bank, which 
allows us to conduct a natural experiment in which Gaza becomes the control case that received 
lower levels of the treatment (ethnic violence).  The results of the experiment suggest that spikes 
in ethnic violence are usually followed by spikes of collaborator killings, but when there is no 
spike in ethnic violence, there is also no spike in collaborator killings.   
    I therefore conclude that this case study provides evidence to support hypotheses three and 
four.  At the individual level, ethnic violence did not increase ethnic cohesion.  Instead, ethnic 
violence created opportunities and incentives for collaboration.  Thousands of Palestinians were 
rotated through the Israeli prison system, where they faced heavy pressure to become informants.  
Some agreed to become informants out of greed, others because of fear, still others because they 
were trying to take care of their family.  If discovered, informants were deemed traitors and often 
attacked by other Palestinians.  In this case study I therefore conclude that at the individual level, 
ethnic violence led to infighting and division within Palestinian society, rather than unity.  
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5.5   Two Periods of Low Infighting  
    Finally, the chapter will test the hypotheses on two periods of low infighting in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  To select the time periods when infighting was especially low, I select the 
two longest stretches of time when the number of Palestinian deaths from infighting was zero.  
Those two time periods are September 2009-March 2011, during which time no deaths were 
recorded for 19 months, and July 2011-May 2012, during which time no deaths were recorded 
for 11 months.  If the hypotheses are true, then in both these time periods ethnic violence should 
also be low. 
 
5.5.1    September 2009-March 2011 
 
    The longest period of time in which there were no reported fatalities from infighting occurred 
between Sept 2009 and March 2011.  Figure 5.9 graphs Palestinian fatalities during this time 
period. 
Figure 5.9 
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    Over the course of these 19 months, the total number of deaths from infighting was zero, 
which is a large decrease from the average number of fatalities, which is roughly 5 per month.  
At the same time, the total number of deaths from ethnic violence was 127, or 6.7 per month, 
which is much lower than the average of roughly 47 per month.  The evidence from this time 
period therefore supports the claim that periods of low ethnic violence are associated with 
periods of low infighting. 
 
5.5.2    July 2011-May 2012 
 
    The second longest period of time in which there were no reported fatalities from infighting 
occurred between July 2011 and May 2012.  Figure 5.10 graphs Palestinian fatalities during this 
time period. 
 
Figure 5.10 
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same time, the total number of deaths from ethnic violence was 96, or 8.7 per month, which is 
much lower than the average of roughly 47 per month.  I therefore conclude that this time period, 
along with the one examined above, provide evidence that periods of low ethnic violence are 
associated with periods of low infighting.   
 
5.6   Summary 
  
    While the previous chapter tested the claim that ethnic violence leads to infighting, the present 
chapter tested the claim that factional violence and collaborator killings are the mechanisms 
through which ethnic violence leads to infighting.  This argument was tested using a case study 
of Palestinian infighting.   
    The chapter began with a statistical regression which found evidence that ethnic violence leads 
to infighting.  To test how ethnic violence led to this outcome, the analysis then used process 
tracing on a set of comparative case studies.  The case studies provided evidence that at the 
factional level, ethnic violence increased infighting due to leadership challenges.  At the 
individual level, ethnic violence increased infighting due to collaboration.  The next two sections 
summarize these findings.   
 
5.6.1    Factionalism 
 
    The highest number of fatalities from infighting occurred between May 2007 and June 2007, 
during a power struggle between Fatah and Hamas.  Tensions between Hamas and Fatah rose 
dramatically in January 2006 when Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative 
Council.  Fatah refused to cede power, leading to leadership struggle in Gaza.  The leadership 
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struggle ended in July 2007, when Hamas forcibly removed Fatah from power after weeks of 
bloody infighting.  
    In this case study, I find that ethnic violence both provided an opportunity to challenge the 
leadership, and created the conditions that made intra-group violence more likely.  Ethnic 
violence provided Fatah with the opportunity to challenge Hamas because (1) Israel concentrated 
the ethnic violence on Hamas, and (2) Fatah was able to receive weapons and training from the 
U.S. and Israel.  Also, by further deteriorating an already tenuous security situation, ethnic 
violence undermined the security institutions that might have restrained violence.  In this case 
study, I therefore conclude that the evidence supports hypotheses one and two. 
 
5.6.2    Collaboration 
 
    The second highest number of fatalities from infighting occurred between March 2002 and 
April 2002, about midway through the Second Intifada.  The Second Intifada was a period of 
increased ethnic violence between Israelis and Palestinians, and this ethnic violence changed the 
role of collaborators in the conflict.  The increased need for military intelligence led Israel to 
intensify recruitment efforts, while the increased danger of collaboration led Palestinians to 
brutally attack suspected collaborators.  The number of infighting deaths during the Second 
Intifada spiked during March and April 2002, and every infighting death during those two 
months was an attack against a suspected collaborator.  I therefore conclude that this case study 
provides evidence to support hypotheses three and four. 
    This chapter therefore finds that ethnic violence did not increase Palestinian cohesion, as much 
of the ethnic conflict literature would expect.  Instead, at the factional level, ethnic violence 
helped create an opportunity for Fatah to challenge the Hamas leadership, while also creating 
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conditions that made it more likely that the challenge would turn violent.  At the individual level, 
ethnic violence created opportunities and incentives for collaboration.  If discovered, 
collaborators were deemed traitors by other Palestinians and often killed.  As the hypotheses 
predicted, the case study finds that ethnic violence did not push the ethnic group toward cohesion 
but rather toward fragmentation. 
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Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
 
 
6.1  The Puzzle of Ethnic Infighting 
    Why, during an ethnic conflict, would an ethnic group turn its weapons against itself?  That is 
the question that has motivated this dissertation.  Such behavior is puzzling because as an ethnic 
group devotes valuable time, energy, and resources on an intra-group conflict, it reduces the total 
amount of resources the group can draw on to effectively wage the ethnic conflict.  Instead of 
focusing attention and resources on fighting the opponent, ethnic leaders turn their weapons on 
the very group in whose name they are supposedly fighting.   
 
6.2  Literature Review 
    With few notable exceptions, the ethnic conflict literature does not see infighting as 
problematic.  This is because the literature generally assumes that violence ‗hardens‘ ethnic 
boundaries and increases group cohesion (Coser 1956).  In Chapter 2, I found that scholars 
actually mean three different things when they use the term ‗hardened boundary‘: (1) increased 
loyalty to one‘s ethnic group, (2) greater hostility between ethnic groups, and (3) the external 
imposition of ethnicity.  I then examined each of these three arguments and found that while 
ethnic violence has sometimes produced group cohesion, under other conditions it can produce 
the exact opposite outcome: ethnic violence (1) can decrease loyalty to an ethnic group, (2) can 
decrease hostility between ethnic groups, and (3) can remove externally imposed ethnic 
identities.   
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    The ethnic conflict literature therefore provides limited clues into the puzzle of infighting 
during ethnic conflict.  Instead, we turned to the civil conflict literature, which has made recent 
inroads into the problem of rebel fragmentation during civil conflict.  This literature tends to 
locate the causes of infighting in three different locations:  combatant characteristics, power 
shifts between factions, and the context in which factions operate.  This dissertation focuses on 
the last of these, and develops a theory which examines the wide range of consequences that 
ethnic violence can have on factions. 
 
6.3  Theory of Ethnic Infighting  
    According to the theory outlined in Chapter 3, infighting during an ethnic conflict is the 
irrational macro-level outcome produced by rational micro-level choices.  At the micro-level, 
individuals and factions are responding to incentives and opportunities generated by the ethnic 
violence itself.  First, at the factional level, ethnic violence encourages fragmentation by 
providing incentives and opportunities to challenge the ethnic leadership.  Incentives to 
challenge the leadership can certainly exist prior to the outbreak of ethnic violence, however 
existing theories assume that the outbreak of ethnic violence then encourages the ethnic group to 
overlook these differences and unite against a common threat.  Instead, this dissertation finds that 
ethnic violence actually creates new areas of contention such as the type of strategy (terrorism 
vs. non-violence) the ethnic group should employ against their opponent.  By placing new issues 
on the table, ethnic violence provides factions with more reasons and opportunities to contest the 
current leadership.   
    As the level of ethnic violence increases, ethnic violence pushes the ethnic group toward 
violent infighting for at least two reasons.  First, intense ethnic violence lowers the cost and 
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increases the benefits of infighting by eroding institutions that maintain law and order, such as 
police forces, and by eroding non-violent pathways toward regime change, such as elections.  
Second, intense ethnic violence increases the cost of bargaining and negotiation.  As the 
casualties from ethnic violence begin to mount, rivals begin to fear for their survival.  The threat 
to their survival increases the costs of a time-consuming bargaining process, and makes the 
efficiency of violence a more attractive option.       
    At the individual level, ethnic violence encourages fragmentation by providing group 
members with incentives and opportunities to collaborate with ethnic rivals.  The rival ethnic 
group might, for example, offer rewards or reduce penalties for collaborators.  During an ethnic 
conflict, the prison system offers an excellent opportunity to gather information and recruit new 
collaborators.   
    As the level of ethnic violence increases, ethnic violence pushes the group toward violent 
infighting because increased ethnic violence also increases the threat collaboration poses to the 
leadership.  Since the leadership cannot know the identity of collaborators, they instead respond 
to the increased threat by using demonstrative violence against suspected collaborators in order 
to generate fear in all group members, deter further collaboration, and ensure group cohesion. 
The end result of these rational micro-level decisions is an irrational macro-level outcome: 
infighting during an ethnic conflict.  
 
6.4  Empirical Findings 
    The theory was used to generate five hypotheses, which were tested using a wide variety of 
quantitative and qualitative methods.  In Chapter 4, the hypotheses were tested using panel data 
on 274 ethnic groups in 115 countries over the time period 1990-2006.  First, an Ordinary Least 
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Squares regression of the data found a positive correlation between ethnic violence and 
infighting, and also found that this relationship only holds when an ethnic group is 
geographically concentrated.  Among ethnic groups that are geographically dispersed, on the 
other hand, there is no relationship between ethnic violence and infighting.   
    Second, a Markov probit regression found that the effect of ethnic violence on infighting 
depended on the level of infighting in the previous year.  Ethnic violence actually had a different 
impact on infighting when the ethnic group was not engaged in infighting in the prior year, when 
the ethnic group was engaged in moderate infighting, and when infighting in the group had been 
high.     
    While Chapter 4 provided evidence that ethnic violence and infighting were positively related, 
the mechanism through which ethnic violence led to infighting still needed to be tested.  In 
Chapter 5, the dissertation tested the claim that ethnic violence leads to infighting by creating 
incentives and opportunities for factional violence and collaboration.  The test was conducted 
using a case study of Palestinian infighting.  Using data from the human rights group B‘Tselem, 
the chapter conducted both a negative binomial regression and a natural experiment comparing 
Gaza with the West Bank.  Both tests provided evidence that ethnic violence and infighting were 
related.  The chapter then used process tracing on two periods of high and low infighting, and 
found evidence that ethnic violence did indeed lead to infighting by increasing the incentive and 
opportunity for factional violence and collaboration. 
 
6.5   Discussion and Further Research 
    This dissertation began by asking why an ethnic group would engage in infighting during an 
ethnic conflict.  To answer this question, the dissertation offered a theory that explored the ways 
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a context of ethnic violence shaped and changed the behavior of factions.  A wide range of 
quantitative and qualitative empirical tests then provided evidence to support the theory. 
    There are, however, still several questions which have yet to be answered.  In the Palestinian 
case study, factional violence was the primary cause of infighting in the first case study, while 
collaboration was the primary cause of infighting in the second case study.  What caused this 
difference?  Under what conditions will ethnic violence increase factionalism, and under what 
conditions will it increase the threat of collaboration?  Future research might test the two 
mechanisms against each other in order to determine the conditions that favor one mechanism 
over the other. 
    Second, are there conditions under which ethnic violence will increase group cohesion?  While 
the dissertation found that ethnic violence tends to increase infighting, there are exceptions in 
which ethnic violence was not accompanied by infighting.  In Iran, for example, Christians and 
Aziris have engaged in low levels of violence, but both groups have managed to remain cohesive 
and have not engaged in any intra-communal conflict.  In Bangladesh, there has been sporadic 
violence between Hindus and Bengali Muslims, but neither group has engaged in any intra-
communal fighting.  What makes these groups different, and why have they not engaged in 
infighting?  Are there conditions in which we might have expected to see Palestinians united 
under a cohesive social movement without any internal conflict?   
    Finally, the theory outlined in this dissertation might be tested on a larger range of cases.  
First, the dissertation tested the theory using a series of cases from the 20
th
 century, but the 
theory could also be tested using case studies of ethnic conflicts in different eras, for example on 
wars of colonization such as the American-Indian wars.  Second, the case study looked at 
Palestinian infighting, but a natural extension would be to test the theory in Israeli society, which 
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would be particularly interesting because a case study of Israel would allow us to examine how 
the impact of ethnic violence is mediated by democratic institutions.  Berrebi and Klor (2008), 
for example, examine the effect of Palestinian terrorist attacks on the percentage of votes 
received by Left/Right parties in Israeli parliamentary elections.  They find that Palestinian 
violence contributes to the ideological polarization of the electorate because in Right leaning 
localities terrorism leads to more support for Right parties.  In Left leaning localities, though, 
terrorism only increases support for the Right if the attack occurred in that specific locality.  If 
not, the attack increases support for the Left.  We might then link electoral polarization to 
infighting because as Berrebi and Klorb (2008:292) write:  
 
…polarization causes centrifugal pressure that shifts away the support for centrist parties 
and inhibits the formation of stable parliamentary majorities. This directly leads to 
fragmentation and destabilization of democratic regimes. In addition, the polarization of 
the population is likely to cause both social conflict and marked fluctuations of public 
policies, thus undermining the country‘s political and economic performance. 
 
6.6   Policy Recommendations  
    The findings presented in this dissertation have several important policy implications, both 
specifically for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and for conflict resolution more broadly. 
6.6.1     Israel and Palestine: The Problem of Factionalism 
 
    The U.S. and Israel have repeatedly stated that their goal in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
the creation of a democratic Palestine alongside a democratic Israel.  However this goal is 
undermined when the U.S. attempts to overthrow freely elected governments.  The attempted 
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coup in Gaza resulted in two months of bloody infighting, devastated the economy, and 
undermined democracy in Palestine.
34
   
    The attempted coup may also have been unnecessary.  Although Hamas officially supports the 
right of armed resistance and the establishment of greater Palestine, the group has also shown 
evidence of pragmatism in its willingness to adopt unilateral ceasefires and negotiate a ‗long-
term truce‘ with Israel based on the 1967 borders (Baumgarten 2005; Norton and Roy 2007).  
Even the decision by Hamas to participate in the 2006 elections, after boycotting the 1996 
elections, is evidence of a more pragmatic shift (Lovlie Forthcoming).  According to the former 
head of Mossad, Ephraim Halevy, there is a strong moderate wing within Hamas that could be 
strengthened if Hamas were to be included in the peace process (Rose 2008).   
    Indeed, the inclusion of Hamas in negotiations might even be a necessary prerequisite for 
peace.   According to Israeli negotiator Shlomo Ben-Ami, one important reason Arafat was 
limited in his ability to compromise at Camp David was because he feared compromise would 
lead to a civil war against Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Ben-Ami 2005).  As one scholar writes, ―a 
lasting agreement is impossible unless it actively involves those with the power to bring it down 
by violence‖ (Darby 2001:118-119).  A more pragmatic Hamas, moderated by the practice of 
governance, may be the only group that has the legitimacy to make the hard compromises that 
Arafat could not.   
    However we cannot completely discount the possibility that Hamas would have refused to 
negotiate with Israel.  If they had, it would have been up to the Palestinian electorate to decide 
whether they supported the new policy.  By refusing to negotiate with Hamas, U.S. policy 
                                                 
34
 In the democratic peace literature, the claim that democracies do not fight one another is seen as one of the few 
law-like propositions in International Relations (Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller 1996).  However the mechanism 
that underlies this empirical finding is only imperfectly known (Rosato 2003).  Perhaps one way to shed light on the 
causes of the democratic peace would be to examine cases such as these, where democracies do not overtly attack 
each other but rather covertly attempt to undermine and overthrow each other‘s regimes.        
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displayed the same ideological rigidity of which it accused Hamas.  The more pragmatic 
approach would have been to wait and see how Hamas chose to govern.      
 
6.6.2    Israel and Palestine: The Problem of Collaboration 
 
    In their recruitment and treatment of collaborators, both Israelis and Palestinians are in 
violation of international law.  Israel is in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which 
prohibits an occupying state from recruiting informants from the local population through the use 
of threats, coercion, or force (International Committee of the Red Cross 1949).  The Palestinian 
Authority is in violation of the Geneva Convention, which prohibits the torture and the 
extrajudicial killing of civilians (International Committee of the Red Cross 1949). 
    One of the many problems faced by the Palestinians on the issue of collaboration is the lack of 
a coherent policy for dealing with collaborators.  Under the Cairo Agreement (1994) and the 
Taba Agreement (1995), the PA has agreed not to kill, attack, or otherwise harass collaborators.  
However popular sentiment, which sees collaboration as treason, usually demands some form of 
retribution or justice when someone is accused of collaboration.  The absence of a coherent 
policy toward collaborators has led to either vigilante groups taking the matter into their own 
hands, or to judicial procedures which lack sufficient protection for the accused (Rigby 2001).  
Feuding families and political parties have also taken advantage of this gap in justice and used 
accusations of collaboration to further their own, personal political struggles.  The lack of a 
coherent policy toward collaborators is therefore a continued source of unrest and internal 
conflict in Palestinian society, and is therefore a problem which must be addressed.  
    As Palestinians move toward statehood there is a desperate need in Palestinian society for 
good political leadership.  Many Palestinians are disillusioned by the obvious corruption of Fatah 
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and the PA (McGreal 2006).  In a recent Doha Debate over the future of Palestine, for example, 
one audience member criticized PA officials for building luxury villas in Gaza while the people 
struggled to find food (Qatar Foundation 2008).  The viability of a future Palestinian state 
depends in large part on the ability of Palestinian leaders to place the good of the people above 
narrow self-interest.  International actors can help in this process by encouraging democratic 
institutions in Palestine, rather than undermining them.   
 
6.6.3    Conflict Resolution more Broadly 
 
    The findings in this dissertation also have important policy implications for conflict resolution 
more broadly.  First the study challenges the common wisdom that violence hardens ethnic 
boundaries.  This is important because the belief that violence hardens ethnic boundaries 
underlies controversial policy recommendations, such as partition as a solution to ethnic conflict 
(Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998; Muller 2008).  Partition theory is based on belief that 
differences between people are a source of conflict, and that by sorting people into groups based 
on ethnicity we can eliminate differences and therefore eliminate conflict.   
    However such arguments are flawed because as this dissertation has shown, people have 
multiple identities and so sorting people into groups based on one identity will not eliminate 
differences due to other identities.  For example, even if groups are sorted based on ethnicity, 
religious or social differences can still be a source of conflict.  By examining infighting within an 
ethnically homogenous group, this dissertation shows that partition by itself is not a solution to 
the problem of organized violence.   
    Second, one might be tempted to conclude from this dissertation that the way to win an ethnic 
conflict is to forcefully attack the ethnic opponent.  The increase in ethnic violence will then lead 
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to infighting within the opposing ethnic group, and once the opposing group is fragmented, 
faction leaders can be co-opted and offered incentives to end the war (Driscoll 2012).  Even if 
faction leaders initially refuse to be co-opted, as fratricide increases, faction leaders may become 
more likely to turn to the ethnic opponent or to outside groups for support (Staniland 2012).   
    That conclusion, though, is imprudent.  Although ethnic violence increases group 
fragmentation, multiple studies have examined the consequences of group fragmentation and 
have concluded that fragmentation can create incentives for outbidding and militancy among 
competing factions.  To attract support from the populace, factions will try to outdo each other in 
their violence against the ethnic opponent (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012).  
Additionally, spoilers are an important problem in peace negotiations.  Fragmentation, then, can 
lead to an increase in ethnic violence.   
    Instead, a more plausible policy conclusion is that when ethnic violence occurs, the resolution 
of the ethnic conflict may not be possible until both sides are able to achieve some degree of 
intra-ethnic cohesion.  As long as once side is fragmented under multiple leaders who have the 
ability and the incentive to spoil the peace, a long-term resolution to the ethnic conflict will be 
extremely unlikely.    
    Finally, when faced with wide-spread violence which cannot be explained using readily 
available theories, there is a tendency to simply dismiss those involved in the violence as 
‗irrational‘, or to attribute their behavior to a ‗culture of violence‘.  Under such circumstances, 
external intervention becomes futile.  This study seeks to counter this tendency by trying to make 
sense of what seems, on the surface, as senseless behavior.  Why would a group attack itself 
during an ethnic conflict?  This dissertation has argued that ultimately, infighting during ethnic 
conflict is the irrational macro-level outcome produced by rational micro-level choices.   
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Appendix 
 
 
    This section briefly describes the results of some robustness tests conducted on the multilevel 
model.  First, table A.1 presents the results of models run without the interaction terms.  In each 
model, ethnic violence is significant and its substantive impact on infighting remains roughly the 
same. 
Table A.1:  Multilevel Model 
Dependent Variable: Level of Infighting 
 
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept .214*** 
(.039) 
.071 
(.075) 
-.191 
(.108) 
-.651*** 
(.222) 
Ethnic violence .098*** 
(.014) 
.100*** 
(.014) 
.095*** 
(.016) 
.094*** 
(.017) 
Geographic 
concentration 
 .071** 
(.075) 
.054 
(.034) 
.050 
(.035) 
Kin across borders   .104*** 
(.040) 
.117*** 
(.041) 
Polity score   .002 
(.006) 
.004 
(.006) 
Discrimination 
Level 
  .035*** 
(.012) 
.039*** 
(.013) 
Log 
Population 
   .059** 
(.025) 
Different 
Race 
   -.017 
(.041) 
Different 
Belief 
   -.001 
(.042) 
Different 
Language 
   .011 
(.056) 
N 1816 1816 1547 1458 
***p<0.01,   **p<0.05,   *p<0.10 
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    Table A.2 then tests the robustness of the regression results by running the same four models 
using an ordered logit regression.  If the results of the analysis are robust, they should not change 
too dramatically in response to a different model specification.   
 
Table A.2:  Ordered Logit Regression 
Dependent Variable: Level of Infighting 
 
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ethnic violence .248*** 
(.031) 
.203*** 
(.077) 
.128 
(.087) 
.034 
(.092) 
Geographic 
concentration 
 .261*** 
(.087) 
.128 
(.100) 
.142 
(.104) 
Ethnic violence * 
group concentration 
 .028 
(.031) 
.064* 
(.035) 
.084** 
(.036) 
Kin across borders   .383*** 
(.076) 
.387*** 
(.080) 
Polity score   .021* 
(.012) 
.034*** 
(.013) 
Discrimination 
Level 
  .087*** 
(.027) 
.123*** 
(.030) 
Log Population    .212*** 
(.050) 
Different Race    -.160* 
(.082) 
Different Belief    .050 
(.078) 
Different Language    -.076 
(.110) 
N 1816 1816 1547 1458 
***p<0.01,   **p<0.05,   *p<0.10 
 
 
    The results suggest that the effect of ethnic violence on infighting is influenced by geographic 
concentration.  To further explore that relationship, I sort the data by level of geographic 
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concentration and run an ordered logit regression on each subset of data.  Table A.3 presents the 
results of that analysis. 
 
Table A.3:  Effect of Ethnic Violence at Different 
Levels of Geographic Concentration 
Dependent Variable: Level of Infighting 
 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Widely Dispersed) 
0 
 
.177 .162 .174 
1 .346*** .185 .160 
2 .251*** .317*** .362*** 
3 
(Highly Concentrated) 
.275*** .331*** .264*** 
***p<0.01,   **p<0.05,   *p<0.10 
 
 
 
    The results of the ordered logit regression are actually quite similar to the results from the 
multilevel linear model, which suggests that the results of the analysis are not overly dependent 
on model specification.  The table tells us that ethnic violence does not lead to infighting among 
widely dispersed ethnic groups.  However as group concentration increases, ethnic violence is 
associated with infighting.  One difference between the two models is that in the Multilevel 
linear model, the effect of ethnic violence was greatest when geographic concentration was at 
level 2.  In the ordered logit model, though, there is no analogous pattern. 
    Next, the robustness of the regression is again tested by dichotomizing the dependent variable 
in the Multilevel model into infighting/ no infighting.  If the results of the regression are robust, 
they should not change dramatically when the dependent variable is dichotomized.  The result of 
the robustness check is presented in table A.4, and then in table A.5, the data is sorted by level of 
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geographic concentration.  The results of these analyses are similar to those presented in Chapter 
4, suggesting that the findings in this chapter are fairly robust and not overly dependent on model 
specification.  
 
Table A.4:  Multilevel Regression with 
Binary Dependent Variable 
 
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept .106*** 
(.014) 
.045 
(.030) 
-.002 
(.042) 
-.195** 
(.082) 
Ethnic violence .030*** 
(.005) 
.026** 
(.011) 
.016 
(.013) 
.015 
(.013) 
Geographic 
concentration 
 .029** 
(.012) 
.013 
(.014) 
.011 
(.014) 
Ethnic violence * 
group concentration 
 .003* 
(.005) 
.008 
(.005) 
.008 
(.006) 
Kin across borders   .036** 
(.015) 
.042*** 
(.015) 
Polity score   .004 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
Discrimination 
Level 
  .003 
(.004) 
.004 
(.005) 
Log Population    .023** 
(.009) 
Different Race    -.007 
(.015) 
Different Belief    .012 
(.016) 
Different Language    .014 
(.020) 
N 1816 1816 1547 1458 
***p<0.01,   **p<0.05,   *p<0.10 
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Table A.5:  Effect of Ethnic Violence at Different 
Levels of Geographic Concentration 
Binary Dependent Variable 
 
Geographic 
Concentration 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Widely Dispersed) 
0 
 
.010 .014 .016 
1 .039*** .011 .006 
2 .058*** .059*** .057*** 
3 
(Highly Concentrated) 
.027*** .035*** .032*** 
***p<0.01,   **p<0.05,   *p<0.10 
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